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ABSTRACT 
 
SECURITY WITH SOLVENCY:  RETRENCHMENT AND STRATEGIC 
REORIENTATION 
Travis E. Robison 
Alex Weisiger 
 What explains the variation in retrenchment outcomes when great power leaders 
attempt this course of action in response to relative decline? I argue that retrenchment 
fails when a great power is unable to extricate itself from existing commitments and, 
therefore, is unable to free resources to address more critical security challenges. In broad 
terms, a great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off 
responsibility to a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by 
abandoning a commitment regardless of the consequences. I use primary and secondary 
sources to conduct in-depth historical analysis and structured, focused comparison of two 
cases of United States retrenchment – from Southeast Asia between 1969 and 1975, and 
the Middle East from 2009 to 2015. My findings illuminate that ally availability, the 
outcome of rapprochement with rivals, and the ability of leaders to abandon a foreign 
interest provide a coherent explanation for observed outcomes. Moreover, I find that 
retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. These findings contribute to the 
literature by situating retrenchment within a larger foreign policy process and identifying 
the necessary conditions for retrenchment to succeed. More importantly, my findings 
deliver policy-relevant knowledge to decisionmakers by providing an analytic framework 
for assessing the utility of retrenchment. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
“A political equilibrium is neither a gift of the gods nor an inherently stable condition. It 
results from the active intervention of man, from the operation of political forces.”1 
 
The Puzzle 
 Sustainable foreign policies balance a state’s international security commitments with 
its available domestic resources.2 At times, however, rising foreign competition, costly 
overcommitment abroad, and declining domestic resources unbalance a state’s foreign 
policy or constrain its ability to project power abroad.3 Given these circumstances, how 
does a great power realign its strategic priorities? In other words, how can leaders 
effectively respond to international relative decline? History shows that leaders must 
respond to these conditions or risk strategic insolvency that jeopardizes national security. 
 For example, the Roman’s failure to mitigate the effects of trade disruption, political 
discord, and multiplying security threats during the late third century ultimately led to 
imperial collapse. The seventeenth century Ottoman and Safavid empires experienced 
numerous security crises that exacerbated the effects of faltering domestic economies and 
the rising costs of warfare. Ottoman leaders implemented policy reforms that extended 
their rule, while their Safavid counterparts failed to realign their priorities and were 
subsequently defeated. Britain’s relative economic decline at the turn of the twentieth 
century constrained its military spending just as several competitors emerged; however, 
                                                 
1 Nicholas J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power 
(New York: Routledge), 25. 
2 International commitments are obligations outside of a state’s borders that may have to be defended, and 
“foreign policy consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the 
nation’s commitments and…power.” See Walter Lippmann, US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950), 9. 
3 This is the often referred to as the “Lippmann Gap.” See Samuel Huntington, “Coping with the Lippmann 
Gap,” Foreign Affairs 66, no. 3 (1987), 453-477. 
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British leaders realigned their priorities and continued their global hegemony for several 
more decades. These examples oversimplify complex histories, yet they highlight the 
importance of remedying the security dilemma of relative decline caused by increasing 
foreign policy challenges and declining domestic resources. 
 Conventional academic wisdom holds that relative decline generates serious security 
concerns for great powers. Hegemonic stability theorists contend that relative decline 
undermines the ability of systemic leaders to uphold a preferred international order.4 
Power transition theorists argue that relative decline creates opportunities for revisionist 
powers to challenge the status quo.5 Balance of Power theorists note that sudden power 
shifts can upset the equilibrium necessary for preserving peace.6 Rationalist theories 
argue that differential growth can lead to commitment problems, one of the leading 
causes of war.7 Each of these theories cites the influence of relative decline on the 
devolution from peaceful stability to conflictual instability. These theories suggest that 
leaders must act, yet each is unclear about whether the best course of action is to delay, 
fight, or cut costs to improve a state’s capacity for providing security. 
 Leaders generally have three options for responding to relative decline.8 One 
possibility is to muddle along and hope for the best. Another option is to fight to restore 
                                                 
4 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 10-11; 
and Robert Gilpin, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 
(1988), 591-613. 
5 A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 19-22; 
and Douglas Lemke and Jacek Kugler, eds., Parity and War: Evaluations and Extension of the War 
Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 7-12. 
6 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1962), 118; and Inis Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random 
House, 1962), 42. 
7 James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995), 379-414; 
and Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” International Organization 60, no. 1 (2006), 169-
203. 
8 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 191-194; Jack Levy, “Declining Power and the Preventive 
Motivation for War,” World Politics 40, no. 1 (1987), 82-107; Stephen Rock, Appeasement in 
3 
 
an equilibrium. In fact, policymakers often increase military spending and replace bluff 
and bluster for diplomacy, provocation for deterrence, and preventive war for inexorable 
decline.9 These options, however, ignore a new strategic reality marked by international 
disruptions to the status quo and domestic resource constraints. Simply stated, the rising 
costs of security exceed a state’s available resources.10 In these circumstances, 
reorienting a state’s foreign policy and realigning its security resources are necessary 
despite the inherent risks of this course of action. Reducing the near-term cost of 
overcommitment and marshalling resources (i.e. retrenchment) may provide the best 
opportunity for realigning a state’s strategic ends and available means even though it can 
be politically disruptive and strategically risky.11 
 Retrenchment is the intentional reduction of costs associated with a state’s foreign 
policy, where costs are the product of security expenses, risks, and burdens.12 It alleviates 
the “dilemma of rising demands and insufficient resources.” Retrenchment reduces risks, 
                                                 
International Politics (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000); Harold Sprout and Margaret 
Sprout, “Retreat from World Power: Processes and Consequences of Readjustment,” World Politics 15, 
no. 4 (1963), 659-660; and Daniel Treisman, “Rational Appeasement,” International Organization 58, 
no. 2 (2004), 345-373. 
9 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 
1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), xxii; and Paul Kennedy, “Conclusions,” in The Fall of 
Great Powers: Peace, Stability, and Legitimacy, ed. Gier Lundestad (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 374. 
10 For example, see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and Mancur Olson, The Rise and 
Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1982). 
11 Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and 
Retrenchment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018), 5; Alex Weisiger, Logics of War (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2013), chapter 2; Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2000), 41; and Aaron Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 
1895-1905 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 17. 
12 For similar definitions see Barry Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany 
Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 13; Richard Rosecrance and Arthur 
Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 4; 
Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2006), 13; and Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose 
in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2014), 2-6. 
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shifts burdens, or economizes expenses to improve a state’s political and strategic 
solvency.13 Retrenching states can economize expenses by reducing military spending or 
force structures. They can reduce international risks by eliminating foreign policy 
liabilities, restraining foreign policy goals in certain geographic areas, or demoting the 
importance of some foreign interests. Regardless of a retrenchment’s form, it allows a 
state to redistribute resources from peripheral to core security interests. 
 Ultimately, states implementing retrenchment have more sustainable foreign policies 
that are less active, ambitious, and burdensome relative to the status quo.14 This 
sustainability is important to the long-term strategic solvency of a great power, without 
which relative decline may become absolute. States that successfully retrench end up 
with more sustainable foreign policies and perform comparatively well in subsequent 
military disputes.15 However, not all retrenchment attempts succeed. Therefore, what 
explains the variation in retrenchment outcomes? 
Core Argument 
 In what follows, I argue that retrenchment fails when a great power is unable to 
extricate itself from existing commitments and, therefore, is unable to free resources to 
address more critical security challenges. In broad terms, a great power might extricate 
itself in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through 
rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment regardless of the 
consequences. Retrenchment fails when none of these three options are a possibility. 
                                                 
13 Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, “The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources,” 
World Politics 20, no. 4 (1968), 660-661. 
14 MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans, 8. 
15 Ibid., 3 and 8. 
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Contrary to prevailing wisdom, retrenchment will generally succeed unless 1) there is no 
ally willing and able to accept responsibility, and 2) a great power fails at rapprochement, 
and 3) the great power is politically unable to abandon an interest. Retrenchment 
arguably has the best potential for improving a great power’s strategic solvency relative 
to the uncertain options of muddling along or launching costly preventative wars, but the 
merits of the policy are mired in debate. 
The Retrenchment Debate 
 Studies of retrenchment remain divided between critics and advocates – pessimists 
and optimists.16 According to critics, retrenchment is a rare, high-risk endeavor that 
signals waning power and damages a state’s reputation among allies and adversaries.17 
They assert that retrenchment from even peripheral commitments signals weakness and 
demonstrates a lack of resolve,18 both of which diminish the benefits derived from 
leading an existing security order.19 Since retrenchment sacrifices relative power, critics 
contend that it lowers a state’s likelihood of winning if war occurs. Therefore, critics 
                                                 
16 For an overview of the debate, see Stephen Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, 
“Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security 37, no. 3 (2012), 
7-51. 
17 For theoretical and historical arguments against retrenchment see, Stephen Brooks and William C. 
Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 40-41; Gilpin, War 
and Change in World Politics, 192-197; G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and 
Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Nuno P. 
Monteiro, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful,” International Security 36, no. 3 (2011), 9-
40; and William R. Thompson, “Correspondence: Decline and Retrenchment – Peril or Promise?” 
International Security 36, no. 4 (2012), 193-197. 
18 For instance, Thomas Donnelly, “We Can Afford to Spend More, and We Need To,” New York Times, 9 
September 2012, at https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/09/09/how-big-should-the-defense-
budget-be/we-can-afford-to-spend-more-and-we-need-to. 
19 Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home, America.” According to critics, retrenchment 
may convince followers to seek another partner. This is the first part of the “hegemon’s dilemma,” in 
which a hegemon may lead an order, but it needs followers. See Arthur Stein, “The Hegemon’s Dilemma: 
Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order,” International Organization 38, 
no. 2 (1984), 358. 
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believe that leaders adopting this policy hasten their state’s decline, and retrenchment is 
rational only when using force is not a viable option.20 From this perspective, the 
outcomes of retrenchment are all negative – diminished power, influence, and security – 
so it should only be a policy of last resort. 
 In contrast, retrenchment advocates argue that the policy can have positive outcomes. 
They contend that critics overstate the costs of retrenchment while minimizing those of 
prolonged overcommitment.21 Great powers often accrue peripheral commitments with 
little inherent value, so advocates note that retrenchment can be a beneficial policy that 
facilitates reallocating resources to core interests.22 Moreover, advocates find that 
retrenchment is less costly and is often an effective policy adopted by great powers 
during periods of relative decline.23 Advocates also downplay reputational concerns, 
noting that a state’s reputation is often context-dependent, so reducing peripheral 
                                                 
20 Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 40. This is the “turbulent frontier” theory: although leaders prefer 
non-expansionist policies, they pursue expansionist strategies in pursuit of security. See John S. 
Galbraith, “The ‘Turbulent Frontier’ as a Factor in British Expansion,” Comparative Studies in Society 
and History 2, no. 2 (1960), 150-68. 
21 For theoretical and historical arguments in favor of retrenchment see, Daniel W. Drezner, “Military 
Primacy Doesn’t Pay (Nearly as Much as You Think),” International Security 38, no. 1 (2013), 52-79; 
Kyle Haynes, “Decline and Devolution: The Sources of Strategic Military Retrenchment,” International 
Studies Quarterly 59, no. 1 (2015), 490-502; Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers; John 
Mueller, The Remnants of War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); MacDonald and Parent, Twilight 
of the Titans; Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of 
Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security 35, no. 4 (2011), 7-44; Joseph M. Parent and Paul K. 
MacDonald, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. (2011), 34; and Daniel Treisman, 
“Rational Appeasement,” International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004), 345-373. 
22 MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans; MacDonald and Parent, “Graceful Decline?”; and Barry 
Posen, “Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 1 (2013): 116-
130. 
23 Douglas B. Atkinson and George W. Williford, “Should We Stay or Should We Go? Exploring the 
Outcomes of Great Power Retrenchment,” Research and Politics 3, no. 4 (2016), 1-6; MacDonald and 
Parent, Twilight of the Titans;  MacDonald and Parent, “Graceful Decline?” 9-10; Parent and MacDonald, 
“The Wisdom of Retrenchment.” Since 1870, great powers in relative decline opted to retrench in 15 of 
18 cases. Of those powers that did retrench, six regained their previous standing and states that retrenched 
were less likely to experience interstate conflicts. 
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commitments may signal resolve in more vital regions.24 States may even be able to 
identify a successor to uphold a preferred security order,25 or use retrenchment as a 
screening mechanism to assess a rising rival’s intentions.26 Finally, advocates suggest 
that when a state refuses to retrench it may undermine its legitimacy and increase the 
likelihood of conflict or the formation of counterbalancing coalitions.27 
 Both sides of the retrenchment debate generally agree on the conditions under which 
retrenchment will likely occur, and about retrenchment’s potential costs. Internationally, 
retrenchment may signal weakness which alarms allies and encourages adversaries. 
Disengagement may also destabilize regions and undermine the international order. 
Domestically, special interests might mobilize to defend their parochial interests, and 
elite consensus could fracture as hardliners conflate retrenchment with defeat and accuse 
advocates of appeasement. Critics view retrenchment as a reactive and unfavorable 
strategy that is rare and only viable when vital interests are at stake or when the costs of 
preventive war are likely to be prohibitive.28 Advocates consider retrenchment a viable 
option, but “only after decline has generated overwhelming incentives [to retrench].”29 
                                                 
24 See Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in 
International Politics,” International Organization 69, no. 2 (2015), 473-495; Joe Clare and Vesna 
Danilovic, “Reputation for Resolve, Interests, and Conflict,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 29, 
no. 1 (2012), 3-27; and Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
25 Haynes, “Decline and Devolution.” 
26 Brandon K. Yoder, “Retrenchment as a Screening Mechanism: Power Shifts, Strategic Withdrawal, and 
Credible Signals,” American Journal of Political Science 63, no. 1 (2019), 130-145. 
27 This is the second half of the “hegemon’s dilemma,” in which a dominant state may have to make 
concessions to retain the support of followers. See Stein, “The Hegemon’s Dilemma,” 358. For similar 
arguments see Christopher A. Preble, The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us 
Less Safe, Less Prosperous, and Less Free (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); and Harvey M. 
Sapolsky, Benjamin H. Friedman, Eugene Gholz, and Daryl G. Press, “Restraining Order: For Strategic 
Modesty,” World Affairs 172, no. 2 (2009), 84-89. 
28 Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 40-41; and Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 192-194, 
197, 232. 
29 Kyle Haynes, “Correspondence: Decline and Retrenchment: Peril or Promise?” International Security 36, 
no. 4 (2012), 192. 
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Critics and advocates view retrenchment as a costly policy that a declining state will only 
reluctantly adopt.30 This ignores the positive outcomes that may occur if leaders conduct 
retrenchment well, and misses the potential that retrenchment may be more likely to 
succeed if leaders meet certain conditions. 
 The literature recognizes that leaders may opt for various retrenchment policies, but it 
fails to examine the effects of these choices on retrenchment outcomes. Critics accept that 
retrenchment may be a viable option under some conditions and note that the way a state 
retrenches may avoiding some negative consequences.31 Advocates show that 
retrenchment occurs more frequently than critics predict, but they do not explain the 
conditions necessary for it to succeed. By focusing debate on retrenchment’s merits 
instead of its outcomes, the literature ignores the purpose of the policy and fails to 
provide criteria for evaluating the utility of retrenchment against alternatives.32 
 Under certain conditions it may be wise to retrench to facilitate prolonging the 
duration of a state’s power and influence. For example, between 1889 and 1914, Britain’s 
leaders debated how to realign the costs and distribution of its naval assets during a 
period of rising regional competition and relative economic decline. Some realignment 
decisions were relatively easy, such as removing naval assets from the Pacific coast of 
North America, but others entailed more risk. During this period, British leaders 
abandoned interests to the United States, allied with Japan to facilitate naval 
redeployment, and sought rapprochement with France and Russia to lower regional 
                                                 
30 Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 194; Haynes, “Decline and Devolution,” 192; and 
MacDonald and Parent, “Graceful Decline?” 21. 
31 Gilpin, chapter 5; and Haynes, “Correspondence,” 192. 
32 David A. Baldwin, “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy,” Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000), 
167-182. 
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security costs. These efforts, along with domestic reforms, alleviated Britain’s resource 
constraints. After Germany enacted a policy of naval expansion in 1904, Britain’s 
improved resource base provided its leaders with options for countering the rising 
German threat. Although retrenchment risked strengthening potential regional 
competitors, it enabled British leaders to confront a higher priority threat without 
jeopardizing Britain’s strategic solvency.33 This example demonstrates that retrenchment 
can succeed, so the ongoing debate about its merits likely stems from a fundamental 
misunderstanding about what retrenchment is and what is its purpose. 
Retrenchment and its Purpose 
 Leaders compete internationally to improve their state’s security.34 The intensity of 
this competition varies, which causes the pattern of a great power’s foreign policy to 
resemble a punctuated equilibrium model of organizational evolution.35 During stable 
periods with few threats and more abundant resources, leaders typically make 
incremental and adaptive security commitments that align with their state’s primary 
geostrategic orientation.36 Periodically, however, new threats may lead to increasingly 
maladapted or inflexible foreign policies that contribute to crises, raise the chances for 
war, or exacerbate the effects of relative decline.37 These episodes often reveal that a state 
                                                 
33 See Nicholas Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1999) and Jon Sumida, In Defense of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval 
Policy, 1889-1914 (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 
34 Leaders reside in a group comprised of the head of state and officials charged with deciding security 
policy. Membership in this group varies, but it remains distinct from bureaucracies charged with 
implementing decisions. See Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, 
Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 25. 
35 See Michael L. Tushman and Elaine Romanelli, “Organizational Evolution: A Metamorphosis Model of 
Convergence and Reorientation,” in Research and Organizational Behavior, eds. Larry L. Cummins and 
Barry M. Staw (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1985), 171-222. 
36 Ibid., 173. 
37 Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), 85; James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” 
10 
 
has insufficient resources or is overcommitted to a foreign policy goal. During these 
periods, a great power may face security challenges on multiple fronts; however, the lack 
of resources and overcommitment often prevents leaders from reacting effectively. In 
these circumstances, leaders may opt to attempt strategic reorientation, a process intended 
to change the direction of their state’s power projection from lesser to more important 
security interests. The challenge is how to successfully realign resources by cutting 
commitments in one region to provide additional resources for addressing more critical 
challenges. 
 Strategic reorientation occurs over time as a four-stage life-cycle that reflects the 
interrelated dynamics of international structure and domestic politics. These mutually-
reinforcing, sequentially-linked stages have an undefined duration ex ante.38 Leaders 
perceive a need for retrenchment during periods of misalignment marked by rising 
international threats, especially shifts in relative power, and declining domestic resources 
resulting from economic downturns, dysfunctional politics, or declining public support 
for existing foreign policies. These antecedent conditions eventually lead to a decision 
point regarding retrenchment where leaders consider the strategic circumstances and 
decide how to reduce security costs. Realignment begins once leaders start to implement 
and synchronize retrenchment activities. An outcome eventually emerges based on how 
the costs and benefits of retrenchment facilitate strategic reorientation. Retrenchment 
succeeds when it results in strategic reorientation and fails otherwise (figure 1). 
                                                 
International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995), 379-414; and Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War 
(London: Macmillan, 1973), 246. 
38 Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International 
Organization 41, no. 3 (1987), 335-370; and Walter Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem in 
Foreign Policy Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 3 (1992), 245-270. 
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Figure 1. Four-stage strategic reorientation model.39 
 Retrenchment is the core stage of strategic reorientation during which leaders mediate 
between existing security goals and the need to adapt to a changing security environment. 
Leaders retrench during periods of overcommitment and acute relative decline because 
the competitive and anarchic realm of great power politics incentivizes them to remain 
strategically solvent.40 Overcommitted great powers attempt to avoid insolvency by 
retrenching to regroup and slow, if not reverse, their decline. Over the long-term, the 
international system punishes states that fail to balance their foreign policy objectives 
with available resources.41 States that fail to retrench will eventually succumb to 
aggression as rivals exploit inflexible foreign policies and military overextension. 
 The goal of retrenchment is to realign resources by reducing security-related costs in 
one region to provide additional resources for addressing a neglected security challenge 
in another region. There are two types of retrenchment – strategic and operational – 
                                                 
39 Adapted from Shamsud D. Chowdhurry, “Turnarounds: A Stage Theory Perspective,” Canadian Journal 
of Administrative Sciences 19, no. 3 (2002), 253. 
40 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 88; and Robert 
Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978), 167. 
41 Lippmann, US Foreign Policy, 7-8. 
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differentiated by the types of policies implemented and whether retrenchment lowers the 
associated risk or price of security.42 Strategic retrenchment entails a variety of external 
policies such as redeploying military forces, removing or mitigating flashpoints, reducing 
security burdens by redistributing them to an ally, or altogether abandoning an interest.43 
This type of retrenchment reduces the risks associated with a state’s foreign policy by 
minimizing extraneous or overly costly commitments, and makes resources available for 
improving deterrence and defenses in more important areas. Operational retrenchment 
involves internal policies aimed at lowering the price of security. States free resources for 
investment elsewhere by slowing or reducing military expenditures and cutting foreign 
aid. Options include reducing military spending, revising military force structures, and 
reforming underperforming or outmoded security institutions.44 
Why This Matters 
 Academic claims about retrenchment’s dangers shape our theoretical understanding 
of the causes of war and influence policymakers’ assessments of the risks of reducing 
American engagement abroad. These claims also fuel concerns over how the rise of new 
powers will undermine the existing international order. Graham Allison reflects the 
widespread view that “based on the current trajectory, war between the United States and 
China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely…When a rising 
power is threatening to displace a ruling power, standard crises that would otherwise be 
contained…can initiate a cascade of reactions.”45 However, in the past, declining powers 
                                                 
42 Leaders often select policy options from both types of retrenchment, but the overall type is evident in the 
predominant reductions of either price or risk. 
43 MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans, 32. 
44 Ibid., 26-29. 
45 Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China Headed for War?” Atlantic, 24 
September 2015, accessed 13 March 2019, at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/ 
13 
 
that successfully retrenched managed power shifts more peacefully and managed to limit 
their rate of decline and prolong their influence on the international order. Therefore, 
understanding the factors that influence retrenchment outcomes is deeply important for 
identifying strategies for success. 
 Most theories about retrenchment have limited empirical support to justify their bleak 
assertions about the policy and its potential outcomes. Retrenchment is the most common 
response to relative decline. States in decline are more likely to cut the costs and size of 
their military or form alliances and abandon interests. Moreover, rather than leading to 
exploitation by adversaries, declining states perform comparatively well in military 
disputes that occur following retrenchment.46 Despite these clear benefits, scholars and 
policymakers continue to believe in the importance of prestige, the need for credibility, 
and the dangers of appeasement. From this perspective, even the mere perception of 
decline or hint of retrenchment might lead to trouble.47 This flawed logic has buttressed 
policies of geopolitical overstretch and resulted in failed geostrategic adjustment.48 
Recent arguments for continued American engagement abroad rest upon this logic which 
holds that any decline in American engagement would destabilize the international 
order.49 Within the policymaking arena, the mantra about the indispensability of the 
                                                 
09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/; and Aaron Friedberg, “Hegemony with Chinese 
Characteristics,” National Interest 114 (2011), 18. 
46 MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans, 3. 
47 See Deborah Welch Larson, “Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?” in 
Dominos and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Heartland, 
eds. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 85-111; and Jennifer 
Milliken, “Metaphors of Prestige and Reputation in American Foreign Policy,” in Post-Realism: The 
Rhetorical Turn in International Relations, eds., Francis Beer and Robert Hariman (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 1996), 217-238. 
48 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1991), chapter 2; and Charles Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1996), 3-8. 
49 Robert Lieber, Power and Willpower in the American Future: Why the US is Not Destined to Decline 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3-5; Robert Lieber, Retreat and its Consequences: 
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United States’ global leadership short-circuits rational policy considerations. Rather than 
critically evaluating the wisdom of retrenchment, leaders hold that America must 
maintain all its commitments regardless of the cost.50 
 The United States now faces a dilemma as its leaders struggle to prolong the benefits 
of hegemony. Political and military developments in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East 
threaten important national interests, but the effects of military overcommitment and an 
eroding domestic resource base have resulted in America’s strategic insolvency. Despite 
having the largest economy in the world, almost two decades of sustained combat 
operations have left the United States poorly postured and struggling to outpace 
modernizing rivals like China and Russia.51 Elite polarization also diminishes the 
political capacity for purposeful action. The American public supports current defense 
spending levels and an active role in foreign affairs.52 Therefore, the crux of the current 
debate is whether and how leaders can reorient American foreign policy and realign the 
resources necessary for continuing global leadership. 
Research Design 
 In subsequent chapters, I assess the claims of retrenchment critics and advocates 
against the empirical record. Rather than examine when retrenchment is most likely to 
                                                 
American Foreign Policy and the Problem of World Order (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2016), 9-12; and Robert Kagan, The World America Made (New York: Knopf, 2012), 133-139. 
50 For instance, Hillary Clinton quoted in Scott Shane and Jo Becker, “After Revolt, a New Libya ‘With 
Very Little Time Left’,” New York Times, 29 February 2016; Leon Panetta, “Speech on Al-Qaeda,” 
Center for New American Security (November 2012); Rex Tillerson, “Statement Before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee,” (11 January 2017), at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/01/ 
267394.htm. 
51 David Ochmanek, Peter A. Wilson, Brenna Allen, John Speed Meyers, and Carter C. Price, U.S. Military 
Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the US Approach to Force Planning (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 2017), xii. 
52 Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, and Craig Kafura, Foreign Policy in the Age of Retrenchment: Results of the 
2014 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy (Chicago: Chicago 
Council on Global Affairs, 2014), 7, 9, and 34. 
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occur, I identify what explains the variation in retrenchment outcomes to determine the 
necessary conditions for it to succeed. I conceptualize retrenchment within a process of 
strategic reorientation shaped by international and domestic constraints. Towards this 
end, I used primary and secondary sources to conduct in-depth historical analysis and 
structured, focused comparison of two cases of United States retrenchment – from 
Southeast Asia between 1969 and 1975, and the Middle East from 2009 to 2015. One 
broad question motivated my effort: what explains the observed variation in the outcomes 
of attempted retrenchment? My findings illuminate that ally availability, the outcome of 
rapprochement with rivals, and the ability of leaders to abandon a foreign interest provide 
a coherent explanation for observed outcomes. Moreover, I find that retrenchment is 
more likely to succeed than fail. These findings contribute to the literature by situating 
retrenchment within a larger foreign policy process and identifying the necessary 
conditions for retrenchment to succeed. More importantly, my findings deliver policy-
relevant knowledge to decisionmakers by providing an analytic framework for assessing 
the utility of retrenchment. 
Methods 
 This study used primary and secondary sources to conduct in-depth historical analysis 
that applied structured, focused comparison of United States retrenchment from 
Southeast Asia from 1969 until 1975, and the Middle East beginning in 2009 until 
2015.53 Investigation focused on published or available public document collections that 
                                                 
53 See Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), chapter 1; David Collier and Henry E. Brady (eds.), 
Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, 2nd ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2010), part II; Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), chapters 3, 9, 10, and 11; and Gary 
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gathered the most important records pertaining to policy decision-making. It also 
included the memoirs of key actors which provided first-hand accounts of relevant 
considerations and reasoning despite their potential bias. Extensive secondary literature 
for each case rounded out considered explanations. Although secondary sources might 
lack historical consensus, the rich historiography for each case enabled assessing the 
overall weight of academic opinion regarding historical contexts and outcomes.54 
 The limited number of historical retrenchment attempts and inherent difficulty in 
quantifying key variables reduced the utility of quantitative analysis and situated the 
phenomenon within a research niche well-suited for a comparative approach. This 
method enabled developing contingent generalizations about the conditions necessary for 
retrenchment to succeed. Despite the difficulty of measuring the weight of causal effects, 
my approach facilitated considering specific contexts through in-depth exploration of the 
variables affecting retrenchment outcomes.55 It may have been possible to identify 
additional cases from the full range of history, but this would have required an unrealistic 
amount of case research given the scope of this project. These trade-offs were not 
sufficiently compelling to forego exploring an understudied phenomenon. 
Defining and Measuring the Variables 
 The proposed model of strategic reorientation posits misalignment between a great 
power’s commitments and resources due to relative decline stemming from international 
                                                 
King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Research in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 43-46. 
54 Ian S. Lustick, “History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the 
Problem of Selection Bias,” American Political Science Review 90, no. 3 (1996), 605-618. 
55 Richard Locke and Kathleen Thelen, “Problems of Equivalence in Comparative Politics: Apples and 
Oranges, Again,” American Political Science Association: Comparative Politics Newsletter 8 (1998), 11; 
and Barbara Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in 
Comparative Politics,” Political Analysis 2, no. 1 (1990), 131-150. 
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or domestic factors. This project established the strategic context for each case using 
secondary sources to identify the presence and nature of emerging threats, shifting 
locations of geopolitical competition, military overcommitment, and domestic political 
divisions. I also examined the political decisions and debates surrounding retrenchment. 
 Unit of Analysis. The unit of analysis is a retrenchment attempt where indicators 
show leaders sought to reduce the near-term costs of providing a state’s security. 
Indicators included a speech by a leader directly expressing plans to retrench, a post-
conflict reduction of military forces to below pre-conflict levels, substituting economic or 
diplomatic engagement for military involvement, diplomatic efforts to form alliances or 
enhance ally capacity, rapprochement with rivals, or abandoning goals that might 
undermine a regional security order. 
 Independent Variables. The independent variables are ally availability, 
rapprochement outcome, and interest abandonment. Ally availability is the presence of a 
potential successor state with compatible strategic preferences and the military capacity – 
or potential capacity – to maintain a regional security order. Whether an ally is available 
was coded as either yes or no. Rapprochement outcome is the result of a determined and 
sustained attempt by the retrenching power to negotiate with its primary regional rival to 
reduce potential flashpoints and limit the risk for predatory behavior. The outcome of 
these negotiations was either success or failure, where a rival in the former circumstance 
agrees to limit aggression and does not consent in the latter case. Finally, interest 
abandonment is whether a great power’s leaders abandoned their security interest in an 
area after retrenchment occurred. Interest abandonment was coded as either yes or no 
depending on whether the great power re-intervened or not following withdrawal. 
18 
 
 Dependent Variable. The dependent variable is a retrenchment outcome. The intent 
of retrenchment is to reduce near-term security costs to increase long-term strategic 
solvency. Evaluating the outcome of a retrenchment attempt required multi-dimensional 
criterion for success. Determining the degree of success required qualitatively evaluating 
its effectiveness, costs, and benefits as they related to the level of reduced commitment, 
rather than other goals which might have changed over time or been prevented by 
evolving circumstances.56 
 Retrenchment is goal-oriented, so effectiveness is a necessary – but not sufficient – 
condition for success.57 Effectiveness is the degree to which retrenchment succeeds in 
realigning resources to address a more critical challenge. As a continuous variable, the 
degree of effectiveness depends on the level of reduced commitment as the result of 
burden sharing, rapprochement, or interest abandonment. Moreover, effectiveness may 
have a positive (i.e., effective) or negative (i.e., ineffective) value. Retrenchment can 
reduce the level of commitment to effectively zero, partially reduce commitments, or 
ineffectively reduce commitments in a meaningful way. 
 Determining success also requires considering incurred costs. Costs are the effort, 
loss, or sacrifice necessary to achieve a leader’s desired retrenchment goals. They may be 
material or non-material, and the most significant costs inhere directly to the retrenching 
state as the result of trade-offs among various interests or goals. Relevant costs also result 
from the effects of retrenchment on allies or regional interests. Costs may be high, 
moderate, or low based on the extent to which the net value of goals achieved exceeds 
                                                 
56 David A. Baldwin, “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy,” Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000), 
171-172. 
57 Ibid., 173. 
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related costs. States facing an existential crisis might incur high costs to retrench and still 
succeed, while a state that achieves a modest goal at high cost gains a Pyrrhic victory and 
fails. 
 Lastly, benefits that accrue to the retrenching state also influence outcome 
assessments. Benefits are the advantages or improvements gained through retrenchment. 
Relevant benefits relate to those gained by the retrenching state, because leaders opt to 
withdraw to protect their state’s national interests, not those of other states. Any benefits 
that accrue to other states as the result of retrenchment are incidental. Since retrenchment 
occurs in part because of military overcommitment, dysfunctional domestic politics, or 
economic decline, improvements to a state’s strategic solvency represent the most 
important benefits for assessing outcomes. In other words, for retrenchment to succeed it 
must close the resource gap and facilitate strategic reorientation. 
 Success occurs when leaders reduce foreign commitments in a less important region 
and realign resources to address a more critical threat. Failure results when leaders fail to 
reduce commitments and cannot reorient their state’s power projection. Threat levels do 
not need to decline in any outcome, since threats are exogenous to the retrenchment 
process; however, successful outcomes require improving a state’s capacity for 
responding to emerging threats. Similarly, the overall number of foreign commitments do 
not need to decline in any outcome, though successful outcomes should provide evidence 
that commitments declined in one region before increasing elsewhere. 
Case Selection 
 The theoretical and empirical requirements for this project entailed examining 
historical periods when great powers maintained peripheral commitments, faced rising 
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international competition, and experienced declining domestic political or economic 
capacity. Under these conditions, leaders considered retrenchment as a viable policy 
option that they subsequently decided to attempt. I examined cases of retrenchment 
during periods of both international and domestic relative decline. To maintain 
consistency and isolate relevant variables, I focused on states with similar domestic 
institutions at comparable periods of technological development. Finally, the 
retrenchment attempts considered within this study emphasized reducing costs by 
changing a state’s strategic ends and the means with which it pursued security. I excluded 
minor adjustments to military budgets, cancellation of weapons acquisition programs, 
mandated base closures, or routine treaty negotiations. With these criteria I identified 
sixteen cases of attempted retrenchment since 1870, the period in which the modern great 
power system and industrialized militaries arose: seven by Great Britain, two by France, 
one by the Soviet Union, and six by the United States. Table 1 lists the universe of cases 
and provides an initial outcome coding. 
Table 1. Considered universe of cases. 
CASE CODING CASE CODING 
1. Great Britain - 1895 Success 9. France - 1954 Success 
2. Great Britain - 1908 Success 10. Great Britain - 1956 Success 
3. United States - 1920 Failure 11. France - 1962 Success 
4. Great Britain - 1930 Failure 12. Great Britain - 1968 Success 
5. Great Britain - 1935 Failure 13. United States - 1969 Success 
6. Great Britain - 1946 Success 14. Soviet Union - 1991 Failure 
7. United States - 1946 Failure 15. United States - 1992 Failure 
8. United States - 1953 Success 16. United States - 2009 Failure 
 
 I selected for analysis two episodes of attempted retrenchment by the United States in 
the post-World War II era: Southeast Asia in 1969 and the Middle East in 2009. Selecting 
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cases from an assortment of countries would likely be illuminating; however, the United 
States is inherently interesting and important given its current standing and ongoing 
debates about the future of American hegemony. Moreover, the United States maintained 
foreign commitments in one or more peripheral regions, emerged as a global hegemon 
during a period of intense competition, and experienced intermittent periods of relative 
decline resulting from international or domestic factors. During this period, the United 
States’ Cold War with the Soviet Union and subsequent unipolar dominance placed a 
premium on signaling resolve, lest competitors assess weakness and decide to challenge 
American hegemony. These conditions suggest that retrenchment should not only have 
been rare, any attempts were risky and likely to fail because an adversary stood ready to 
take advantage of American withdrawal. Thus, the United States is a hard case for the 
arguments proposed by retrenchment critics. 
Case Summaries 
 As mentioned above, I examined two cases of United States retrenchment. The cases 
include different strategic environments as defined by ally availability, regional 
adversaries, rising competitors, and domestic circumstances influencing the ability to 
abandon an interest. These cases illustrate how my proposed variables affect 
retrenchment outcomes and validates my hypotheses regarding when retrenchment will 
succeed or fail. The first case, a success, occurred in Southeast Asia between 1969 and 
1975. The second one, a failure, occurred in the Middle East from 2009 to 2015. 
 Case 1: Retrenchment from Southeast Asia, 1969-1975. The Nixon administration 
assumed responsibility for American foreign policy during a period of international and 
domestic change that necessitated developing a new strategic approach. American 
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diplomacy and military force had become overcommitted during America’s conflict in 
Vietnam. The level of political and diplomatic effort expended in Vietnam resulted in the 
strategic neglect of other critical areas of Cold War competition. In the Middle East, the 
Soviet Union took advantage of American preoccupation with Vietnam to increase the 
Soviet’s presence and influence in the region. President Nixon believed that this, along 
with ongoing international changes, reduced the United States’ relative power and had to 
be addressed.58 
 President Nixon and his security advisor, Henry Kissinger, recognized that ongoing 
American involvement in Vietnam and the evolving international system needed to be 
addressed to alleviate their foreign policy dilemma. Changes in the international system 
included the emergence of nascent political and economic multipolarity as the strength of 
the Western European and Japanese economies increased their international clout. The 
Soviet Union’s attainment of strategic parity and emergence as a global power was 
another key change that developed while the United States was distracted in Vietnam. 
The Nixon administration had to reconcile the conflicting demands emerging from 
political and economic multipolarity and revitalized military bipolarity, though the 
administration focused more on the latter given the inherent risks involved in ongoing 
Cold War competition along the periphery. 
 President Nixon opted for a policy of retrenchment from Vietnam and Southeast Asia 
to facilitate strategically reorienting towards more important regions of geopolitical 
competition. He managed to retrench successfully by adhering to a policy of gradual and 
orderly withdrawal supported by burden sharing with an ally, South Vietnam, and 
                                                 
58 Robert S. Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Security, 
1969-1976 (New York: Cambridge University Press), 1. 
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rapprochement with rivals, China and the Soviet Union. By 1975, despite the changed 
dynamics of the executive and legislative branches that emerged after the withdrawal 
from Vietnam and Watergate scandal, Congress continued to support engagement abroad 
even if it forced President Ford to abandon any American interest in South Vietnam. 
Overall, President Nixon successfully retrenched and reoriented American foreign policy. 
Withdrawal from Southeast Asia neither discouraged key allies nor encouraged adversary 
aggression. Moreover, retrenchment facilitated reorienting towards the Middle East to 
counter increasing Soviet involvement in a region critical for the economic security of the 
United States and its allies. Figure 2 illustrates the pertinent facets of this case. 
 
Figure 2. Successful American retrenchment from Southeast Asia, 1969-1975. 
 Case 2: Retrenchment from the Middle East, 2009-2015. Forty years after President 
Nixon, President Barack Obama faced similar security challenges in the Middle East. 
President Obama rose to office on a wave of public discontent with the country’s foreign 
policy and questions about the role of American power and ideas.59 The security context 
                                                 
59 Nicholas Kitchen, “The Obama Doctrine – Détente or Decline?” European Political Science 10, no. 1 
(2011), 27. 
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he faced was arguably more complicated than that of his processors, partly because the 
consensus regarding the American-led liberal order was shaken following the 2003 
invasion of Iraq and the 2008 financial crisis.60 The Obama administration faced a tough 
reality characterized by rising regional powers, America’s relative military and economic 
decline, and power diffusion throughout a changing international order. President Obama 
believed that his foreign policy task was to redefine the United States’ role in the world. 
He sought to restore weakened relations with allies, extricate the United States from Iraq 
and Afghanistan, and to avoid further entanglements in the Middle East. In other words, 
President Obama aimed to retrench. 
 President Obama intended to improve the United States’ strategic solvency by 
eliminating peripheral commitments in the Middle East and reorienting to address more 
critical interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Before entering office, he concluded that the 
ideological struggles in the Middle East were too complex for external powers to resolve, 
particularly through either regime change or large-scale ground combat operations 
typified by those in Iraq from 2003 onward.61 However, President Obama failed to hand 
off responsibility to regional allies like Saudi Arabia and failed at rapprochement with 
Russia and Iran. Subsequent security challenges in the Middle East following American 
disengagement demonstrated that the United States could not afford to limit its role in the 
region. 
 The United States reluctantly participated in coalition efforts to depose the Libyan 
dictator Muammar Gaddafi, and its unwillingness to lead post-intervention security 
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efforts contributed to Libya becoming a failed state and host to Islamist extremist groups. 
Moreover, in the absence of American diplomacy backed by the threat of military force, 
Russian military intervention into the Syrian Civil War on behalf of the Syrian 
government resulted in a mass exodus of refugees that destabilized Syria’s neighbors and 
disrupted European politics. Retrenchment also meant that the United States was unable 
to counter Iranian influence spreading throughout the region in direct opposition to 
America’s regional security interests. Finally, American political dysfunction prevented 
abandonment of the United States’ interests in the greater Middle East. As a result, the 
attempted retrenchment failed and an American strategic reorientation to Asia was 
unsuccessful. Figure 3 illustrates the pertinent facets of this case. 
 
Figure 3. Failed American retrenchment from the Middle East, 2009-2015. 
Chapter Outline 
 In the remaining four chapters I explain my theory of retrenchment outcomes and 
present hypotheses regarding when particular outcomes will occur. Then I test these 
hypotheses against two historical cases of attempted American retrenchment. Finally, I 
present my conclusion in which I summarize my findings and discusses their relevance to 
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scholarship and policy-making by examining the ongoing American retrenchment from 
Syria. Below, I provide a summary of each chapter. 
 Chapter 2. This chapter presents my theoretical framework for explaining the 
variation in retrenchment outcomes. I argue that a policy of retrenchment can facilitate 
overcoming the challenges of overcommitment by redistributing resources from 
peripheral to core security interests to improve a state’s strategic solvency. In broad 
terms, a great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off 
responsibility to a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by 
abandoning a commitment regardless of the consequences. Retrenchment fails when none 
of these three options are possible. Contrary to prevailing wisdom, I argue that 
retrenchment will generally succeed unless 1) there is no ally willing and able to accept 
responsibility for maintaining regional security, and 2) a great power fails at 
rapprochement, and 3) the great power is politically unable to abandon an interest. 
 Chapter 3. This chapter applies my theoretical framework and tests hypotheses on the 
case of American retrenchment from Southeast Asia from 1969 to 1975. In this case, 
President Richard Nixon overcame the challenges of overcommitment and constrained 
power projection by implementing a policy of retrenchment. He redistributed resources 
from peripheral to core security interests and improved the United States’ strategic 
solvency. President Nixon attempted to hand off responsibility to the South Vietnamese, 
but ultimately failed because of their political dysfunction. However, effective 
rapprochement by the United States with China and the Soviet Union, combined with the 
abandonment of American interests in South Vietnam, ultimately led to retrenchment 
success. 
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 Chapter 4. This chapter applies my theoretical framework and examines why the 
United States failed to retrench from the Middle East between 2009 and 2015. President 
Obama intended to retrench from the Middle East – especially Iraq and Afghanistan – to 
reorient American power towards East Asia. However, he could not identify a suitable 
successor to counter rising Iranian influence or contain regional crises, nor did he succeed 
at rapprochement with Iran to minimize its potential for taking advantage of American 
withdrawal. Subsequent Middle East crises sparked intense debate about the wisdom of 
withdrawal. A combination of American political partisanship and allied pressure left 
President Obama unable to abandon American interests in the region. As a result, 
retrenchment failed. 
 Chapter 5. In this concluding chapter I summarize my key findings and discuss their 
implications for academic scholarship and policymaking. I also apply my theory to 
predict the likely outcome of President Donald Trump’s recent announcement to 
withdraw all American forces from Syria. 
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CHAPTER 2:  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
“For what settles practical controversy is the knowledge that ends and means have to be 
balanced: an agreement has eventually to be reached when men admit that they must pay 
for what they want and that they must want only what they are willing to pay for. If they 
do not have to come to such an agreement, they will never except by accident agree. For 
they will lack a yardstick by which to measure their interests, or their ways and means of 
promoting and protecting them.”62 
 
Core Theoretical Argument 
 How does a great power realign its strategic priorities when overcommitment abroad 
constrains its military power projection and limits diplomatic flexibility? A policy of 
retrenchment may facilitate overcoming these challenges by redistributing resources from 
peripheral to core security interests to improve the state’s strategic solvency. States that 
successfully retrench end up with more sustainable foreign policies and perform 
comparatively well in subsequent military disputes.63 However, not all retrenchment 
attempts succeed. Therefore, what explains the variation in retrenchment outcomes? I 
argue that retrenchment fails when a great power is unable to extricate itself from a 
commitment to free resources for addressing more critical challenges. 
 In broad terms, a great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing 
off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by 
abandoning a commitment regardless of the consequences. Retrenchment fails when none 
of these options are possible. In other words, and contrary to prevailing wisdom, 
retrenchment will generally succeed unless 1) there is no ally willing and able to accept 
responsibility, and 2) a great power fails at rapprochement, and 3) the great power is 
politically unable to abandon an interest. The discussion below explains key assumptions, 
                                                 
62 Walter Lippmann, US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little Brown, 1943), 7-8. 
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presents a model of retrenchment and strategic reorientation, then discusses plausible 
hypotheses for explaining variation in retrenchment outcomes. 
Key Assumptions 
 The following theory of retrenchment outcomes makes three key assumptions about 
states that retrench, leader behaviors, and international threats. First, any state may 
conceivably retrench, but the most important cases of retrenchment involve great powers. 
These states possess the largest share of international military, economic, and diplomatic 
power and they have interests distributed across geographic regions.64 I do not assume 
that material factors have the most substantial impact on national power. Instead, I give 
them equal footing with non-material factors that influence a state’s ability to react to and 
shape the international environment.65 Those powers that seek to maintain their status 
encounter more complex realignment decisions than the simpler guns versus butter 
calculations made by smaller states. Mid- and small-sized states do worry about the 
global distribution of power, but their limited stature and resources constrain their 
capacity to influence anything beyond local issues. 
 Second, I assume great power leaders focus on long-term trends rather than short-
term power fluctuations when assessing national power. Furthermore, because great 
powers exist within a self-help system where they must maintain security against external 
threats, I assume leaders focus on assessments of relative rather than absolute power.66 I 
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also assume leaders are generally prudent and rational actors capable of assessing relative 
power.67 Though leaders are undoubtedly subject to motivated biases and cognitive 
errors,68 the hazards associated with decline incentivize disregarding biases and opting 
for pragmatic policies.69 
 Third, while the goal of retrenchment is to lower security costs to free up resources, I 
do not assume that threat levels necessarily decline, since this is a structural condition 
independent of a state. Moreover, reorienting will likely result in threat substitution and 
may even result in a net increase, because threats remain in the area from which the state 
retrenched. Similarly, the overall level of foreign commitments does not need to decline 
for retrenchment to succeed, because the state will establish commitments that align with 
its new strategic orientation. 
Retrenchment 
Retrenchment is the core stage of strategic reorientation during which leaders mediate 
between existing security goals and the need to adapt to a changing security environment. 
States retrench during periods of overcommitment and acute relative decline, because the 
competitive and anarchic realm of great power politics incentivizes them to remain 
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strategically solvent.70 Overcommitted great powers attempt to avoid insolvency by 
retrenching to regroup and slow, if not reverse, their decline. Over the long-term, the 
international system punishes states that fail to balance their foreign policy objectives 
with available resources.71 States that fail to retrench will eventually succumb to 
aggression as rivals exploit inflexible foreign policies and military overextension. 
 The goal of retrenchment is to realign resources by reducing security-related costs in 
one region to provide additional resources for addressing a neglected security challenge 
in another region. There are two types of retrenchment – strategic and operational– 
differentiated by the types of policies implemented and whether retrenchment lowers 
security’s risk or price.72 Strategic retrenchment entails a variety of external policies 
including the redeployment of military forces, removal or mitigation of flashpoints, 
reduction of security burdens by redistributing them to an ally, or abandonment of an 
interest.73 This type of retrenchment reduces the risks of a state’s foreign policy by 
minimizing extraneous or overly costly commitments, which makes resources available 
for improving deterrence and defense in more important areas.74 Operational 
retrenchment involves internal policies aimed at lowering the price of security. States 
free resources for investment elsewhere by slowing or reducing military expenditures and 
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cutting foreign aid. Options include reducing military spending, revising military force 
structures, and reforming underperforming or outmoded security institutions.75 
Explaining Variation in Retrenchment Outcomes 
 Great powers can recover from decline if they adjust their policies regarding foreign 
commitments, yet this takes time, resources, and leader attention. Consequently, states 
require “breathing room” in which leaders can focus on making necessary adjustments.76 
Retrenchment provides this “breathing room” and allows states to realign security-related 
resources and reorient foreign policy by shifting burdens onto allies, avoiding conflicts, 
and reducing expenditures.77 It is not, however, a simple or one-size-fits-all activity; 
instead, retrenchment is a multifaceted policy that leaders can tailor to fit their strategic 
circumstances. 
 Retrenchment success hinges on a great power’s ability to reduce overcommitment by 
extricating itself from existing commitments in a region to free resources for countering 
more pressing threats.78 When realigning resources and commitments, a great power can 
retrench in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through 
rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment regardless of the 
consequences. How allies or rivals react to withdrawal and the influence of domestic 
political divisions on foreign policy also affect retrenchment outcomes. 
 Burden Sharing. Retrenching states will generally be risk averse when withdrawing 
from a region because of the potential consequences of the collapse of the status quo. A 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 26-27. MacDonald and Parent highlight four domestic policies for retrenchment. I argue that their 
fourth, reallocating resources to non-foreign policy pursuits, is an outcome of retrenchment rather than a 
policy of retrenchment. As such, I exclude it as a possible form of operational retrenchment. 
76 Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 301. 
77 MacDonald and Parent, Twilight of the Titans, 26-27. 
78 Threats may be foreign, like a rising regional competitor, or domestic, such as a severe financial crisis. 
33 
 
great power’s expectation for post-retrenchment stability will often depend on the 
availability of a suitable “successor state.” These states ostensibly have the ability and 
willingness to accept responsibility for preserving a favorable balance of power.79 The 
availability of such a partner facilitates withdrawal by providing deterrent benefits and 
maintaining local dynamics beneficial to the retrenching state’s interests.80 While 
offering distinct benefits, relying on a successor creates a dilemma. 
 Entrusting security to a successor means the retrenching state must trust another state 
to truthfully represent its capabilities and ambitions.81 Successor states may misrepresent 
their will or capability to maintain regional order or they may have revisionist 
intentions.82 Despite these risks, a retrenching state can use its existing resources, as well 
as resources gained through retrenchment, to strengthen, recruit, and reward faithful allies 
or punish betrayal.83 In general, a retrenching state will seek to improve the capacity of a 
successor state by providing bilateral economic and military aid explicitly intended to 
enhance the successor’s military capabilities and power projection.84 Though identifying 
a suitable successor or improving their military capabilities does not guarantee that the 
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status quo will be maintained, retrenchment is more likely to succeed when a state can 
identify a suitable successor to uphold an existing security order. 
 Britain’s support of Japan during the former’s withdrawal from East Asia in the early 
1900s illustrates how identifying a successor can enable retrenchment success. Russian 
expansion in Asia and its threat to the “Open Door” policy prompted Britain to form an 
alliance with Japan in 1902.85 The pact was intended as a means by which Britain could 
maintain the status quo in the Far East by sharing the burden with another power.86 
Between 1902 and 1904, Britain sought to improve Japan’s military capacity relative to 
the Russians and French. Britain built the bulk of the Japanese Navy and provided it with 
better ships than Japan could have constructed on its own. British banks also financed 
Japan’s war efforts against Russia during the 1905 Russo-Japanese War.87 After Japan 
decisively defeated the Russian navy at the Battle of Tsushima, effectively ending the 
Russian threat in East Asia, Britain could afford to withdraw the bulk of its naval forces 
and rely on its ally to defend British interests in the region.88 
 Rapprochement. Besides identifying a successor state, a retrenching great power can 
attempt to remove potential flashpoints through rapprochement with regional rivals.89 
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Rapprochement occurs when a state makes policy concessions or engages in sustained 
efforts to settle disputes with another state.90 The great power can either negotiate a 
settlement on divisive issues, or tacitly accept limited spheres of influence to prevent 
friction and reduce the risk of aggression during retrenchment. Rapprochement operates 
by resolving grievances and diffusing secondary threats. 
 Resolving grievances involves the hope by the retrenching power that significant, 
even asymmetrical, concessions will resolve an issue to prevent aggression or war in the 
future. Retrenching great powers might attempt to diffuse secondary threats when they 
face multiple security challenges and possess limited resources. Diffusing secondary 
threats requires the retrenching state to make extensive concessions to a less threatening 
rival to free resources to deter or defend against a more threatening adversary. By settling 
disputes and making limited concessions on outstanding disagreements, the retrenching 
state appears less threatening to the rival’s interests. The intent is to avoid conflict with 
the less threatening rival to better position the retrenching power for potential conflict 
with another rival.91 Though resolving grievances and diffusing secondary threats with a 
rival through rapprochement does not guarantee a rival will not renege on an agreement, 
strategic retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more a state succeeds at 
rapprochement with adversaries. 
 Britain’s rapprochement with the United States between 1898 and 1903, followed by 
British retrenchment from the Western Hemisphere between 1904 and 1906 illustrates the 
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potential value of rapprochement to retrenchment success. Throughout the 19th century, 
Britain viewed the United States as the primary threat to British interests in the Western 
Hemisphere; however, budgetary constraints and the rising threat of Germany compelled 
British leaders to begin rapprochement with the United States. They resolved grievances 
by acceding to arbitration to settle the 1895 Venezuelan Crisis, signed the Hay–
Pauncefote Treaty granting the United States the right to build and control the Panama 
Canal, and settled an ongoing Alaskan boundary dispute. Moreover, by tacitly accepting 
the Monroe Doctrine, Britain diffused secondary threats to Canada and the West Indies, 
thereby allowing it to focus its resources on more salient European threats.92 
 Abandonment. Abandoning a security interest is an option when a great power 
cannot find a suitable ally for burden-sharing and regional adversaries remain implacable. 
Abandonment rapidly frees resources for use in more critical areas. Abandoning an 
interest presents significant challenges, because it involves overcoming risk aversion to 
altering the status quo. Regardless, when a suitable ally is unavailable, and an adversary’s 
grievances remain non-negotiable, retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more able a 
great power is to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal. However, 
retrenchment is a Fabian strategy that seeks to trade space for time to realign a state’s 
foreign policy.93 The inherent political opposition to this type of strategy suggests that the 
likelihood of abandonment occurring will depend upon the influence of domestic politics. 
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 Domestic political divisions not only affect the decision to retrench,94 they can 
influence retrenchment outcomes. Divisions result from party factions, bureaucratic 
interests, and regional or sectoral interests, or war weariness. They center on the level of 
polarization in perceptions about the nature and extent of security threats, similarity of 
policy preferences, agreement about the domestic political risks associated with 
retrenchment, and the amount of military versus civilian spending.95 Moreover, the 
defection or failure of an ally or sudden aggression by an adversary during withdrawal 
may strengthen political opposition to abandonment. Political opponents have an 
incentive to advocate for alternative policies, so they may resist abandonment or attempt 
to exploit its consequences for domestic political gain. This diminishes a leader’s 
political autonomy and may result in half-measures or contradictory policies. Therefore, 
retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less influence domestic political divisions have 
on accepting the logical implications of regional withdrawal. 
 Britain’s decision to withdraw “East of Suez” reflects the dynamics of abandonment 
in retrenchment success. Following World War II, Britain retained a chain of overseas 
military bases stretching from the Suez Canal to Singapore. These bases were historically 
viewed as vital for Britain’s security and economic strength. Nevertheless, the post-war 
strategic landscape, effects of the 1956 Suez Crisis, and severe financial crisis and 
economic decline ultimately resulted in British leaders deciding in 1968 to abandon these 
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bases. Though economic factors motivated the desire to abandon Britain’s foreign bases, 
the decision was ultimately a political choice. Faced with on-going economic crises, 
lacking an ally with whom Britain could share their security burden, and with no 
opportunity for rapprochement, British leaders overcame domestic political opposition 
and opted to abandon their bases, so they could focus on strengthening Britain’s domestic 
economic circumstances.96 
 Outcomes. Regional overcommitment and periodic relative decline by a great power 
whose economy temporarily underperforms or who faces the rise of new rival are not 
uncommon. In fact, “strategic and geographic overextension may…be the natural state of 
affairs of great powers actively engaged in the world.”97 Therefore, the need for 
retrenchment will recur over time when a great power must realign by cutting 
commitments in one region to free resources to address a neglected challenge, whether 
domestic or international. In these circumstances, a great power might extricate itself 
from existing commitments by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, negotiate 
a deal with a regional rival, or abandon an interest and accept the consequences. If none 
of these options are a possibility, then retrenchment and realignment will fail. However, 
this implies that retrenchment will generally succeed unless 1) there is no ally willing and 
able to assume responsibility for a regional security order, and 2) the great power fails at 
rapprochement, and 3) domestic political divisions keep the great power from accepting 
the consequences of abandonment. Therefore, given that all three conditions must obtain 
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for failure to occur, the probability of which is less than any single condition occurring, 
retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. 
 Table 2 summarizes the five proposed hypotheses regarding retrenchment outcomes. 
Table 2. Hypotheses regarding retrenchment outcomes. 
Hypothesis 1 
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed when a state can identify a 
suitable successor to uphold an existing security order. 
Hypothesis 2 
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more a state succeeds at 
rapprochement with adversaries. 
Hypothesis 3 
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more able a great power is 
to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal. 
Hypothesis 4 
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less influence domestic 
political divisions have on accepting the logical implications of 
regional withdrawal. 
Hypothesis 5 Retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. 
 
Alternative Explanations 
 One consequence of the underdeveloped state of the retrenchment literature is that 
little scholarship directly examines the topic of retrenchment outcomes. The hypotheses 
above are theoretically plausible; however, the alternative explanations below propose 
other independent variables to develop testable competing hypotheses. 
 Source of Relative Decline. The source of relative decline may be either domestic or 
international – perhaps both in circumstances of terminal decline.98 The nature of relative 
decline hinges on the fact that, at any given time, power within the international system is 
finite. When the power of other states increases, the relative power of any single state 
decreases. These periods are particularly salient to policymakers.99 However, power 
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indicators continuously fluctuate and shift over short periods of time, thereby making 
accurate assessments difficult. Beyond the inherent difficulties in assessing relative 
power, leaders face the challenge of identifying the primary factors contributing to 
decline. Correctly identifying whether the source of relative decline is domestic or 
international is important, because each has distinct associated risks and optimal policy 
responses. 
 If decline stems from international conditions, such as the emergence of a new 
geopolitical rival or when regional overcommitment allows a rival in another region to 
rise uncontested, then the best course of action may be to decrease peripheral 
commitments. Though more difficult to implement, because it may require the reciprocity 
of allies or effective mollification of adversaries, this course of action facilitates 
reorienting resources to improve the security of core interests. Domestically-driven 
conditions, whether as the result of economic downturns, an underperforming military, or 
political disfunction suggest that the best solution may be to attempt internal reforms. 
These are easier to implement and rely on self-help rather than the reciprocity of allies. 
Therefore, retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more closely leaders align the type 
of cost reductions with the risks associated with the nature of relative decline. 
 Retrenchment Type. States existing in anarchy generally have a strong incentive to 
prefer self-help.100 Moreover, the ability to project power abroad depends on what leaders 
can extract domestically,101 so they typically attempt to choose policies that do not 
undermine domestic support.102 As a result, retrenching states will have a strong 
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preference for attempting operational retrenchment to achieve their goals, because all the 
benefits accrue solely to the state. Conversely, strategic retrenchment will be less 
preferred, since it requires a state to rely on another to honor commitments and because 
the state surrenders something it values.103 
 Operational retrenchment focuses on lowering the price associated with a foreign 
policy without reducing the level of risk. Moreover, reducing security-related 
expenditures and bureaucratic reforms are not guaranteed to reverse decline or 
overcommitment. In fact, they may exacerbate it as excessive cuts might make the state 
“incompetent to every exigency.”104 A similar risk inheres during attempts to revise force 
structures. By altering the types and number of forces available for crises, a state may 
find itself without the necessary tools to confront a foreign policy challenge. Lastly 
institutional reform during a period of decline and fiscal austerity may be especially 
challenging when bureaucracies must perform numerous complex tasks.105 As a result, 
operational retrenchment is less likely to succeed than strategic retrenchment. 
 Retrenchment Speed. The speed of retrenchment lies along a continuum between 
deliberate and hasty. Deliberate retrenchment is inherently slower as leaders implement 
withdrawal tied to on-the-ground conditions where reductions will occur. As events 
unfold during retrenchment, reductions must be calibrated to minimize disruption and 
ensure continued deterrence. Hasty retrenchment is faster, even potentially precipitous, as 
leaders implement rapid withdrawal regardless of existing security conditions or in 
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reaction to changing political circumstances. Because of the increased rate of reductions, 
a state risks being unable to respond to aggression or unforeseen events or rapid 
withdrawal may create a power vacuum. Adversaries may be emboldened to act 
aggressively to fill the vacuum created by the retrenching state, or allies may doubt that 
state’s commitment to defend shared interests. Slower policies of retrenchment, however, 
provide time for regional dynamics to adjust and limit the uncertainty created by more 
rapid reductions. They signal that the retrenching state seeks to reduce tensions while 
gauging a rival’s intentions and remaining able to oppose revisionist ambitions.106 
Domestically, slower retrenchment ensures adequate forces remain available to respond 
to unexpected crises or provocation. It also provides time for leaders to develop a new 
foreign policy consensus or attempt to correct the political dysfunction that often attends 
overcommitment. Therefore, slower rates of retrenchment are more likely to succeed 
than more rapid withdrawal or reductions. 
 Table 3 summarizes alternative hypotheses regarding retrenchment outcomes: 
Table 3. Alternative hypotheses regarding retrenchment outcomes. 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 1 
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more closely leaders align 
the type of cost reductions with the risks associated with the nature of 
relative decline. 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 2 
Operational retrenchment is less likely to succeed than strategic 
retrenchment. 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 3 
Slower rates of retrenchment are more likely to succeed than more 
rapid withdrawal or reductions. 
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 In subsequent chapters, I test the primary and alternative hypotheses explained above 
using two cases of post-World War II retrenchment by the United States. These cases 
included different strategic environments as they relate to ally availability, regional 
adversaries, rising competitors, and domestic circumstances influencing the ability to 
abandon an interest. The cases illustrate how my proposed variables affect retrenchment 
outcomes and validate my hypotheses regarding when retrenchment will succeed or fail. 
The first, a success, occurred in Southeast Asia between 1969 and 1975. The second, a 
failure, occurred in the Middle East from 2009 to 2015. 
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CHAPTER 3:  RETRENCHMENT FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1969-1975 
“The war in Viet Nam has for so long dominated our field of vision…. A small country 
on the rim of [Asia] has filled the screen of our minds; but it does not fill our map.”107 
 
“We…have mortgaged our whole foreign policy to the defense of one country.”108 
 
 How does a great power realign its strategic priorities when overcommitment abroad 
constrains its military power projection and limits diplomatic flexibility? In the case of 
the United States’ withdrawal from Southeast Asia between 1969 and 1975, President 
Richard Nixon overcame these challenges by implementing a policy of retrenchment. 
Though he sought to redistribute resources from peripheral to core security interests and 
improve the United States’ strategic solvency, success was never assured. In broad terms, 
a great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to 
a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment 
regardless of the consequences. Retrenchment fails when none of these three options are 
possible. The United States attempted to hand off responsibility to its South Vietnamese 
ally, but eventually failed because of dysfunctional South Vietnamese politics. However, 
effective rapprochement by the United States with China and the Soviet Union, and the 
abandonment of American interests in South Vietnam ultimately led to success. 
 President Nixon inherited a stalemated war when he assumed office in 1969. By the 
time he became president, the Vietnam War had cost the United States hundreds of 
millions of dollars and tens of thousands of American servicemembers’ lives. President 
Nixon contended that the war distracted previous administrations and prevented them 
from grappling with fundamental changes in the international system. The tenor of 
                                                 
107 Richard Nixon, “Asia After Viet Nam,” Foreign Affairs 46, no. 1 (1967), 111. 
108 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 1386. 
45 
 
European politics was changing with West German chancellor Willie Brandt’s Ostpolitik, 
Middle Eastern conflicts were boiling over, and the Soviet Union was actively expanding 
its influence and cementing its superpower status. Meanwhile, the United States was 
mired in the rice paddies of South Vietnam. President Nixon sought to rectify this and lay 
the foundation for a proactive, long-range foreign policy that first required retrenching 
from Southeast Asia.109 
 The Nixon administration opted to address the United States’ international relative 
decline by implementing a policy of retrenchment from Southeast Asia. President Nixon 
first began the Vietnamization of the conflict, whereby the South Vietnamese accepted 
increasing levels of responsibility for their defense augmented by capacity building by 
the United States. His intent was to improve the material capability of South Vietnam so 
that it could prosecute the war as the United States withdrew its forces and reoriented its 
power projection to more critical regions. Concurrently with these efforts, President 
Nixon attempted, and ultimately succeeded, at rapprochement with the United States’ two 
main geopolitical rivals, China and the Soviet Union. Finally, the failure by South 
Vietnamese leaders to implement meaningful governmental reforms and politicization of 
their senior military leaders resulted in the collapse of South Vietnam. Faced with the 
prospect of re-intervening to honor its commitments, President Gerald Ford, Nixon’s 
successor, opted instead to abandon all interests in South Vietnam. A political consensus 
regarding the undesirability of providing further support to sustain South Vietnamese 
independence made this decision easier (figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Variables Affecting American Retrenchment from Southeast Asia 
 I discuss this example of successful retrenchment by highlighting the relevant 
variables within the context of the posited model of strategic reorientation. First, I 
demonstrate the international relative decline and strategic misalignment of the United 
States resulting from its overcommitment in Southeast Asia between 1954 and 1968. I 
then discuss the linked policies of détente and the Nixon Doctrine, both of which 
provided the policy framework for retrenchment from Southeast Asia between 1969 and 
1973. Next, I examine the period of political and military realignment following 
withdrawal from Vietnam and geostrategic reorientation from 1973 to 1975. Finally, I 
conclude by providing an empirical assessment of the outcome of this successful 
retrenchment attempt. 
International Relative Decline and Strategic Misalignment 
 The Road to Overcommitment, 1954-1968. America’s involvement in Vietnam 
stemmed from a broad spectrum of political, military, economic, and psychological 
concerns. Between 1946 and 1954, the United States steadily increased its financial and 
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military assistance to French efforts to restore their colonial control over Indochina.110 
President Dwight Eisenhower viewed a French defeat by Indochinese communist forces 
as an unacceptable outcome; however, he and others within his administration debated 
what to do. The saliency of the conflict increased in March 1954 when the Vietminh lay 
siege to the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu. The Eisenhower administration’s primary 
concern as the siege continued was the erosion of French resolve and strengthening of the 
Vietminh’s negotiating position at the ongoing Geneva peace talks.111 Given the 
perceived global consequences of a French defeat by the communist North Vietnamese, 
Eisenhower exclaimed “My God, we must not lose Asia…” since it would diminish 
American credibility.112 Moreover, “It was important that we not show weakness at this 
critical time and that we not let the Russians think that we might not resist…in Indochina 
and elsewhere.”113 
 President Eisenhower justified the need to demonstrate resolve against the 
communists in Indochina by describing the “falling domino principle” at a 7 April 1954 
press conference. He explained, “You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the 
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first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very 
quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most 
profound influences.”114 Eisenhower’s views reflected the continuation of security beliefs 
first espoused by the Truman administration. Both administrations believed that 
“Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would seriously 
endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term, United States 
security interests.”115 Although lying on the geopolitical periphery of American interests, 
Southeast Asia bordered critical strategic sea and air lines of communication and 
contained important military bases and economic resources.116 These considerations, 
within a context of global turmoil, perceived threats, and ongoing ideological struggle, 
raised the importance of the French struggle in Indochina for United States policymakers. 
 The symbolic nature of the French conflict and ambiguous value of maintaining 
credibility resulted in a cautious, almost ad hoc, approach to the United States’ 
involvement in an area that was deemed important, if not worth taking too many risks. In 
1954, the French and Vietminh signed the Geneva Agreement. According to the terms of 
the armistice, Vietnam was temporarily partitioned along the 17th Parallel, the French 
evacuated all forces from the North, there was a ban on increasing any military aid in 
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either part of the country, an international control commission would monitor the parties, 
and there would be elections to reunify the country before 20 July 1956. Though the 
United States was not a signatory to the 1954 Geneva Agreement, Undersecretary of 
State Walter Bedell Smith issued a pledge on behalf of the United States to refrain from 
interfering in the execution of the armistice terms.117 However, almost immediately after 
the French and Vietminh signed the Geneva Agreement, the United States began lending 
its support to South Vietnam. In less than two years, the South Vietnamese military 
increased to approximately 280,000 personnel with United States training and support. 
American military aid rose between 1956 and 1962, by which time the aid necessary to 
sustain South Vietnam’s military totaled around $300 million, and the American military 
mission increased from a handful of men to more than 4,000.118 
 When President John F. Kennedy assumed office in 1961, he and his advisors, 
particularly Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, 
stressed the need to commit American ground forces because 
the deteriorating situation in South Viet-Nam requires attention to the 
nature and scope of United States national interests in that country. The 
loss of South Viet-Nam to Communism would involve the transfer of a 
nation of 20 million people from the free world to the Communist bloc. 
The loss of South Viet-Nam would make pointless…any further 
discussion about the importance of Southeast Asia…[and] would 
undermine the credibility of American commitments elsewhere. Further, 
loss of South Viet-Nam would stimulate bitter domestic controversies in 
the United States and would be seized upon by extreme elements to divide 
the country and harass the Administration. 
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Secretaries Rusk and McNamara ultimately recommended sending military forces to 
prevent the fall of South Vietnam to the Communists, a task they estimated would take no 
more than six United States divisions, about 205,000 soldiers.119 
 By the end of 1963, there were more than 16,000 United States military personnel in 
South Vietnam, Air Force sorties increased from 2,334 to 6,929, economic assistance 
rose to $186 million, and military aid increased from $65 million in 1961 to $185 
million.120 Furthermore, the Kennedy administration’s tacit support of the 1 November 
1963 coup that overthrew and killed South Vietnam’s president, Ngo Dinh Diem, 
deepened American involvement in South Vietnam. According to General Maxwell D. 
Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Kennedy’s principle military 
advisor, “In the post-Diem period when the political turbulence in South Vietnam offered 
the United States an excuse to withdraw from its involvement, the realization of our role 
in creating the Vietnamese predicament was a strong deterrent to anyone inclined to 
make such a proposal.”121 
 Shortly after becoming president in the wake of President Kennedy’s assassination, 
President Lyndon Johnson vowed “I am not going to lose Vietnam,” and “I am not going 
to be the President who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went.”122 Two political 
beliefs framed how Johnson interpreted Vietnam:  the New Deal of the 1930s and it’s 
                                                 
119 Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1971), book 2, part B, 125-133. 
120 Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (London: Oxford University Press, 1980), 24; United States Senate, 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, 90th 
Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), 115, 267-268. 
121 Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), 407. 
122 Tom Wicker, JFK and LBJ: The Influence of Personality Upon Politics (New York: Penguin Books, 
1968), 205; Tom Wicker, “The Wrong Rubicon,” in Who We Are: An Atlantic Chronicle of the United 
States and Vietnam, eds. Robert Manning and Michael Janeway (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1969), 216. 
51 
 
benefits on rural development, and European appeasement of Hitler at the Munich 
Conference in 1938. Johnson believed New Deal type programs could work everywhere, 
but appeasement could not be tolerated anywhere.123 In early 1964, Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara explained that the situation in South Vietnam “has unquestionably 
been growing worse…since September [1963],” and was continuing to deteriorate 
rapidly.124 By late 1964, President Johnson actively considered escalating the United 
States’ involvement in South Vietnam but refrained for fear of possible Chinese 
intervention.125 Finally, in early 1965, President Johnson ordered bombing raids 
ostensibly in retaliation for Communist attacks against United States forces at Pleiku, 
South Vietnam.126 By mid-1965, he began the massive military build-up that immersed 
the United States in another land war in Asia. 
 Between 1963 and 1966, United States ground forces increased from 16,000 to 
267,000. During that same time, National Liberation Front (i.e., Vietcong) forces rose 
from 25,000 to 101,000 with another 170,000 irregulars in reserve. More ominously, 
North Vietnamese regular forces in South Vietnam went from zero to 30,000, and 
President Johnson’s bombing campaign accelerated the infiltration of communist forces 
into South Vietnam.127 However, in 1966 the United States and China reached a tacit 
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agreement about Vietnam. China signaled that it would refrain from intervening in the 
Vietnam conflict below the 17th Parallel if the United States did not attack China, invade 
North Vietnam, or bomb the Red River dike system. The United States in turn signaled 
that it would adhere to these caveats. The stand-off agreement between the United States 
and China fundamentally transformed the American rationale for its involvement in 
Indochina.128 Regardless, the Johnson administration continued to pursue its policies in 
South Vietnam despite a growing awareness that the United States could not achieve its 
political objectives militarily. 
 North Vietnam’s Tet Offensive in early 1968 underscored the inability of the United 
States to militarily achieve its political goals in South Vietnam. During the offensive, 
North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces gained control of parts of Saigon, several 
provincial capitals, and the ancient capital city of Hue. It took intense American bombing 
of the captured cities and fierce battles by American and South Vietnamese forces to 
dislodge the enemy.129 Despite this military victory by the United States, the 
psychological shock of the Tet Offensive on the American public was decisive in turning 
opinion against the war.130 
 Declining public support for the Vietnam War did not result in a reevaluation of 
American objectives, but two events finally led President Johnson to realize the 
hopelessness of the Vietnam conflict.131 First, in February 1968, General William 
Westmoreland, commander of American forces in South Vietnam, secretly requested 
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206,000 additional troops following the Tet Offensive. Recognizing that North Vietnam 
would continue to fight, Johnson’s advisors debated whether accomplishing the United 
States’ objects might require 500,000 to one million additional soldiers. Secretary of 
Defense McNamara conceded that those numbers might represent the potential cost. He 
also noted that General Westmoreland’s request was not enough to achieve American 
objectives.132 
 Second, Johnson’s changing attitudes were shaped by other administration officials. 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earl Wheeler, admitted that winning the 
Tet Offensive was “a very near thing” and that the war would likely become more 
challenging and costly because of North Vietnam’s freedom of maneuver.133 In light of 
ongoing inflation, growing antiwar protests, and race riots, Secretary of Defense 
McNamara cautioned that sending additional troops to Westmoreland was risky since 
some had to be available in the United States “to meet the possibility of widespread civil 
disorder…in the months ahead.”134 Newly appointed Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, 
who replaced McNamara, also reported to the president that the military chiefs did not 
have a plan to win the war. He argued that the Pentagon had no tenable solutions for 
achieving victory short of destroying most of South Vietnam trying to eject communist 
forces.135 Secretary Clifford also knew first-hand how the war was harming the American 
economy and straining alliances with Western Europe and Japan.136 
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 In March 1968, President Johnson appointed Secretary of Defense Clifford to chair a 
task force created to evaluate Westmoreland’s request and its possible domestic 
consequences. Secretary Clifford convened a panel of senior presidential advisors – 
dubbed the “Wise Men” – to examine the post-Tet situation. On 26 March 1968, the 
panel reported its consensus opinion to the president that the United States should reduce 
its involvement in South Vietnam and have the South Vietnamese assume more of the 
military burden. According to former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, a member of the 
group, “we can no longer do the job we set out to do in the time we have left and we must 
begin to take steps to disengage.” The panel also expressed its belief that further 
escalation of the Vietnam conflict was unsupported by Congress, the business 
community, and the public.137 These conclusions convinced President Johnson of the 
futility of further escalation and continuing involvement in Vietnam. On 31 March 1968, 
Johnson delivered a televised speech to the American public in which he announced a 
partial halt to the United States’ bombing of North Vietnam. He also declared that he 
would not seek a second term in office. 
 By late 1968, the interplay between time, economics, domestic politics, and 
international events led to a turning point in American involvement in South Vietnam. 
President Johnson secretly raised troop levels from 486,000 to 535,000, but the Tet 
Offensive had exposed the insufficiency of American military power. Despite their losses 
during the offensive, Communist forces controlled, or influenced, over 80% of South 
Vietnamese hamlets and 65% of the total population. Ongoing negotiations with the 
North Vietnamese stalemated by late 1968, and the unpopular and undemocratic South 
                                                 
137 “Meeting with Special Advisory Group,” March 26, 1968, Meeting Notes File, Box 2, Lyndon B. 
Johnson Library, cited in America in Vietnam, 270-272. 
55 
 
Vietnamese regime relied upon United States support for its continuing existence. 
Domestically, there was a looming federal budget crisis, along with a marked upturn in 
the level of antiwar opposition.138 
 Military Overcommitment. By the end of 1968, the United States was militarily 
overcommitted in Southeast Asia. With a total active duty military force of over 3.4 
million service members, approximately 1.2 million – over one-third of available active 
forces – served overseas.139 Of those serving overseas, more than 536,000, just under 
46%, were in Vietnam.140 There were more than double the number of service members 
serving in South Vietnam than there were in West Germany, the primary area of potential 
military confrontation with the Soviet Union. The expanding cost of the conflict in 
Vietnam siphoned economic and human resources from Germany, where facilities 
deteriorated, equipment fell into disrepair, and experienced military members were 
replaced by poorly trained conscripts.141 From an economic standpoint, war related 
expenditures totaled over $26.2 billion in 1968, almost 37% of the total military 
expenditures that year.142 Discussing the issue in 1969, President Richard Nixon 
declared: 
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While the United States is tied down in Viet Nam, the Soviets are loose in 
the World – free to challenge us in the Mediterranean, free to move into 
the vacuum left by retreating colonial powers in the Middle East and along 
the vast rimland of the Indian Ocean….The war bitterly divides the people 
of the United States, and separates us from our allies….143 
 Psychological and physical factors also contributed to America’s military 
overcommitment. Policymakers and the publics’ frustration and impatience with the lack 
of military progress, questions and confusion about the purpose of military operations, 
uncertainty about the conflict’s outcome, and the rising imbalance between the costs of 
military operations and their exacerbation of declining economic and social conditions all 
influenced the growing perception of geostrategic overcommitment.144 
 The physical realities of prosecuting a war abroad also contributed to American 
overcommitment. United States leaders underestimated the obstacles to victory in modern 
war, the specific conditions unique to Vietnam, and the enemy’s fighting abilities. 
Policymakers and military leaders misunderstood how to fight in South Vietnam’s terrain 
and climate, the logistical challenges created by Vietnam’s geographic distance from the 
United States, South Vietnam’s contiguity to North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as 
well as its proximity to China, the underdeveloped economies of North and South 
Vietnam, South Vietnam’s politics, North Vietnam’s alliance with the Soviet Union and 
China, and the deeply-rooted sense of nationalism within the Vietnamese people who had 
a long history of resisting foreign invaders.145 By the end of 1968, the North Vietnamese, 
using better tactics and armed with supplies from the Soviet Union and China, had 
stalemated the powerful United States military and forced policymakers to make difficult 
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decisions. In the post-Tet period, policymakers and military leaders realized that 
American power could destroy Vietnam, but no amount of power could achieve the 
United States’ political objectives.146 
 In November 1968, Richard Nixon defeated Hubert Humphry with 43% of the 
popular vote, a mere. 0.7% more than his opponent. Nixon was only the second 
Republican elected President since 1933 and the first new president since Zachary Taylor 
to face opposition control in both houses of Congress. He inherited an unpopular and 
stalemated war which State department officials estimated might take as many as thirteen 
years to win, as the war was costing 200 American dead each week and over $30 billion a 
year.147 According to Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s National Security Advisor: 
The new Nixon Administration was the first of the post [World War II] 
generation that had to conduct foreign policy without the national 
consensus that had sustained its predecessors largely since 1947. And our 
task was if anything more complex. We faced not only the dislocations of 
a war but the need to articulate a new foreign policy for a new era.148 
Nixon’s pessimism grew as he reviewed the facts and searched for policy options after 
becoming President in early 1969, and he finally came “to the conclusion that there’s no 
way to win….”149 
 Declining Domestic Capacity. The global activism of the preceding two decades 
strained American diplomacy and, by 1968, left it immobile and adrift.150 Besides its 
effects on public opinion, the Tet Offensive precipitated a recognition that the conflict 
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was militarily unwinnable given existing constraints and led to a major shift in strategy 
towards de-escalation.151 Tet did not result in a re-evaluation of the purposes or 
objectives of American involvement in South Vietnam, but it did call into question the 
instrumentalities of American power and where they were focused. Several structural 
changes in the international system challenged American power projection given its 
overcommitment in Vietnam: the decline in the utility of military power, the advent 
Soviet strategic parity, the emergence of political and economic multipolarity, and the 
demise of the seemingly monolithic Communist world. 
 The costs and frustrations of the conflict in Vietnam influenced changes in public and 
elite opinion that resulted in declining domestic willingness to achieve policy objectives 
in South Vietnam. Increasing American casualties, a declining economy, social discord, 
and a sense of the conflict’s futility all played a role in turning the public and political 
elites against the war. In contrast to the Korean War, where the number of American 
casualties was greatest during the first year of the conflict, the number of casualties in 
Vietnam increased each year and the cumulative total exceeded that of the entire Korean 
War by 1968. The increasing costs of sustaining the war also resulted in inflation, new 
taxes, and policymakers having to choose between waging the war and supporting 
domestic programs. Social divisions became more pronounced as racial strife engulfed 
                                                 
151 For examples see “Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson,” 
FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968, eds. Kent Sieg and David S. Patterson 
(Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), Document 154, accessed 15 October 
2018 at https:// history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d154; “Editorial Note,” Ibid., 
Document 155, accessed 15 October 2018 at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-
68v06/d155; “Notes of Meeting,” Ibid., Document 158, accessed 15 October 2018 at https://history. 
state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d158; “Memorandum from the Ambassador at Large 
(Harriman) to Secretary of State Rusk,” Ibid., Document 164, accessed 15 October 2018 at https://history. 
state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/ d164; and “Memorandum for Record,” Ibid., Document 
166, accessed 15 October 2018 at https://history.state. gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d166. 
59 
 
American cities, a growing counterculture challenged mainstream values, and blue and 
white-collar workers became alienated from their respective party’s positions regarding 
the war. Finally, in the aftermath of Tet the war appeared to the public and policymakers 
alike as irretrievably stalemated with no end in sight.152 
 Politicians were conscious of antiwar sentiments and divisions within the American 
pubic regarding the war, and they recognized that these divisions reduced America’s 
ability to continue the conflict.153 Public support for the United States’ involvement in 
Vietnam began declining as early as 1966. In October 1967, for the first time during the 
conflict, surveys asking whether America’s involvement was a mistake and whether it 
should have stayed out revealed that opposition to the war surpassed support – 46 to 44%. 
The downward trend in support continued, and by March 1968 polls revealed 49% of the 
public opposed the war.154 During the first half of 1969, Gallup polled public preferences 
regarding the Vietnam War, and a majority favored the gradual withdrawal of American 
forces and establishing a fixed end date for involvement. A January 1969 poll showed 
54% of the public favored a monthly troop reduction, with support rising to 56% by May 
1969.155 When Nixon announced the first troop reductions in June 1969, 41% of survey 
respondents favored a faster rate of withdrawal.156 Finally, an October 1969 poll revealed 
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53% of the public supported completing troop withdrawals by the end of 1970; however, 
only 20% of those polled favored a hypothetical plan for immediate withdrawal.157 
 Polling clearly showed that a significant portion of the American public was unhappy 
with the Vietnam war and growing increasingly weary of the United States’ involvement. 
Beginning in late 1967, a majority of American’s supported a cessation of bombing in 
North Vietnam, gradual withdrawal of military forces, and turning over more 
responsibility for the conflict to South Vietnam. These opinions influenced policymakers 
and politicians, and political elites also considered the perspectives of friends, family 
members, the press, business leaders, and informed members of the uniformed military. 
In general, support for the conflict among Democratic policymakers was waning, and 
even Republicans were moving away from a policy position advocating all-out support 
for the war.158 
 Deciding to Withdrawal. The policy debate over whether to withdraw United States 
forces from Vietnam began in 1968 during the Johnson administration. President Johnson 
asked Secretary of Defense Clifford to establish a working group to examine whether the 
United States should continue its current strategy in Vietnam. Members of this group 
were unable to form a consensus on recommended changes or likely policy outcomes.159 
Johnson’s advisors continued to debate the merits of troop increases or withdrawals 
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throughout 1968.160 These debates carried on publicly during the 1968 presidential 
campaigns of Vice President Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon. Although the 
Vietnam War was the most significant issue during the campaign, neither candidate 
offered clear or distinct plans for ending the conflict. Humphrey, as Vice President, could 
not repudiate Johnson’s policies, and Nixon, though privately approving of Johnson’s 
efforts,161 publicly critiqued Johnson’s handling of the war. Both candidates agreed on 
the need to withdraw from Vietnam, and both rejected the idea of unilateral 
withdrawal.162 In other words, a bipartisan consensus existed in favor of ending the war, 
but how to accomplish that goal remained in debate. 
 Once elected, despite pledging to “end the war and win the peace in the Pacific,” 
Nixon lacked a specific plan to end the conflict,163 though he did have a general 
framework for solving the Vietnam dilemma.164 The fact that his new administration 
lacked accurate information about the conflict further complicated matters. On his first 
day in office Nixon issued National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 1, “In an 
effort to develop an agreed evaluation of the situation in Vietnam as a basis for making 
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policy decisions….”165 Though President Nixon “did not believe in changing policy for 
change sake,” he did think it was important to “rethink all of our policy tracks” with 
respect to Vietnam.166 NSSM 1 directed key national security-related departments and 
agencies to answer 28 primary and 50 subsidiary questions regarding the North and South 
Vietnamese military capabilities, progress of countryside security in South Vietnam, the 
political situation in South Vietnam, United States military strategy and operations, and 
political factors that might affect peace negotiations.167 
 The responses to NSSM 1 “made clear that there was no consensus as to facts, much 
less as to policy.”168 Agency answers revealed that the United States’ national security 
bureaucracy was divided over the prospects of progress and victory in South Vietnam. 
Agency assessments generally fell into two camps, one which was optimistic about 
American prospects in Vietnam and one that was pessimistic. Optimists included the 
Ambassador to South Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
commander of military forces in Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams, and the 
commander of all forces in the Pacific, Admiral John McCain. This group believed that 
military operations in Vietnam were gaining ground and influencing North Vietnam who 
they believed was willing to negotiate because of the North’s military weakness. 
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Pessimists included civilians in the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and the State department. This group believed that the situation in South 
Vietnam was stalemated and that any gains were either inflated or tenuous, and that 
North Vietnam was negotiating from a position of strength so was unlikely to make major 
concessions. Overall, both groups agreed on some basic positions regarding North 
Vietnam’s objective, but there were significant disagreements over basic facts such as the 
size and deployment of enemy forces. 
 President Nixon faced a situation in Vietnam that closely resembled the predicament 
faced by French leaders in 1953. At that time, the seven-year French conflict in Indochina 
was at risk of defeat due to military and political failures in Vietnam, the threat of 
increasing Chinese support of the Vietminh, and a war-weary French public. This led 
French leaders to consider a negotiated settlement that would allow them to withdraw. To 
achieve this diplomatic solution French leaders believed they needed to stabilize or 
improve their military position on the ground in Vietnam. Subsequent military decisions, 
ultimately leading to the debacle at Dien Bien Phu, aimed to achieve the goal of an 
honorable French withdrawal.169 As it was with the French in the early 1950s, so it was 
with Nixon in 1969. 
 The dilemma was not whether to withdraw from South Vietnam, but how to extricate 
the United States from the conflict without undermining American credibility and the 
survival of an independent South Vietnam. Nixon’s plan amounted to a policy of 
retrenchment that included the gradual withdrawal of American forces (i.e., de-
Americanization), the strengthening of South Vietnam’s government and military forces 
                                                 
169 Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War, 16. 
64 
 
(i.e., Vietnamization), antiguerrilla pacification operations, détente with the Soviet 
Union, and diplomatic negotiation with the Vietnamese communists. De-Americanization 
entailed the withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam and was politically 
necessary to appease the public’s desire to end the war. President Nixon and his National 
Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, hoped that ongoing troop withdrawals would bolster 
public support for the president’s policy, thereby strengthening the president’s ability to 
negotiate with North Vietnam and pursue diplomatic initiatives elsewhere. The primary 
purpose of Vietnamization, the training and equipping of South Vietnam’s military forces 
and political reform of its government, was to compensate for American troop withdraws 
by strengthening South Vietnam’s ability to assume responsibility for defending itself.170 
Though distinct policy goals, the Nixon administration referred to de-Americanization 
and Vietnamization as “Vietnamization”, a term suggested by Secretary of Defense 
Melvin Laird to highlight the positive aspects of improving South Vietnam’s 
governmental and military capabilities – the “right issues.”171 
Framework for Retrenchment, 1969-1972 
 The idea of Vietnamization, the simultaneous withdrawal of American forces and of 
strengthening South Vietnam’s political and military capacity, emerged after the Tet 
Offensive in 1968 during the Johnson administration. By the time Nixon assumed office 
“the goal of victory had been abandoned and a commitment had been made…to seek a 
negotiated compromise solution [to the war].”172 The Nixon administration, however, 
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debated the pace at which Vietnamization should occur. On one side, Secretary of State 
William Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird argued for military de-escalation 
and an accelerated withdrawal of American forces. On the other side, Kissinger 
advocated for decelerated withdraw and military escalation. Although President Nixon 
generally sided with Kissinger, his policy decisions often alternated between both 
approaches.173 Some of Nixon’s decisions to expand the conflict into Cambodia in 1970 
and Laos in 1971 appeared to contradict a policy of United States withdrawal from 
Indochina. However, the purpose of these operations was to support the overall policy of 
Vietnamization, a policy of retrenchment based on building South Vietnam’s capacity for 
security burden sharing. 
 The stalemate in Vietnam prompted a reevaluation of the relationship between the 
military means and political ends. Throughout the conflict, the United States applied 
disproportionate military power against a militarily inferior opponent for a limited 
political goal. Regardless of the level of force applied, a United States “victory” remained 
elusive because America could not supply the political conditions necessary for success. 
By 1969, policymakers were aware of this paradox. On one hand, America retained the 
preponderance of military power throughout the world. On the other hand, it was 
increasingly experiencing a relative decline in its global political influence.174 In other 
words, though America was not experiencing the erosion of its power resources relative 
to other countries, it did suffer relative decline in its ability to shape international 
                                                 
from Henry Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America's Involvement in and Extrication 
from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003). 
173 Kimball, The Vietnam War Files, 12. 
174 Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine, 74-75. 
66 
 
outcomes.175 The challenge was how to negotiate the transition from preponderance to a 
position of primus inter pares. Between 1969 and 1973, retrenchment from Vietnam 
would be the linchpin of this transition. 
 Lowering Costs. President Nixon assumed responsibility for foreign policy during 
America’s deepest crisis since World War II. His goal in Vietnam focused on “ending the 
war and winning the peace” rather than achieving victory “over any other people.”176 To 
win the peace, President Nixon not only had to end the fighting in Vietnam while 
avoiding defeat, he had to ensure a noncommunist South Vietnamese government 
remained in power. Therefore, achieving peace required a military and political victory 
over communist forces in South Vietnam and a diplomatic victory over North Vietnam. 
At the start of President Nixon’s term in 1969, most policymakers prioritized achieving 
victory over the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. 
 Victory took precedence because of the widely held perception that the political status 
of South Vietnam had strategic implications. Policymakers believed that defeat would 
undermine the United States’ credibility to defend allies and to contain the expanding 
influence of the Soviet Union and China. In other words, defeat in Vietnam would 
ultimately endanger the United States’ preferred global order. These beliefs generally 
reflected the views of successive post-World War II presidential administrations that 
holistically conceived the United States’ policy goals as an interrelated system of military 
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balances of power, geostrategic positions, political stability, ideological compatibility, 
and national prestige.177 By the time Nixon ascended to the presidency, he 
was eager to negotiate an honorable extraction [of American forces], 
which he defined as almost anything except turning over to the North 
Vietnamese Communists the millions of [South Vietnamese] people who 
had been led by his predecessors to rely on America. He took credibility 
and honor seriously because they defined America’s capacity to shape a 
peaceful international order.178 
 Within the legislative branch, reaction to public opinion focused not only on the 
implementation of American commitments, but also on the continuing utility and 
desirability of widespread security obligations. Less than two weeks after Nixon’s 
inauguration, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee announced an investigation into 
executive power and the military’s role in influencing foreign policy.179 The committee 
also ignored State Department objections and passed a National Commitments resolution 
that called upon the Executive to refrain from entering into new security obligations 
without Congressional consent.180 These actions reflected the firm belief among 
influential members of the committee, especially its chairman, J. William Fulbright, that 
if the United States were entering a new era of diplomacy – as the Nixon administration 
claimed – then is should reassess its existing network of security commitments.181 
 Retrenchment from Southeast Asia in general, and Vietnam specifically, would 
facilitate the United States establishing new terms for a continuing and active role in the 
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international system. The immediate foreign policy problem was managing the removal 
of United States combat forces. This challenge was part of the larger one of the 
overextension of America’s foreign commitments. Within this context, retrenchment not 
only focused on the way to mitigate the consequences of withdrawal from Vietnam, but 
also the nature and scope of the United States’ political and military retrenchment along 
the periphery. The Nixon administration acknowledged the immobility of American 
diplomacy resulting from the impasse in Vietnam and accepted the logic of 
disengagement. However, the administration consistently argued that the way 
disengagement occurred was important to America’s international reputation and to 
prevent the erosion of its domestic support for continuing global engagement.182 
President Nixon summarized this sentiment during a meeting at which he said 
A pull-out of the American forces precipitously would be disastrous for 
Asia, including countries like Japan and India. Europe would be affected. 
But, the most serious effect would be in the United States. When a great 
power fails, it deeply affects the will of the people. While the public 
would welcome peace initially, they would soon be asking why we pulled 
out and this would in turn lead an attack on the leadership and 
establishment and the US role in the war. Isolation could easily be the 
consequence.183 
 President Nixon believed he could end the Vietnam War quickly – within a year he 
hoped. His initial instincts were to attempt a knock-out blow against North Vietnam, and 
he ordered the military to plan for such an attack, code-named “Duck Hook.” In support 
of Nixon’s military moves, he hoped the Soviets would put diplomatic pressure on the 
North Vietnamese government. His strategy for gaining Soviet support was “linkage,” 
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whereby Nixon would refrain from negotiating arms control or trade agreements unless 
the Soviets complied. Domestically, Nixon sought to discredit his opponents by 
questioning their loyalty and patriotism. For instance, at a speech he delivered at the 
United States Air Force Academy he declared, “Military programs are ridiculed as 
needless if not deliberate waste. The military profession is derided in some of the so-
called best circles of America. Patriotism is considered by some to be a backward fetish 
of the uneducated and the unsophisticated.”184 
 Despite Nixon’s pointed rhetoric towards his opponents and attempts to pressure the 
Soviets, he sought to avoid the confrontations and controversies likely to result from 
carrying out his ideas.185 He quickly moved away from “Duck Hook” for fear that it 
would raise congressional opposition or split his cabinet – “I just wasn’t ready for that” 
Nixon later admitted. Furthermore, instead of escalation, Nixon opted to announce the 
first withdrawal of 25,000 American soldiers from South Vietnam, and implementation 
of “Vietnamization” to train the South Vietnamese military and government to assume 
the burden of self-defense. By the end of the summer of 1969, Nixon announced another 
planned withdrawal of 35,000 troops.186 A desire to avoid controversy also led President 
Nixon to abandon linking Soviet pressure on North Vietnam with diplomatic progress in 
other areas. He was unwilling to sacrifice the political benefits of détente with the Soviets 
and agreed to open talks on limiting strategic nuclear weapons without any meaningful 
action by the Soviets towards Hanoi. In fact, Henry Kissinger believed that the Soviets 
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made use of “reverse linkage” by exploiting Nixon’s need for foreign policy progress to 
sustain domestic support.187 
 The Nixon administration explicitly portrayed retrenchment under the guise of the 
Nixon Doctrine as a transitional policy that would facilitate maintaining regional stability 
by substituting local forces for direct American involvement.188 The main thrust of the 
doctrine was on Indochina, with emphasis on the nature and scope of American military 
assistance to the region after the withdrawal of American forces. However, the 
administration regarded the doctrine as having wider applications, thereby linking 
retrenchment to the continuing role of the United States in the international system. As 
Kissinger explained 
[T]he relationship of the United States to other countries depends…on the 
legal relationships but more fundamentally on the conception the United 
States has of its role in the world and on the intrinsic significance of the 
country’s relationship to overall security and progress.189 
 This new approach, coupled with the Nixon Doctrine’s emphasis to only “help where 
it makes a real difference and is considered in [America’s] interest,”190 implied two 
political prerequisites. First, the United States would have to change its perception of the 
nature and level of threat within the international system and reduce its military 
accordingly. Between 1969 and 1971, the Nixon administration reduced defense spending 
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to its lowest level since 1951. As a percentage of the gross national product, defense 
spending in 1971 was 7%, down from a high of 9.5% in 1968. Secretary of Defense Laird 
justified these reductions in terms of countering domestic inflation and because of the 
reduced level of threat American forces might plausibly encounter given the 
administration’s posture of strategic sufficiency. Regarding the later, the Department of 
Defense also argued for reconfiguring America’s military forces from a 2 ½ to a 1 ½ 
warfighting capability.191 By 1974, the United States’ conventional ground forces were 
reduced to 16 active Army and Marine divisions, more than six fewer than in 1968 and 
more than three fewer than in 1964.192 Second, the administration would have to revise its 
perspective on the forces available to participate in the defense of allies. Towards this 
end, the Nixon administration’s “National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence” 
applied a total force concept whereby the size and effectiveness of allied military 
capabilities were integrated into American defense planning.193 
 The Nixon administration implemented its policy of retrenchment across a range of 
military, diplomatic, and economic activities. Between 1969 and 1972, the total number 
of United States military personnel declined from 3.4 million to 2.3 million, a more than 
32% reduction, bringing the military forces to their lowest level since before the Korean 
War. More than 500,000 military personnel were withdrawn from South Vietnam, the 
number of troops in Japan and South Korea were reduced by one-third, and those in the 
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Philippines were cut by one-half.194 Nixon justified these reductions by pointing to his 
articulated doctrine and noting United States allies would assume a larger burden for their 
own defense. In other words, the United States’ relations with its allies would change 
from “predominance” to “partnership.”195 In the realm of nuclear strategy, the United 
States scaled back its goals from superiority to sufficiency.196 Economically, the Nixon 
administration decreased most areas of the defense budget and devalued the dollar 
twice.197 Although dedicated to pursuing a cost-conscious foreign policy, President Nixon 
was concerned that the United States was going “down the drain as a great power” and 
vowed he would not “fall into [the] dry rot of just managing the chaos better.”198 
 Managing Withdrawal. A central feature of the Nixon Doctrine was its ambiguity. 
President Nixon and his administration believed that maintaining ambiguity would 
facilitate regaining diplomatic initiative and flexibility. By providing the conceptual 
ability to discriminate between cases of potential intervention, the doctrine freed Nixon 
from the confines of a more specific declaratory policy. Moreover, the perceived interests 
at stake were also subject to change since 
the Doctrine…is given full meaning through a process that involves other 
countries…. To attempt to define the new diplomacy completely by 
ourselves would repeat the now presumptuous instinct of the previous era 
and violate the very spirit of our new approach.199 
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 Critics generally argued that it was a flawed policy that failed to provide a coherent 
framework for American foreign policy.200 Some noted the apparent contradiction 
between reducing capabilities while maintaining commitments.201 They argued that the 
Nixon doctrine was merely substituting forces rather than “adjusting [American] 
commitments, restricting [American] objectives or modifying [the American] conception 
of the interests of the United States.”202 According to Nixon and Kissinger’s worldview, 
the first set of critical arguments were disputable. The Nixon administration reconciled 
the apparent contradiction between the continuance of commitments despite a reduction 
in forces through a policy of superpower détente with the Soviet Union, rapprochement 
with China, and the development of mid-range regional powers. 
 Nixon explicitly aimed to develop “a new approach to foreign policy to match a new 
era of international relations.” Guiding his approach was the idea that “[American] 
enmities are not immutable, and we must be prepared realistically to recognize and deal 
with their cause.” Doing so required “mutual self-restraint and a willingness to 
accommodate conflicting national interests through negotiation rather than 
confrontation.”203 The first step was to attempt to achieve a global modus vivendi with the 
Soviet Union through a policy of détente. Though commonly perceived as an attempt by 
the Nixon administration to bring about more peaceful relations with the Soviets, détente 
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was an instrumentalist strategy designed to achieve the administration’s goals in Vietnam 
and globally.204 Nixon and Kissinger viewed détente as “a strategy to contain and harness 
Soviet use of its increasing power” by creating a “web of relationships” that the United 
States would weave.205 
 The intent for détente, tantamount to rapprochement, was to stabilize the nuclear arms 
race, prevent or mitigate the consequences of crises, and to narrow the ongoing rivalry. 
Détente was also a means for encouraging or coercing Soviet behavior in relation to the 
existing world order and in accordance with American preferences. The main instrument 
for achieving these aims was linkage, a stratagem of carrots and sticks that served as a 
“governing device for applying incentives and penalties that [the United States] placed at 
the center of their concept of diplomatic strategy.”206 Positive incentives included offers 
of deals on divisive issues like Berlin, the Arab-Israeli conflict, nuclear weapons, and 
economic aid in exchange for support of America’s attempt to withdraw from Vietnam. 
Disincentives included diplomatic maneuvers like rapprochement with China, denial of 
economic aid, and military threats. Ultimately, détente was pursued to resolve grievances 
and diffuse secondary threats. This was so the United States could preserve its central 
role in maintaining the international order at a time when the Soviet Union reached 
strategic nuclear parity and acted as an obstacle to America’s foreign policy goals.207 
 America’s rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China was intended by 
President Nixon to complement détente and facilitate retrenchment from Southeast Asia. 
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By improving relations with China Nixon hoped to produce stable regional conditions to 
facilitate American withdrawal.208The main objective of American rapprochement was to 
establish a Sino-American relationship to counter-balance the Soviet Union. Regionally, 
the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine was meant to signal that the American threat to 
China would decline post-Vietnam.209 The American opening to China was intended to 
elicit diplomatic pressure on North Vietnam to negotiate an end to the war. Consequently, 
rapprochement led to triangular diplomacy between the United States, China, and the 
Soviet Union.210 Much like détente with the Soviet Union, Nixon viewed rapprochement 
with China as a type of modus vivendi developed at a regional, rather than global, level. 
 The consensus among the national security agencies at the beginning of Nixon’s 
presidency was that China opposed negotiations between the United States and North 
Vietnam, and the Soviets were believed to support a negotiated settlement on terms 
favoring North Vietnam.211 Despite these views, Nixon opted to explore options for 
altering the United States’ relationship with China. He issued National Security Study 
Memorandum 14 in which he directed the security agencies to explore the status of 
American relations with China, the nature of the Chinese communist threat in Asia, the 
interaction between American policy and other relevant countries towards China, and the 
costs and risks of alternative approaches.212 The results of this interagency study revealed 
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that the national security agencies were focused on China’s ideology and alleged military 
goals. Kissinger, however, criticized this focus because he believed it failed to regard the 
implications of increasing Sino-Soviet tensions and opportunities for a triangular 
relationship.213 
 Though the motives behind Nixon’s triangular strategy were somewhat ambiguous,214 
as the process of rapprochement progressed they evolved into a means for pressuring the 
Soviets and hastening the end of the Vietnam War.215 The notion of playing the “China 
card” against the Soviets preceded any concrete steps toward rapprochement, though it 
served as a motivation to achieve that goal. The timing for playing the card was 
influenced by a period of increasing Sino-Soviet tensions in the middle of 1969,216 as 
well as by Nixon’s plan to withdraw from South Vietnam. The triangular relationship 
between the United States, Soviet Union, and China resulting from rapprochement was 
supposed to assist extricating the United States from Vietnam. When combined with the 
carrots of détente mentioned earlier, the China card was intended to encourage the Soviet 
Union to pressure North Vietnam to negotiate an end to the war. Moreover, Nixon hoped 
that rapprochement with China would also intimidate the North Vietnamese and serve as 
an added incentive to negotiate a settlement.217 
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 Developing a new approach required changing American attitudes towards its 
alliances which were “no longer addressed primarily to the containment of the Soviet 
Union and China behind the American shield.”218 Moving forward, the United States 
would adopt a new role of “accepting and encouraging initiative and leadership from our 
allies.”219 The Nixon administration also attempted to develop locally preponderant states 
into regional powers capable of burden sharing and to further stabilize the new 
relationship with the Soviet Union and China. These powers would become the recipients 
of the devolution of America’s regional security responsibilities, along with the military 
aid necessary to maintain and promote regional stability. The Nixon administration’s 
policies of détente and rapprochement ushered a period of global diplomacy. Though 
attempts to develop regional powers essentially fragmented the international system, they 
fit within the administration’s belief in an emerging multipolarity.220 
 Rather than being an adjunct to the modus vivendi the United States achieved with the 
Soviet Union and China, the Nixon Administration’s development of regional powers 
aimed to stabilize superpower relations by expanding the web of relations that could 
influence or mitigate Soviet actions. Nixon hoped that these regional relationships would 
facilitate his strategy of linkage politics and mitigate the apparent contradiction between 
the reduction in United States capabilities and maintenance of commitments. However, 
the Nixon administration essentially conducted relations with its preferred regional 
clients – Brazil, Indonesia, Iran, and Zaire – in an uncoordinated and ad hoc manner that 
hinted at their secondary importance. Another flaw in the administration’s approach was 
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the optimistic assumption that the United States would be able to maintain long-term 
consonance of interests with its regional partners. This error was magnified by a failure to 
differentiate between contending views on security within region, where there might not 
be a common perception of threats, and between regions, where security criteria might 
vary.221 
Realignment and Reorientation, 1973-1975 
 Diminishing Importance of Vietnam. After winning re-election in 1972, President 
Nixon was determined to end American involvement in Vietnam to facilitate refocusing 
on other global issues.222 Of primary concern was stabilizing superpower relations to 
complement retrenchment from peripheral regions. First, the United States had to 
terminate its involvement in Vietnam. The successful negotiation of the Paris agreement 
between the United States and North Vietnam in January 1973 finalized the 
disengagement of American forces from Southeast Asia. Under the terms of the 
agreement, the United States agreed to stop all military activity against North Vietnam 
and remove all remaining American troops from South Vietnam within 60 days.223 The 
last American troops departed on 29 March 1973, and the only residual American 
presence consisted of embassy guards and members of the Defense Attaché Office tasked 
to monitor South Vietnamese military activities and provide technical assistance.224 
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 Over the next two years, the importance of the survival of South Vietnam, the 
resolution of other conflicts in Southeast Asia, and the political struggles stemming from 
the Nixon administration’s desire to continue providing support decreased. Between 1973 
and 1975, the United States sent South Vietnam approximately $1.5 billion in military 
aid, $640 million in economic aid, and $535 million worth of food. Despite the Nixon 
administration’s doubts about the efficacy of Vietnamization during this period, they 
believed that the settlement agreement and level of aid gave South Vietnam “every 
opportunity to demonstrate their inherent strength.”225 This belief rested on an 
assumption that each year that passed improved the South Vietnamese regime’s prospects 
for survival. This assumption depended on the Soviet Union decreasing its arms transfers 
to North Vietnam as well as a domestic political consensus regarding the re-introduction 
of American airpower should South Vietnam’s collapse be imminent. Neither of these 
prerequisites occurred, however, as Soviet arms sales continued unabated and American 
political consensus overwhelmingly favored terminating any American involvement in 
Vietnam.226 
Abandoning American Interests in Vietnam 
 In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Act which limited the President’s ability to 
use American military forces oversees without consultation. That same year Congress 
also passed a resolution forbidding the use of funds to pay for any military activities in 
Vietnam. Following the Watergate scandal, the Democrats gained 43 seats in the House 
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and three in the Senate during the 1974 mid-term elections. The enhanced Democratic 
majority intended to use their power to “correct imbalances in the Congressional-
Presidential relationship.”227 During the early stages of the Nixon administration, the 
Democrats favored and end to the war but were often hesitant to challenge the 
president;228 however, by 1975, Congress was unified in its opposition to any 
involvement in Vietnam and unconcerned about the consequences of abandoning the 
president’s policy goal.229 
 During the final months of 1974, the situation in South Vietnam increasingly 
deteriorated as the North Vietnamese violated the Paris agreement and began a 
widespread offensive. President Ford was unable to directly address the violations 
because of the limitations passed by Congress. Instead, he attempted to negotiate to 
secure additional military assistance for Cambodia and South Vietnam.230 During the 
negotiations, President Ford argued that continuing to provide military aid to Southeast 
Asian nations was important to maintain American credibility and the validity of the 
Nixon Doctrine. In a letter to Speaker of the House Carl Albert, Ford argued 
It has been a basic policy of the Government to give material support to 
friends and allies who are willing and able to carry the burden of their own 
self-defense. 
 This is a moral question that must be faced squarely. Are we to 
deliberately abandon a small country in the midst of its life and death 
struggle? Is the United States, which so far has consistently stood by its 
friends through the most difficult times, now to condemn, in effect, a 
small Asian nation totally dependent on us? Our national security and the 
integrity of our alliance depend upon our reputation as a reliable partner. 
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Countries around the world who depend on us for support – as well as 
their foes – will judge our performance.231 
Congress answered yes to both of President Ford’s questions and refused further 
assistance to Cambodia or South Vietnam. North Vietnam noted these developments and 
took advantage of them by devising a two-year plan for a general uprising to complete 
taking over the South.232 Instead of two years, the North defeated South Vietnam by the 
end of April 1975. Shortly before the collapse, on 23 April 1975, President Ford 
announced that the war was finished as far as America was concerned.233 
 While the legislated termination of the United States’ involvement in Southeast Asia 
sparked new debates over foreign policy, the Nixon administration sought to preserve 
American credibility and revitalize the domestic political consensus necessary for 
sustaining global engagement. Until the middle of 1973, the United States’ concentration 
on the situation in Vietnam came at the expense of other important issues. Kissinger 
noted this clearly when he observed “We…have mortgaged our whole foreign policy to 
the defense of one country.”234 President Nixon wrote “Now that the Vietnam war had 
ended, we could turn our attention to the other areas of the world where war was always 
imminent and where the danger of a great-power nuclear confrontation was far greater 
than in Southeast Asia.”235 Between 1973 and 1975, Vietnam continued to set the 
emotional tone of foreign policy discussions; however, the centrality of the United States 
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and Soviet Union relationship re-emerged as the primary thrust of American foreign 
policy, particularly as it related to the Middle East. As Chinese Premier Chou Enlai 
noted, “When the [United States] got stuck in Vietnam, the Soviet revisionists embraced 
the opportunity to extend vigorously their sphere of influence in…the Middle East.”236 
 Arab-Israeli Conflict and its Aftermath. The 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict (i.e., the 
Yom Kippur War) led to a reassessment of Soviet intentions in the Middle East. In each 
of the successive Middle East conflicts that occurred while the United States was mired 
in Vietnam – 1967, 1970, and 1973 – the Soviet Union increased its involvement and 
power projection into the region. Increased Soviet involvement was attributed, in part, to 
its attainment of strategic nuclear and military parity while the United States and its 
military was distracted in Vietnam.237 The political ramifications of Soviet involvement 
in the 1973 war extended across a range of foreign policy issues, most notably the 
undermining of détente diplomacy. The Soviet Union’s failure to abide by its accords 
with the United States regarding involvement in the conflict called into question the 
perceptions of Soviet intentions in the periphery. This erosion of trust then undermined 
confidence in strategic arms negotiations.238 
 The deteriorating relationship between the United States and Soviet Union following 
the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict reaffirmed the centrality of the bipolar superpower 
relationship despite an emerging political and economic multipolarity. Following the 
conflict, the United States’ foreign policy shifted back to a more explicit policy of Soviet 
containment. From this perspective, the political and military retrenchment from 
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Southeast Asia and détente with the Soviet Union were clearly temporary conditions. 
Rather than reflecting a foreign policy failure, the unstable international context during 
retrenchment underscored the inherent political and technological instability of the 
ongoing Cold War between the Americans and Soviets. Politically, the period of post-
colonialization and proliferation of conflicts challenging existing state structures 
coincided with the rising ability of both superpowers to project power globally. Because 
of this development and the ongoing ideological competition of the Cold War, domestic 
conflicts in the periphery became international conflicts in which the United States and 
Soviet Union competed – the internationalization of domestic conflict. Technological 
advancements in nuclear technologies and the implications of Soviet parity also renewed 
the challenge of integrating nuclear weapons and foreign policy.239 
 Free from the constraints of Vietnam, the United States’ response to the 1973 Yom 
Kippur War, the first international test following America’s withdraw from Southeast 
Asia, showed the benefits of retrenchment. The conflict severely tested Soviet-American 
relations politically divided the United States from its main European allies, and 
increased tensions between the United States and several Arab states in the Middle East. 
In meeting these challenges American diplomacy was active, innovative, and determined 
throughout the crisis.240 To achieve these results, the Nixon administration temporarily 
abandoned the cooperative assumptions of détente and sought to gain geopolitical 
advantage over the Soviets in the Middle East. The United States continuously sought 
advantages during and after the conflict while repeatedly assuring the Soviet Union that 
America remained committed to collaborative problem solving. During the conflict, the 
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United States deterred possible Soviet military intervention by issuing an unprecedented 
alert of American nuclear forces. This act was meant to minimize conjecture that the 
United States may have “provoked [Soviet intervention] by being soft” and to issue a 
warning “in a manner that shocked the Soviets into abandoning” notions of intervening 
on behalf of their Egyptian clients.241 Following the conflict, the Soviet Union had little 
more than a ceremonial role in the diplomacy between the Middle Eastern powers 
involved in the conflict. In fact, the Soviet’s client states, Egypt and Syria, sought 
American diplomatic assistance believing that the United States was the only power that 
could deliver meaningful results.242 
 Because of the United States’ support of Israel during the Yom Kippur war, Arab oil 
producers used their oil monopoly power in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) to embargo oil exports to the United States and its European and 
Japanese allies. The embargo raised oil prices fourfold and severely impacted the 
economies of the targeted countries. The economic shock of the oil embargo 
overshadowed fears of Soviet military threats and raised the strategic importance of the 
Middle East to the American and European economic security.243 However, when the 
United States attempted to unify opposition to the embargo, its European allies balked 
because of their dependence on Arab oil and Japan wanted to pursue other options.244 In 
response, Nixon declared to American allies that they could not “have it both ways. They 
cannot have the United States’ participation and cooperation on the security front and 
then proceed to have confrontation and even hostility on the economic and political 
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front.”245 The United States also implemented a unilateral strategy that threatened 
countermeasures against OPEC states, including the implied threat of military force.246 
The United States’ ultimate unilateral success resulted from effective diplomacy in which 
Kissinger applied the principle of linkage to elicit Arab concessions. In conducting his 
“shuttle diplomacy”, Kissinger successfully demanded that if Egypt and Syria wanted 
him to serve as a mediator between them and Israel, then they would have to mediate 
between the United States and OPEC states to eliminate the embargo.247 
Outcome of Strategic Reorientation 
 Level of Reduced Commitment. Nixon and Kissinger noted the relative decline of 
American power resulting from overcommitment in Vietnam and believed that changing 
international circumstances required the United States to realign and reorient its foreign 
policy. Besides the inherent challenges of devising a sustainable foreign policy, domestic 
constraints further exacerbated developing an appropriate response. The Nixon 
administration understood that a large segment of the American public wished for a 
return to isolationism after more than 20 years of global engagement and bipolar 
competition.248 Therefore, the administration had the dual challenge of reorienting 
American foreign policy in line with new structural circumstances while simultaneously 
maintaining domestic political support. 
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 The first step in meeting these challenges was retrenchment from Vietnam and 
Southeast Asia. Nixon consistently held that the maintenance of American credibility as 
an international partner relied upon providing South Vietnam a reasonable chance to 
determine its future. In his first speech on Vietnam after becoming president, President 
Nixon explicitly rejected attempting to achieve a “purely military solution on the 
battlefield” in South Vietnam, as well as “a one-side withdrawal from Vietnam or the 
acceptance of [peace terms] that would amount to disguised defeat.”249 While the former 
would require a level of support Nixon knew he could not attain,250 the latter might 
undermine American prestige, encourage adversaries, and threaten allies’ security.251 
Nixon contended that the nature of the United States’ withdrawal from Vietnam would 
influence both international and domestic perceptions. He also realized that to maintain 
domestic support for his foreign policy he would not be able to halt troop withdrawals 
once begun. 
 Between Nixon’s first announcement of troop reductions on Midway Island on 8 June 
1969 and November 1972, the United States reduced its troop levels from over 549,000 
to less than 27,000. By 1975, the Defense Attaché Office in South Vietnam had only 50 
American servicemembers and 1,200 civilians. Vietnam was no longer America’s 
primary concern. Regarding funding for the South Vietnamese government and military, 
the budget for fiscal year 1973 included $3.2 billion in aid, and this was reduced to $1.1 
billion in fiscal year 1974. By fiscal year 1975, Congress only allocated $700 million. 
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 Effects on Allies and Adversaries. Contrary to President Nixon’s assertions regarding 
the consequences of withdrawal and the loss of South Vietnam, United States allies 
continued to remain committed. In an assessment of ally sentiment following the collapse 
of South Vietnam, officials noted a “reverse domino” effect. They found that 
Most nations in Asia apparently believe that revolutionary warfare of the 
Vietnamese model, like a car accident, is something that happens to other 
people…. On the other hand, they are worried about North Vietnamese 
expansionism, which they quite accurately regard as having been the 
principal determinant of events in Indochina. They are also worried about 
the danger of increased Russian and Chinese activity, though they still 
regard these in rather amorphous terms.252 
Even though international partners were concerned about the level of American 
commitment, they continued to depend on the United States because they lacked other 
options. A review of those countries most affected by events in Southeast Asia – South 
Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines – showed little willingness to forsake partnership 
with the United States. South Korea had no other option in the face of continuing 
animosity with the communist North Korean regime supported by the Soviet Union and 
China. Virtually surrounded by new communist regimes in Laos and Cambodia, Thailand 
vacillated between conflicting desires to expel United States forces from its territory or to 
adopt neutrality that would imply some level of continued American support. In the 
Philippines, domestic issues prompted its leader to desire a stronger commitment from 
the United States while reducing its overt presence, yet the Philippines’ objectives were 
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not hostile to American interests. Lastly, other countries like Malaysia, Australia, and 
Singapore attempted to move even closer to the United States.253 
 Not only did allies remain committed to partnership with the United States, 
adversaries refrained from further aggression against American interests. At the time of 
the Paris peace accords ending the Vietnam War, American interest in South Vietnam 
remained an independent country with “the opportunity for the South Vietnamese people 
to determine their own future without outside interference.”254 North Vietnam did invade 
and subsequently conquer South Vietnam in 1975; however, at the signing of the Paris 
peace accords the Nixon administration knew this would likely happen and hoped to 
forestall collapse by providing copious military aid. At the time of the North’s final 
offensive, South Vietnam possessed a numerically and technologically superior force 
relative to their rival. When the invasion and pending collapse occurred, the United States 
deliberately abandoned its goals and interests in the region. Laos and Cambodia fell to 
internal communist insurgents. Beyond inhibiting the general spread of communism, the 
United States never maintain a committed interest in maintaining the survival of either 
country. In 1975, Cambodian Khmer communists seized the American container ship SS 
Mayaguez, but this was deemed an act of piracy related to an ongoing territorial dispute 
between Cambodia and Vietnam.255 Regardless, the United States opted to take a strong 
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stand against the Cambodians to send a signal to the North Koreans and Chinese that the 
United States was willing to defend its interests and would not tolerate similar actions.256 
Outcome. 
 How does a great power realign its strategic priorities when overcommitment abroad 
constrains its military power projection and limits diplomatic flexibility? Second, what 
explains the variation in outcomes when states opt to attempt retrenchment. I argue that 
great powers correct the dilemma of overcommitment by going through a process of 
strategic reorientation, of which retrenchment is the critical mechanism. Retrenchment is 
the stage in strategic reorientation when leaders attempt to mediate between existing 
security goals and the need to adapt to an evolving security environment. Retrenching 
states are more likely to succeed when they can share a security burden with a likeminded 
ally, settle grievances or diffuse secondary threats with a rival through rapprochement, or, 
failing either of these, abandon an interest regardless of the consequences. When none of 
these options are available, retrenchment will fail, because a great power will be unable 
to extricate itself from existing commitments and free resources to address more critical 
challenges. In this case, President Richard Nixon sought to lay the foundation for a 
proactive, long-range foreign policy. He began by implementing a policy of retrenchment 
that redistributed resources from peripheral concerns in Southeast Asia to core security 
interests in other regions. He was successful and ultimately improved the United States’ 
strategic solvency. 
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 Much as my theory of retrenchment outcomes predicted, Nixon’s success stemmed 
from a combination of ally burden sharing, rapprochement with geopolitical rivals, and 
abandoning American interests in Southeast Asia. I argue that retrenchment is more 
likely to succeed when a state can identify a suitable successor to uphold an existing 
security order. In this case, President Nixon focused on Vietnamization to improve South 
Vietnam’s ability to assume responsibility for its own defense and relieve the United 
States of its security burden. He committed substantial financial and material resources to 
strengthen South Vietnam’s ability to defend itself. By the time United States military 
forces withdrew in 1973, South Vietnam had a numerically and qualitatively superior 
military that gave the South a fighting chance. The failure by South Vietnamese leaders 
to implement meaningful governmental reforms and politicization of their senior military 
leaders resulted in the collapse of South Vietnam; however, this was the South’s failure 
and did not impede American retrenchment. 
 My theory of retrenchment outcomes also holds that retrenchment is more likely to 
succeed the more a state succeeds at rapprochement with adversaries. President Nixon 
successfully implemented a policy of détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement 
with China. He held the idea that competing interests with rivals were not immutable and 
could be realistically managed through negotiation. Nixon’s policy of détente with the 
Soviet Union was an instrumentalist strategy for achieving the administration’s goals in 
Vietnam. President Nixon intended to complement détente and facilitate retrenchment 
from Southeast Asia through rapprochement with China. By improving relations with 
China, Nixon hoped to produce stable regional conditions to facilitate United States 
withdrawal. The announcement of the Nixon Doctrine was meant to signal that the 
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American threat to China would decline post-Vietnam. The American opening to China 
was intended to elicit diplomatic pressure on North Vietnam to negotiate an end to the 
war. Rapprochement led to triangular diplomacy between the United States, China, and 
the Soviet Union and facilitated American retrenchment between 1969 and 1973. 
 Absent an ally willing and able to assume responsibility for burden sharing, and when 
rapprochement fails, I predict that retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more able a 
great power is to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal. During the 
United States’ retrenchment from South Vietnam, President Nixon committed extensive 
political, economic, and military resources to improve South Vietnam’s security capacity. 
Given the consequences of failure, South Vietnamese leaders were ostensibly willing to 
provide their own security, and American military aid gave them the material ability to 
do so. However, South Vietnamese political dysfunction hindered their effectiveness and 
ultimately led to collapse. Faced with the prospect of re-intervening to honor its 
commitments, United States leaders opted instead to abandon all interests in South 
Vietnam, a decision supported by the public and political elites. 
 Regarding my last two hypotheses – retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less 
influence domestic political divisions have on accepting the logical implications of 
regional withdrawal, and retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail – I find 
evidence to support both claims. The American public and political elites favored 
withdrawal, and Congress went so far as to limit the president’s war powers, cut funding 
for South Vietnam, and preclude using American military forces in in that country. 
President Ford did try to secure additional military aid for South Vietnam, but faced with 
a political consensus about remaining uninvolved, Ford acquiesced and declared that the 
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Vietnam War was over before the South finally collapsed. Finally, retrenchment in this 
case succeeded because the United States was able to find an ally for burden sharing, 
successfully settle disputes with its rivals, and, when South Vietnam’s demise seemed 
imminent, domestic political circumstances in favor of nonintervention resulted in 
abandonment of American interest in South Vietnam specifically, and Southeast Asia in 
general. 
 Table 4 summarizes my findings regarding the five main hypotheses. 
Table 4. Hypotheses and Summary of Successful Retrenchment 
Hypothesis 1 
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed when a state can identify a 
suitable successor to uphold an existing security order. Nixon 
focused on improving South Vietnam’s ability to assume 
responsibility for its own defense and relieve the United States of its 
security burden. Nixon committed substantial financial and material 
resources to strengthen the South’s ability to defend itself; however, 
political dysfunction in that country made it an ineffective proxy. 
Hypothesis 2 
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more a state succeeds at 
rapprochement with adversaries. President Nixon successfully 
implemented a policy of détente with the Soviet Union and 
rapprochement with China. 
Hypothesis 3 
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more able a great power 
is to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal. The 
United States abandoned its interest in South Vietnam and declined to 
commit American airpower to stave off defeat by the North. 
Hypothesis 4 
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less influence domestic 
political divisions have on accepting the logical implications of 
regional withdrawal. The American public and political elites favored 
withdrawal. Nixon managed to avert the risk of isolationism and 
maintained a political consensus on the need for engagement abroad. 
Hypothesis 5 
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. Attempts to bolster 
South Vietnam’s ability to secure itself ultimately failed, but the 
United States successfully settled issues with its main rivals which 
prevented aggression. When faced the prospect of re-intervening to 
prevent the collapse of South Vietnam, American leaders opted 
instead to abandon their interests in that country. 
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Alternatives 
 How about the alternative hypotheses for retrenchment outcomes? This case provides 
limited to no support for any of the three identified alternatives. What support does 
appear falls well short of the robust evidence supporting my main claims. First, 
retrenchment may be more likely to succeed the more closely leaders align the type of 
cost reductions with the risks associated with the nature of relative decline. President 
Nixon did opt for strategic retrenchment when faced with international relative decline; 
however, this did not necessarily contribute to the United States’ success. His ability to 
enhance South Vietnam’s capability for providing for its own defense and triangular 
diplomacy made possible because of rapprochement facilitated America’s deliberate 
withdraw. Had either of these factors not manifested, retrenchment likely would have 
failed due to the consequences of a precipitous withdraw and rapid collapse of the South 
at a time when the American public still supported honoring their country’s commitment 
to a free and democratic South Vietnam. Therefore, while President Nixon did correctly 
link the type of cost reductions with the nature of American relative decline, this alone 
was not enough to bring about success. 
 Second, another possible explanation is that operational retrenchment is less likely to 
succeed than strategic retrenchment. Here too, the evidence of the case does not fully 
bear this out, though it does suggest the need for further investigation. President Nixon 
implemented a mixture of operational and strategic retrenchment policy responses, yet 
the main thrust of cost savings involved reducing the level of foreign commitments – the 
level of risk in foreign policy. He also provided cover for force reductions and reduced 
warfighting capacity by engaging in active diplomacy with Soviet and Chinese rivals. 
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This reassured allies, particularly in the Middle East, who up to that point were slowly 
being pulled into the Soviet orbit. Middle Eastern countries quickly abandoned the 
Soviets when the United States asserted itself diplomatically. Had President Nixon opted 
to solely cut costs through reducing the price of security or refrained from substituting 
diplomacy for force, it seems likely retrenchment would have failed. Counterfactually, by 
withdrawing from South Vietnam, abandoning its interests in Southeast Asia, and 
significantly cutting its forces, American rivals might have opted to act more 
aggressively to take advantage of the apparent United States’ retreat, aggression to which 
it might not have been able to respond given recently reduced force structures. Therefore, 
the hypothesis that operational retrenchment is more likely to fail than strategic 
retrenchment has some support and warrants further investigation, even if it was not an 
operative factor in this case. 
 Finally, slower rates of retrenchment may be more likely to succeed than rapid 
withdrawal or reductions. Here again, the evidence does not fully support this hypothesis. 
Nixon began withdrawing large numbers of servicemembers within eight months of 
assuming the presidency. After making the initial withdrawal announcement, he 
proceeded to make other large reductions over the course of the next three years. While 
the number of servicemembers in South Vietnam rapidly declined, President Nixon 
attempted to calibrate withdraw to on-the-ground conditions and the South’s ability to 
assume more responsibility for their security. In this respect, the size of reductions seems 
less important that the managed pace at which they occurred. While providing some 
support for the idea that the rate of withdrawal may matter, little evidence points to it 
being a vital factor to success. In 1974, after it became clear to the North Vietnamese that 
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the United States would no longer support the South, the North planned and initiated an 
offensive to capture South Vietnam. Perhaps had Nixon opted for rapid and immediate 
withdraw this might have precipitated a similar response from the North; however, the 
factor determining success would have been the United States’ ability to abandon its 
interests, not how quickly it withdrew its forces. There might have been an effect on 
allies or other rivals, but this case provides little evidence. Therefore, there is limited 
support for the rate of retrenchment influencing outcomes. Counterfactuals suggest, 
however, the need for further research regarding not only whether the rate of reductions 
matter, but how they might matter. 
 Table 5 summarizes my findings regarding the three alternative hypotheses. 
Table 5. Alternative Hypotheses of Successful Retrenchment. 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 1 
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more closely leaders align 
the type of cost reductions with the risks associated with the nature of 
relative decline. President Nixon correctly matched cost reductions to 
the nature of decline, but this played no role in the outcome. 
(Unsupported) 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 2 
Operational retrenchment is less likely to succeed than strategic 
retrenchment. President Nixon mixed and matched types of cost 
reductions, with the predominant being strategic retrenchment 
policies. His success neither proves nor disproves this hypothesis. A 
counterfactual where Nixon favored operational reduction might 
plausibly have resulted in aggression by American rivals. 
(Limited support) 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 3 
Slower rates of retrenchment are more likely to succeed than rapid 
withdrawal or reductions. President Nixon attempted to calibrate 
withdraw to on-the-ground conditions and the South’s ability to 
assume more responsibility for their security. The pace of reductions 
may play a role, but little evidence from the case points to it being a 
vital factor for success. 
(Limited support) 
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CHAPTER 4:  RETRENCHMENT FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, 2009-2015 
 
“Any thoughtful president would hesitate about making renewed commitment in the 
exact same region of the world with some of the exact same dynamics and the same 
probability of an unsatisfactory outcome.”257 
 
 This project aims to answer how a great power realigns its strategic priorities when 
foreign overcommitment constrains its military power projection and diplomatic 
flexibility. Retrenchment is one way to realign resources and priorities, but its outcome 
varies. I argue that retrenchment fails when a great power is unable to extricate itself 
from existing commitments and, therefore, is unable to free resources to address more 
vital challenges. Extrication occurs in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to 
a partner, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandonment. Retrenchment fails 
when none of these three options are available. 
 President Obama entered office in January 2009 with a desire to reverse what he 
perceived as foreign policy overreach by his predecessor. He inherited two stalemated 
wars – in Afghanistan and Iraq – and he believed that American foreign policy had 
ossified over the previous eight years. President Obama and his advisors thought that the 
George W. Bush administration overcommitted the United States in Iraq and neglected 
more critical issues like institutional reform, nuclear proliferation, economic growth, and 
collective responses to man-made and natural disasters. These crises were believed to be 
symptoms of weakness in the existing international architecture.258 
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 Seeking to lay the foundation for a proactive, long-range foreign policy, President 
Obama intended to retrench from the Middle East – especially Iraq and Afghanistan – 
and reorient American power towards East Asia. In the final analysis, the Obama 
administration failed. President Obama could not identify a suitable successor to counter 
rising Iranian influence and contain regional crises, nor did he succeed at offsetting his 
retrenchment policy with rapprochement to minimize the potential for rivals to take 
advantage of American withdrawal.259 Subsequent turmoil resulting from the Arab 
Spring, the Syrian Civil War, the emergence of the Islamic State, and Iran’s expanding 
influence sparked intense post hoc debate about the wisdom of withdrawal. Despite 
President Obama’s intent, political partisanship and allied pressure meant he could not 
abandon American interests in the region (figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Variables Affecting American Retrenchment from the Middle East. 
                                                 
259 Robert B. Zoellick, “A Presidency of Missed Opportunities: Unlike Nixon in the Wake of Vietnam, 
Obama has Failed to Offset Retrenchment with a Strategic Initiative,” Wall Street Journal, 10 August 
2014, accessed 21 December 2018, at https://www.wsj.com/articles/robert-zoellick-a-presidency-of-
missed-opportunities-1407709833. 
98 
 
 In what follows, I discuss this example of unsuccessful retrenchment within the 
context of the posited model of strategic reorientation. First, I demonstrate the 
international relative decline and strategic misalignment of the United States resulting 
from its overcommitment in the Middle East between 2004 and 2008. I then discuss the 
linked policies of the nebulous Obama Doctrine and related pivot to Asia, both of which 
provided the policy framework for political and military retrenchment from the Middle 
East between 2009 and 2011. Next, I examine the period of political and military 
realignment following and the attempted geostrategic reorientation towards the East Asia 
from 2011 to 2014. I conclude by providing an empirical assessment of the outcome of 
this unsuccessful retrenchment attempt. 
International Decline and Strategic Misalignment 
 The Road to Overcommitment, 2001-2008. Attacks on 11 September 2001 made 
terrorism the United States’ strategic priority in a worldwide geopolitical and ideological 
struggle. Cast in a Manichean light, President George Bush asserted that “our 
responsibility to history is clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.”260 
Rather than leaving it to law enforcement and passive countermeasures, President Bush 
began a military offensive based on the “need to fight overseas by bringing the war to the 
bad guys,”261 while “making no distinction between the terrorists who committed [the 
                                                 
260 George W. Bush, “President’s Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Service,” National 
Cathedral, Washington, DC, 14 September 2001, accessed 28 December 2018, at https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives. gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914-2.html. 
261 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 281. 
99 
 
9/11 attacks] and those who harbor them.”262 Assessing terrorism as a worldwide threat 
led Bush to formulate a strategy for fighting a global “War on Terror.”263 
 Five assumptions guided the Bush administration’s “War on Terror” and military 
action in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other areas around the world. First, American military 
dominance provided an unprecedented ability to fight overseas. Second, previous 
administrations failed to respond more expansively to terror provocations which 
emboldened extremist groups like Al Qaeda. Vice President Dick Cheney argued that 
weakness, vacillation, and the unwillingness of the United States to stand 
with our friends – that is provocative. It encouraged people like Osama bin 
Laden…to launch repeated strikes against the United States, our people 
overseas and here at home, with the view that he could, in fact, do so with 
impunity.264 
Third, the United States had to act pre-emptively because the Cold War doctrines of 
containment and deterrence would not work against terror groups that did not have to 
defend territory.265 Fourth, since terrorists required state support, the War on Terror was 
indistinguishable from efforts to combat rogue regimes like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea 
who supported terror groups. Finally, alliances and multilateral organizations were not 
essential to American efforts to fight terrorism.266 
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 Afghanistan became the first battle in the War on Terror because its Taliban 
government harbored Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda and would not turn them over to 
the United States following the 9/11 attacks. One day after the attacks, the United Nations 
Security Council expressed its readiness “to take all necessary steps to respond to the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in 
accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations.”267 On the 
same day, and for the first time in its history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
invoked Article 5, obligating its members to come to the defense of another member. 
Within a week of the attacks, Congress authorized President Bush “to use all necessary 
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 
11, 2011, or harbored such organizations or persons.”268 By October 2001, the United 
States, joined by almost twenty other countries, attacked Afghanistan and succeeded in 
routing the Taliban by December. 
 Most allies who joined the United States to fight the Taliban assumed the Bush 
administration had an Afghanistan-only policy. In fact, President Bush was pursuing an 
Afghanistan-first policy.269 Although Bush ultimately decided against invading Iraq as 
the first offensive in the War on Terror, he and his advisors began debating whether to 
invade immediately after the 9/11 attacks.270 Iraq and its dictator, Saddam Hussein, 
embodied the potential for the convergence of terrorists operating within rogue states in 
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possession of weapons of mass destruction. President Bush’s decision was not whether 
but when to invade Iraq. Though Congress ultimately authorized President Bush to 
launch a war against Iraq, the United Nations Security Council did not. Despite that set-
back, President Bush launched an attack against Iraq in March 2003 over objections by 
many of the United States’ allies and much of the rest of the world. 
 The United States defeated Iraq in less than four weeks, but by the summer of 2003 
the American military found itself embroiled in an insurgency. President Bush attributed 
this to the “consequences of catastrophic success,”271 but the reality was misguided post-
war planning that assumed the United States would hand over control to the Iraqis within 
a few months. This did not happen. More than half-way through President Bush’s second 
term, the United States was still mired in Iraq with well over 120,000 servicemembers 
deployed there annually, and an additional 30,000 deployed each year to Afghanistan. In 
2007, after costing over half a trillion dollars and tens of thousands of casualties, 
President Bush deployed an additional 20,000 troops during “the Surge” to Iraq to try and 
stop internecine ethnic violence and quell the insurgency. 
 Because of the Surge’s seeming success,272 and “recognizing the performance and 
increasing capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces,”273 President Bush and Iraqi Prime 
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Minister Nouri al-Maliki signed a comprehensive Status of Forces Agreement in 
December 2008. The agreement established a framework for curtailing American military 
presence in Iraq and making the Iraqi government responsible for its security.274 The 
agreement stipulated that all American combat forces be removed from Iraqi cities no 
later than 30 June 2009, and that “[a]ll the United States Forces shall withdraw from all 
Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.”275 Moreover, the United States 
recognized Iraq’s right to request the withdrawal of American forces at any time.276 
Administration officials believed that the agreement would ultimately be renegotiated to 
allow a sizable residual force to remain in Iraq after 2011.277 
 Meanwhile, the Taliban regained the initiative in Afghanistan because of the Bush 
administration’s diplomatic and military fixation on Iraq. Iran and North Korea also 
advanced their nuclear programs, America ineffectively opposed China as it expanded its 
influence throughout the Asia-Pacific region, and Russia brazenly demonstrated 
revanchist behavior in its near-abroad. Though the United States demonstrated it could 
topple regimes with unprecedented speed,278 it became mired in Iraq and struggled to 
defeat the insurgency or build a functioning democratic government. Worse, the United 
States was strategically misaligned and unable to address emerging challenges in Asia 
because of its military overcommitment and declining capacity for action. 
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 Military Overcommitment. By December 2008, the United States military, 
particularly the Army, was overcommitted in the Middle East. All military services 
deployed forces in support of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the Army 
bore the brunt of these sizable land operations. As a result, the Army most clearly 
reflected the costs of strategic overreach. According to Defense Manpower Data Center 
data, between March 2003 and December 2008, the Army deployed an average of 
117,000 active duty Soldiers each year to Iraq and Afghanistan. This average increased to 
128,000 between September 2005 and December 2008, by which point approximately 
67% of active duty Soldiers had deployed, with many on their second or third 
deployments. By December 2008, approximately 373,000 active Army soldiers had 
served in Iraq or Afghanistan: 121,000 had deployed for their first year, 173,000 for their 
second, and 79,000 for their third year. Over 9,000 of the latter group had deployed for 
their fourth year.279 
 The high demand for forces led the Army to change its force generation model to 
ensure it could maintain an adequate forward deployed force, provide rotational forces, 
and ensure deploying units were properly trained and equipped. The new model 
established a structured, event-based progression of increased unit readiness over time. 
The intent was for active units to be available for deployment once every three years, 
reserve units every five years, and National Guard units every six years. In practice, 
however, it meant that the only trained and available units were those deployed or just 
about to be deployed. Those just returning from a deployment or recently returned were 
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untrained, undermanned and resourced, and unavailable. For every deployed unit there 
were two others unavailable – one recently redeployed and one preparing for deployment. 
In aggregate, the number of deployed and unavailable soldiers totaled approximately 70% 
of the active Army. The remaining 30 % of forces were either new soldiers or military 
academy cadets in training, forward-deployed soldiers at other locations, supporting 
operations from the United States, or injured. Less than 6% of soldiers – approximately 
31,000 – in the active Army did not fall into one of these categories.280 
 Operational demands forced the Army to exceed desired dwell times for soldiers – the 
time soldiers spent at home station between deployments – to maintain required troop 
levels. Rather than maintaining a dwell time ratio of one year deployed and two years at 
home, the Army adhered to a roughly one to one ratio to generate enough replacement 
forces for deployed units. In addition to more frequently occurring deployments, the 
Army had to increase its end strength, remove deterrent units stationed in South Korea 
and Europe for use in the deployment cycle, and decrease the size of its generating forces 
to make more soldiers available for deployment. Even with these stopgap measures, the 
active Army experienced an approximately 94% annual utilization rate, deployment 
ratios stayed the same, and it retained almost no capacity to deploy more soldiers in 
support of ongoing operations or in response to unexpected contingencies.281 
 Declining Domestic Capacity. Three main factors contributed to declining domestic 
capacity:  a war-weary American public, fiscal austerity resulting from the 2008 financial 
crisis, and dysfunctional political partisanship. First, by early 2009, only 35% of 
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Americans believed that the Iraq war was the main problem facing the United States, 
57% thought that sending troops to Iraq was a mistake, and 65% believed that the costs of 
the war outweighed it benefits.282 Over 49% of Americans felt that the United States 
should “mind its own business internationally.”283 A majority of the public also felt that 
the United States should only assist five out of fifty of its formal defense treaty allies – 
Canada, Germany, Israel, Mexico, and the United Kingdom – if required, thereby 
signaling serious doubt about America’s global leadership role and commitment to the 
exiting American-led world order.284 The effects of the 2008 financial crises heightened 
these concerns. 
 Widespread failures in financial regulation, corporate governance lapses, risky 
lending and borrowing, and ethics violations caused the financial crisis beginning at the 
end of 2007 and lasting through 2008.285 Massive bailouts of financial institutions 
prevented economic collapse, but the United States entered “the Great Recession” and 
there was a global economic downturn. Housing markets suffered in many parts of the 
country, resulting in high levels of evictions, foreclosures, and prolonged unemployment. 
The economic crisis also contributed to widespread business failures and trillions of 
dollars of lost consumer wealth.286 
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 “The Great Recession” led to domestic economic concerns that presented President 
Obama with his most pressing challenges when he entered office. The recession also 
highlighted the spiraling budget deficits and increasing national debt that accrued 
between 2001 and 2009. A large portion of the debt increase resulted from the Bush 
administration’s decision to finance the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq by borrowing 
instead of raising taxes. It became increasingly clear that the United States would have to 
reign-in federal spending or risk being unable to repay its debts or control inflation.287 In 
2009, the Congressional Budget Office forecast that the United States would run 
unsustainable $1 trillion budget deficits annually, and observed that even if recovery 
from the recession occurred as expected, the United States would still have the highest 
debt-to-gross national product ratio since 1945.288 
 Spiraling budget deficits and increasing national debt between 2001 and 2009 sparked 
concerns about the material foundations of American power. The weakening of the 
United States’ economic and financial underpinnings suggested that it would have to 
either raise taxes and interest rates, consume less and save, or reduce its military 
expenditures.289 Significantly reducing military spending would likely force the United 
States to scale back its overseas commitments with two important consequences. First, 
reducing defense spending would make it easier for rising great powers like China to 
close the military power gap with the United States. Second, declining military capacity 
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would make it more difficult for the United States to respond to crises and stabilize 
important regions or secure the global commons.290 Left unchecked, both consequences 
would hasten America’s relative decline. Regardless, the Obama administration proposed 
an annual defense spending cut of $400 million over eleven years, totaling approximately 
$40 billion over that period – a 10% cut in annual defense spending. 
 By the time of President Obama’s inauguration, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had 
cost over $1.5 trillion with a human toll of over 6,000 dead and more than 40,000 
wounded.291 These costs sapped the political will to sustain the conflicts and distorted 
policy making by increasingly polarizing politicians forced to simultaneously contend 
with terrorism, economic decline, and the steady rise of near-peer geopolitical rivals. 
Whereas the decision to attack Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks received bipartisan 
support, the war in Iraq produced some of the highest levels of polarization recorded in 
the history of popular polling. A year after the United States invaded Iraq, the gap in 
support for the war between Republicans and Democrats reached 63%. By comparison, 
the gap in support for previous wars in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Vietnam, and Korea 
averaged 5%.292 This ongoing public polarization coincided with equally divided political 
elites. Regardless of party affiliation, members of Congress actively sought to frustrate or 
complicate opposition party initiatives, whether domestically or internationally. 
 The partisan lens through which political elites and the public viewed the Iraq War 
also influenced the lessons learned and conclusions about the efficacy of the war on 
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American security.293 One study of Republicans and Democrats showed divergent 
opinions about the effects of the war on the United States’ long-term security. The study 
found that 66% of Republicans thought the war was the right decision, while only 31% of 
Democrats and 38% of independents agreed. Similarly, 69% of Republicans believed the 
war improved American security, while only 35% of Democrats and 40% of 
independents agreed.294 These views also established the parameters for adjusting 
national security policies. Political polarization undermined the United States’ foreign 
policy where the lack of unity encouraged adversaries, disheartened allies, and sapped 
American resolve for taking needed action.295 Moreover, the inability of the president to 
get bipartisan support for foreign policy increased the political risk of subsequent military 
action.296 
 Considering Withdrawal. President Obama believed that the war in Iraq rested on 
flawed assumptions.297 He outlined his foreign policy views as a Senator in the 2007 
article “Renewing American Leadership” in which he argued “for a new vision of 
[American] leadership in the twenty-first century” that would not be “bound by outdated 
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thinking.”298 Obama argued that contemporary security challenges, especially those in the 
Middle East, could only be addressed by applying the full range of American power 
rather than narrowly focusing on military power alone.299 Key to his approach was 
rebalancing American engagement abroad from an overreliance on military power during 
the Bush administration to the use of non-military, soft-power. 
 During his presidential campaign, Obama promised to remove all United States 
combat units from Iraq within sixteen months of his inauguration. While noting that “we 
must be as careful getting out of Iraq as we were careless getting in,” he argued that the 
United States could remove all combat forces by the summer of 2010. However, he 
explained “we'll keep a residual force to perform specific missions in Iraq: targeting any 
remnants of al-Qaida; protecting our service members and diplomats; and training and 
supporting Iraq's Security Forces, so long as the Iraqis make political progress.”300 This 
suggested that the United States retained critical security interests in the region. In two 
early speeches as president, at Cairo in June 2009 and at the September 2009 address to 
the United Nations General Assembly, Obama also appeared to question the capacity and 
virtue of American efforts to spread democracy, advance human rights, and open free 
markets around the world.301 
 President Obama’s approach ultimately responded to his perspectives on the limits of 
American power and an inclination to leverage the influence provided by the previous 
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period of American primacy.302 During his first term in office, this meant that his biggest 
security challenges involved the extrication of the United States from the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and changing the way America prosecuted the War on Terror.303 Benjamin 
Rhodes, one of Obama’s deputy national-security advisers, said, “The project of the first 
two years has been to effectively deal with the legacy issues that we inherited, 
particularly the Iraq war, the Afghan war, and the war against Al Qaeda, while 
rebalancing our resources and our posture in the world.”304 “If you were to boil it all 
down to a bumper sticker, it’s ‘Wind down these two wars, reestablish American 
standing and leadership in the world, and focus on a broader set of priorities’….”305 
 The Obama administration was not only skeptical about the limits of American 
power, especially military power, it focused on the constraints imposed by the rise of 
other states like China and India. The 2008 global financial crisis also hinted at the limits 
of the United States’ economic power, but the rise of regional competitors was the 
primary driver of American relative decline. President Obama and his aides believed that 
they were struggling to hold on to America’s dominant position for another few 
decades.306 Benjamin Rhodes explained “[w]e’re not trying to preside over America’s 
decline. What we’re trying to do is get America another 50 years as leader.”307 
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 The rise of regional powers meant that the United States’ desire to maintain primacy 
faced opposition in areas like the Middle East and Asia where rising powers competed for 
resources and influence. However, the Obama administration fundamentally sought to 
preserve primacy. During her confirmation hearing, Secretary of State nominee Hillary 
Clinton noted that “our overriding duty is to protect and advance America’s security, 
interests, and values…to strengthen America’s position of global leadership so we remain 
a positive force in the world.”308 Similarly, during his first inaugural address, President 
Obama declared, “we are ready to lead once more.”309 Despite the administration’s intent 
and efforts to preserve primacy and America’s leadership role, it experienced an abiding 
tension between this desire and balancing domestic economic and political constraints 
with international challenges to American leadership. 
Framework for Retrenchment, 2009-2011 
 The Obama administration’s foreign policy rested on the notion that the United 
States’ involvement in Iraq undermined its world standing and threatened America’s 
fundamental economic and security interests. His initial goal was to end American 
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan while encouraging Middle Eastern partners to 
assume more responsibility for providing for their security and regional stability. Success 
in both these areas would facilitate the United States’ disengagement from the region to 
focus on strengthening America’s domestic circumstances and strategically reorienting to 
address emerging economic and security challenges in Asia. The Obama administration 
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envisioned leaving a small military force in the Persian Gulf region to counter the spread 
of Iranian influence, while focusing efforts to expand American economic and security 
interests in the Asia-Pacific region to prevent China from altering the status quo.310 
President Obama opted for a mixture of policies and actions designed to calibrate 
American commitments with its constrained capacity to maintain and maximize its ability 
to provide global leadership.311 
 President Obama’s worldview of the international system rested on four pillars. He 
believed he inherited a world that was hyper-connected, uncontrollable, and required 
multi-partner action. Both the 2010 and 2015 National Security Strategies reflected these 
views and redefined the United States’ relationship to the international system. Hyper-
connectedness described the world in which American would act considering the 
condition of uncontrollability, and the belief in partnerships reflected how the United 
States would exercise it leadership.312 
 These four pillars provided the basis for President Obama’s attempts to restore 
equilibrium to American foreign policy which he perceived had become misaligned 
during the Bush administration. President Obama saw Bush’s reaction to the 9/11 terror 
attack – an overreaction in Obama’s estimate – as the biggest danger to American 
interests. Because the Bush administration overcommitted to the War on Terror in 
general, and specifically the Iraq War, President Obama believed he needed to rebalance 
foreign policy to regain American prestige and freedom of action. To succeed, Obama 
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needed to achieve equilibrium in six interrelated areas: resetting the global War on 
Terror, balancing America’s hard and soft power, pursing multilateralism in a “new era 
of engagement,”313 finding a balance between foreign and domestic policy needs, finding 
a new foreign policy consensus, and geostrategic equilibrium.314 
 Lowering Costs. President Obama entered office when the United States was 
experiencing its worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. His primary task was 
to avoid economic collapse, and his priorities during his first year in office reflected an 
emphasis on domestic and economic issues. Obama’s first National Security Strategy 
mirrored this emphasis on domestic economic solvency and asserted “[t]he foundation of 
American leadership must be a prosperous American economy.”315 President Obama’s 
domestic focus comported with widely held opinions in which the public, Democrats and 
Republicans alike, believed America should pay less attention to foreign policy issues 
and focus on domestic problems.316 Accordingly, Obama made clear his determination to 
reduce national security spending. 
 In February 2009, President Obama delivered a speech in which he revised the 
original date of withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq from 30 June 2009 to 31 August 
2010. Despite this extension, President Obama reaffirmed his commitment of complete 
withdrawal of American forces from Iraq by 31 December 2011, in accordance with the 
Bush administration’s agreement with the Iraq government. In the meantime, the United 
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States would “retain a transitional force to carry out three distinct functions: training, 
equipping, and advising Iraqi security forces as long as they remain nonsectarian; 
conducting targeted counterterrorism missions; and protecting our ongoing civilian and 
military efforts within Iraq. Initially, this force will likely be made up of 35,000 to 50,000 
[American] troops.”317 
 As he did with Iraq, President Obama began pushing for a withdrawal of American 
forces from Afghanistan within sixteen months of entering office.318 After initially 
approving an increase of 17,000 troops in Afghanistan, the debate over withdrawal lasted 
several months and appeared indecisive.319 However, by October 2009, Obama seemed to 
make up his mind. At a National Security Council meeting discussing sending more 
troops to Afghanistan he stated, “[w]e’ve recognized that we’re not going to completely 
defeat the Taliban which we all agree on,” and after hearing recommendations declared 
“[t]his is not what I’m looking for…I’m not doing ten years. I’m not spending a trillion 
dollars. That’s not in the national interest.”320 Moreover, some on his national security 
team believed that the Taliban could be accommodated like Hezbollah, so President 
Obama decided to pursue a policy of withdrawal rather than trying to defeat the 
enemy.321 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted “[for President Obama], it’s all about 
getting out.”322 In November, President Obama decided to send 30,000 additional soldiers 
to Afghanistan, far below the 60-80,000 his advisors recommended, but stressed that 
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“there needs to be a plan about how we’re going to hand off and get out of 
Afghanistan.”323 
 President Obama’s decision to increase troop levels in Afghanistan was a comprise 
because he was reluctant to continue devoting resources to the conflict.324 Military 
leaders requested what they thought were enough additional troops to win the campaign. 
President Obama, however, did not want to deepen American commitment and settled on 
a plan he believed to be politically viable. Critics on both ends of the political spectrum 
panned President Obama’s decision.325 Regardless, when he announced the deployment 
of additional troops he simultaneously announced that they would start being withdrawn 
within eighteen months. Moreover, he reduced the United States’ objectives in 
Afghanistan which he now “narrowly defined as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating 
Al Qaeda and its extremist allies,” because he “[refused] to set goals that go beyond 
[America’s] responsibility…means…and interests.” President Obama argued that the 
United States could no longer ignore financial costs and declared that “our troop 
commitment in Afghanistan cannot be open-ended – because the nation that I’m most 
interested in building is our own.”326 In other words, President Obama limited further 
involvement in Afghanistan to conserve resources and focus on domestic priorities. 
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 President Obama remained “absolutely convinced that you cannot solve the problem 
of Afghanistan, the Taliban, the spread of extremism in that region solely through 
military means.”327 While announcing on 1 December 2009 that he would send additional 
troops to Afghanistan, President Obama set July 2011 as the date to begin withdrawing 
all troops from that country.328 On 22 June 2011, President Obama announced that 10,000 
troops would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of the year, and an additional 
23,000 would leave by the summer of 2012.329 The announced drawdown would leave 
approximately 68,000 by the end of 2012. President Obama and Afghan president Hamid 
Karzai signed a strategic partnership on 2 May 2012. The agreement stipulated that 
Afghan Security forces would take the lead in combat operations by the end of 2013, and 
almost all US troops would be completely withdrawn by the end of 2014.330 Finally, on 
27 May 2014, President Obama announced that American combat operations in 
Afghanistan would end in December 2014 and that troops levels would be reduced to 
9,800 troops by this time. He noted it was “time to turn the page on a decade in which so 
much of our foreign policy was focused on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.”331 
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 Besides the planned troop reductions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama 
administration sought to lower the cost of the War on Terror by relying on drones and 
special operation forces.332 It also attempted to reduce foreign commitments and share 
burdens with allies. These dynamics indicated the Obama administration was concerned 
with redefining “the circumstances under which the United States [would] use diplomacy, 
coercion and force to shape the world around it” at as little cost as possible.333 As 
President Obama explained 
the world is a tough complicated, messy, mean place, and full of hardship 
and tragedy. And in order to advance both our security interests and those 
ideals and values that we care about, we’ve got to be hardheaded at the 
same time as we’re bighearted, and pick and choose our spots, and 
recognize that there are going to be times where the best that we can do is 
to shine a spotlight on something that’s terrible, but not believe that we 
can automatically solve it. There are going to be times where our security 
interests conflict with our concerns about human rights. There are going to 
be times where we can do something about innocent people being killed, 
but there are going to be times where we can’t.334 
 President Obama’s response to the Libyan crisis exemplified this approach whereby 
he sought to avoid additional military commitments in the Middle East unless necessary 
to protect American security interests.335 The Obama administration believed that other 
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regional powers like France and Britain, both American allies, had more direct interests 
in resolving the crisis. Accordingly, President Obama persuaded these powers to act 
while he implemented a “lead from behind” strategy by which the United States applied 
its unique military capabilities to assist NATO allies who conducted the main operations 
against Libya.336 Obama’s approach to the Libyan crisis and the War on Terror amounted 
to a policy of “surrogate warfare” whereby he externalized the costs of conflict by using 
human and technological surrogates when the administration determined vital national 
interest were not at stake.337 
 Managing Withdrawal. President Obama was determined to limit the use of the 
military in defense of vital interests within the context of globalization and forced 
austerity resulting from two costly wars and the 2008 financial crisis. Furthermore, any 
use of a leaner and more flexible military force would only be considered if it were 
multilateral and in cooperation with allies.338 With the president’s attention focused on 
domestic affairs, it appeared that his approach to foreign affairs, particularly security 
policy, was non-interventionist.  President Obama recognized the limits to the United 
States’ resources and capacity,339 so his primary strategic approach relied upon the 
principles of “multilateral retrenchment” designed to “curtail the United States’ overseas 
commitments, restore its standing in the world, and shift burdens onto global partners.”340 
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 The 2010 and 2015 National Security Strategies echoed these themes. They stated 
“[t]he threshold for military action is higher when [United States] interests are not 
directly threatened. In such cases, we will seek to mobilize allies and partners to share the 
burden and achieve lasting outcomes.”341 Ultimately, President Obama did not 
necessarily change the objectives of American foreign policy so much as the means he 
would use to achieve them.342 The intent for altering the means used to achieve security 
objectives was to reduce military commitments in the Middle East and Europe to 
facilitate sizable military force reductions and divert savings towards domestic programs. 
 President Obama demonstrated on several geopolitical issues that he preferred a 
policy of retrenchment and restraint over continuing engagement in unproductive and 
interminable conflicts. First, the Obama administration sought to minimize conflict with 
major powers like China despite ample opportunities for confrontation. Second, the 
administration’s dealings with middle powers like Iran demonstrated restraint despite 
Iranian provocation. Finally, in regional flashpoints like North Africa and the Middle 
East, President Obama’s actions showed the limits of American ambition and desire for 
constrained military engagement.343 
 Some viewed the Obama administration’s implementation of these policies as an 
abandonment of the United States’ “pivotal role as the world’s default power,” 
particularly in a volatile and conflict-prone region like the Middle East.344 However, 
Derek Chollet, a special adviser to President Obama and Assistant Secretary of Defense 
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for International Security Affairs explained that the Obama administration was playing 
the “long game.” He claimed that “the defining element of Obama’s grand strategy is that 
it reflects the totality of American interests – foreign and domestic – to protect global 
leadership in an era of seemingly infinite demands and finite resources.”345 Essentially, 
President Obama’s approach was comprised of “a set of reactions, adapting itself to 
reality rather than reshaping it.”346 
 Strategically, President Obama’s approach emphasized using collective action 
through coalition warfare and international partner capacity-building.347 Operationally, it 
prioritized covert operations and using technological platforms like drones to achieve 
security objectives.348 Changing the means used to achieve the United States’ foreign 
policy objectives resulted in three key actions taken by the Obama administration. First, 
President Obama sought near-term withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, and he resisted 
any new ground operations in the Middle East. Second, the administration sought 
rapprochement and Iran. Third, the administration wanted to shift the United States’ 
strategic focus to Asia – the “pivot to Asia” – which further justified retrenchment from 
the Middle East. 
 During his first term, President Obama conducted relations with Middle Eastern 
countries within the larger context of the “pivot to Asia” and desire to reduce military 
costs. He did not intend to reduce the importance of the Middle East, but he viewed Asia 
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as the most strategically important area across all the dimensions of the United States’ 
national interest.349 Instead of redefining the United States’ primary objectives in the 
Middle East, President Obama’s policy of retrenchment focused on achieving them at 
lower cost.350 For President Obama, diplomacy would become the first line of defense 
against becoming embroiled in the types of all-consuming commitments made by the 
Bush administration. As he explained in an interview: 
A president does not make decisions in a vacuum. He does not have a 
blank slate. Any president who was thoughtful, I believe, would recognize 
that after over a decade of war, with obligations that are still to this day 
requiring great amounts of resources and attention in Afghanistan, with 
the experience of Iraq, with that strains that it’s placed on our military – 
any thoughtful president would hesitate about making renewed 
commitment in the exact same region of the world with some of the exact 
same dynamics and the same probability of an unsatisfactory outcome.351 
 President Obama declared a formal end to United States combat operations in Iraq in 
August 2010. The United States military continued to provide a stabilizing presence after 
this time;352 however, keeping forces in Iraq beyond the end of 2011 required 
renegotiation of the Status of Forces Agreement between American and Iraq.  President 
Obama attempted to renegotiate an agreement and offered to leave behind 10,000 troops, 
about one division’s worth, for training and counterterrorism. The future number, 
mission, and legal status of American troops in Iraq emerged as sticking points. Iraq’s 
prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, appeared unable or unwilling to provide assurances of 
legal immunity for American troops and the talks finally broke down. President Obama 
arguably could have come to an agreement. However, political concerns about the effect 
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of extending the United States’ mission in Iraq before his upcoming 2012 reelection bid 
led President Obama to abandon the attempt.353 Despite military concerns about a 
complete withdrawal, all remaining American forces in Iraq quickly departed to make the 
31 December 2011 withdrawal deadline. The last American troops departed Iraq on 18 
December 2011.354 
 Withdrawal from Iraq presented several risks that had the potential to disrupt 
American retrenchment from the region. The risks included: logistics, terror groups, the 
main Iraqi groups, and neighboring countries. Logistically, withdrawing American troops 
would be relatively straightforward unless insurgent or terror groups disrupted the 
process. Terror groups had the potential to complicate withdrawal by attempting to 
embarrass the United States by making its withdrawal appear to be a rout. More 
significantly, these groups had the potential to stoke ethnic tensions that could lead Iraq 
back into a civil war. This possibility suggested the largest risk to withdrawal would be 
that associated with the ethnic disputes between the Sunnis and Shia, and between the 
Arabs and Kurds. Regarding the former dispute, the main danger resulted from the 
possibility that the Shia-led Iraqi government would refuse to fully integrate the Sunnis 
into a truly unified government structure, especially if the government failed to integrate 
Sunni militias into the Iraqi Security Forces. The Arab-Kurdish disputes over territories 
in the oil-rich north of Iraq had the greatest potential risk for erupting into a civil war that 
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would force the United States to choose between backing the government it helped form 
or America’s Kurdish allies.355 
 The risk of Sunni-Shia and Arab-Kurdish disputes heightened the role of regional 
actors and the roles they might play by interfering in Iraq. Iraq’s neighbors – especially 
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey – had a vested interest in interfering because of the 
domestic consequences of Iraq becoming a failed state. Moreover, most of these states 
believed the United States’ invasion of Iraq was a bad decision that had negative 
consequences for their countries.356 These neighbors stoked potential conflicts by backing 
the ethnic factions most likely to advance their power and interest. Saudi Arabia and 
Syria backed Iraqi Sunnis and manipulated Iraqi politics to ensure Sunni groups were 
integrated into Iraqi government to prevent the spread of Iranian influence in the 
region.357 These countries typically acted surreptitiously, unlike Turkey, who possessed 
the main conventional military threat to Iraq and who had a history if attacking Iraqi 
Kurds in response to Kurdish terrorism. Finally, Iran had the most potential for 
destabilizing Iraq and a motive for embarrassing the United States. Destabilizing Iraq, 
whose government was predominantly Shia, might not be in Iran’s interests, but the 
possibility provided it leverage over the United States as a tool for managing American-
Iranian relations.358 
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 In all, the greatest potential risk affecting the prospects of American retrenchment 
from the Middle East was the longstanding conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
These two regional powers, the former the dominant Sunni state and the latter the 
dominant Shia state, often engaged in zero-sum conflict between their ethnic blocks. 
While these two powers had for many years maintained a modus vivendi in the region, 
their mutual interest in the Iraqi state might bring them into conflict. As a result, the 
United States’ withdrawal from Iraq left that country open to becoming the frontlines in 
Sunni-Shia competition fought by Saudi and Iranian proxies.359 Complicating matters 
was the fact that Saudi Arabia was a traditional regional ally, while Iran remained a 
seemingly implacable foe with an active nuclear development program. Any attempt by 
President Obama to diffuse the risks associated with American retrenchment would 
require building up the Saudi’s capacity – both is ability and willingness – to assume a 
larger regional security burden, as well as rapprochement with Iran. 
 The United States long relied on Saudi Arabia to play a vital role in maintaining 
Middle Eastern security because of the country’s economic, political, and cultural 
importance, as well as its strategic location. Since the beginning on the War on Terror, 
the United States relied on Saudi Arabia to counter Islamist extremism and support 
counterterrorism efforts to promote regional stability. The Saudis had long been the 
United States’ largest foreign military customer, receiving equipment, training, and 
support.360 However, after President Obama announced his intention to withdraw 
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American troops from Iraq and pivot to Asia, American foreign military sales increased 
from $244 million in 2009 to $358 million in 2010. Sales generally increased in 
subsequent years, with large increases occurring after 2013 when the Syrian civil war 
began, and again in 2014 when ISIS began to emerge as a regional threat. In all, 
American foreign military sales to Saudi Arabia increased from $244 million in 2009 to 
almost $3.5 billion by 2017, an over 1300% increase.361 These sales clearly illustrated an 
attempt to improve Saudi Arabia’s capacity to maintain regional security and its 
importance to the United States’ policy of regional retrenchment. However, defusing 
Iranian hostility towards American interests that might destabilize regional security 
meant President Obama would have to attempt rapprochement. 
 The Obama administration’s relationship with Iran, once designated as a member of 
the “axis of evil,”362 demonstrated a clear preference for diplomacy over saber rattling. 
President Obama explicitly campaigned with the intent to de-escalate ongoing tensions 
with Iran to stem its pursuit of nuclear weapons.363 He argued that Iran was “acting 
irresponsibly” by pursuing nuclear weapons and supporting Shiite militant groups in Iraq 
and throughout the Middle East. However, Obama blamed the Bush administration and 
its regional policies for Iran’s behavior.364 Iran seemed to sense an opportunity and its 
president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, called two days after President Obama’s election to 
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congratulate him, the first such call made to an American president since 1979. During 
President Obama’s first inauguration speech he seemed to be replying to this overture 
when he declared 
To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual 
interest and mutual respect. To those leaders around the globe who seek to 
sow conflict or blame their society's ills on the West: Know that your 
people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To 
those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing 
of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will 
extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.365 
 When mass protests erupted in Iran following its disputed 2009 presidential election, 
President Obama resisted pressure to advocate for regime change. Instead, he adopted a 
wait-and-see approach and refused to meddle by refraining from offering any direct 
American support to protesters.366 Even after more than two years of failed negotiations, 
regional Iranian aggression, and the apparent unwillingness of Iran to engage in 
rapprochement with the United States, the Obama administration continued to refrain 
from threatening or using military action against Iran. President Obama even declined to 
explicitly, even if only rhetorically, support regime change in Iran, the sworn enemy of 
the United States, leading state-sponsor of terrorism in the Middle East, and repeated 
threats to destroy Israel, a key regional American ally.367 Despite this forbearance, Iran 
continued to confront the United States in the region by capturing and shooting at 
American unmanned aerial vehicles whose technology they threated to share with Russia 
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and China,368 and by making repeated threats to close the Straits of Hormuz, thereby 
cutting off oil from the Persian Gulf.369 
 Though consideration of great power conflict faded following the 9/11 terror attacks 
against the United States.370 Over time, realities revealed that great power competition 
continued apace while the United States was fixated on lesser threats. One of those 
“threats” was China’s rise and burgeoning regional aspirations. China increasingly 
displayed assertiveness during the Obama administration’s first year. It interfered with 
American naval vessels, objected against combined United States-South Korea military 
exercises, and limited military-to-military cooperation in protest over ongoing arms sales 
by the United States to Taiwan.371 China’s assertiveness increasingly became a theme in 
official reports,372 yet the Obama administration consistently sought to avoid conflict by 
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accepting China’s growing power.373 While resisting the temptation for confrontation, 
President Obama revealed his willingness to bear the burden of reassuring China 
regarding American intentions and willingness to manage – as opposed to stymie – 
China’s rise.374 
 President Obama believed that the Bush administration was so preoccupied with the 
War on Terror in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, that it neglected the 
Asia-Pacific region and China’s rise. This view was not entirely accurate. In fact, the 
Bush administration maintained forward-deployed air and naval forces at Guam and 
Japan, began cooperation with Singapore to build an aircraft carrier facility at Changi 
Naval Base, assigned an additional aircraft carrier battle group to the Pacific theater, and 
declared it would station 60% of American submarines in Asia.375 Furthermore, the Bush 
administration prioritized revitalizing the relations with Japan and other Asian allies and 
adeptly managed relations with China.376 However, despite these positive steps, the Bush 
administration’s Asian policies were largely reactive and arguably secondary to its 
primary fixation on the War on Terror and Middle East conflicts. Forward-positioned air 
and naval forces, the assignment of an additional aircraft carrier, and overweighting of 
submarine forces in the Pacific were largely stopgap measures intended to offset the 
reduction of American ground combat forces in the region that were removed to meet 
operational needs in the Middle East. Moreover, even though the Bush administration 
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maintained generally positive relations with China, it never fully settled the question of 
whether China was a strategic competitor or cooperative partner.377 
 The Obama administration viewed Asia as an arena where they could achieve foreign 
policy success, unlike the interminable Middle East quagmires. President Obama aimed 
to use the “pivot” to Asia as a means for shifting American attention away from Middle 
Eastern hot spots like Iraq and Afghanistan and towards a more economically and 
strategically important region. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted 
Over the last 10 years, we have allocated immense resources to [Iraq and 
Afghanistan]. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic 
about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the 
best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance 
our values. One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over 
the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased 
investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in the Asia-
Pacific region.378 
To achieve these tasks, Secretary Clinton stated that the Obama administration would 
focus on six lines of effort aimed at 
strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working 
relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with 
regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging 
a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human 
rights.379 
 The Obama administration recognized that an increasingly assertive China might 
cause conflicts that could undermine the Asia-Pacific region’s growing economies and 
emerging nations. Moreover, through geographically separated from Asia, as a Pacific 
power the United States would directly benefit from increased engagement with the 
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region.380 The strategic narrative accompanying the announcement of America’s turn to 
Asia unsettled allies in the Middle East who feared abandonment,381 as well as Asian-
Pacific partners who questioned the determination of the United States to exert its power 
in that region.382 Moreover, though the administration intended to strengthen ties with 
long-standing regional allies and bring new energy to managing the United States’ 
relationship with China, it had the opposite effect. President Obama’s emphasis on 
strengthening security ties with its allies – Australia, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, 
South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam – created the impression in China that the United 
States was implementing a containment strategy intended to counter China’s rising power 
status.383 
Failing to Realign and Reorient, 2012-2015 
 Ally Failure to Uphold the Regional Security Order. President Obama could not 
keep Iran from exploiting growing regional instability, because he lacked an effective 
Middle Eastern ally to uphold the United States’ preferred regional security order. Iran 
was relatively free to exert its influence after the United States first removed Iran’s 
primary threat on its east, the Taliban in Afghanistan, then removed Iran’s main western 
threat by toppling Saddam Hussein. Once the United States withdrew most of its forces 
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from the Middle East, Iran had virtually unconstrained freedom of maneuver. Iran 
effectively became the main force shaping Middle Eastern politics because America’s 
regional allies seemed unwilling to assist in containment. Since the effects of any 
confrontation would affect neighboring states, the unwillingness to assume that risk made 
many of America’s Middle Eastern partners ineffective.384 Saudi Arabia remained an 
exception. However, it pursued its own security goals, only tangentially compatible with 
American interests, as it increasingly engaged in proxy conflict with Iran. 
 Saudi Arabia and the United States share a common interest in limiting Iran’s Middle 
Eastern sphere of influence. However, as the regional power in direct confrontation with 
Iran, Saudi Arabia has a deeper interest that prompts it to pursue its own regional security 
goal. When Saudi actions benefit the United States, this is the consequence of, rather than 
the motivation for, Saudi Arabia’s behavior.385 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the 
dominant Sunni power in the region, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the dominant Shia 
power, historically engaged in proxy conflicts throughout the Middle East, and extending 
into the Caucasus, South and Central Asia, and across Northern Africa.386 Rather than 
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engage in direct military competition, the two states participate in a “Cold War” in which 
their influence is brought to bear on the domestic politics of weak states throughout the 
region. The Saudi-Iranian Cold Was is more a struggle over domestic politics, where the 
political and military strength of supported parties in civil conflicts is more important that 
the balance of military power of the Saudis and Iranians.387 
 The decades old Saudi-Iranian Cold War flared up in 2011 as a result of the Arab 
Spring.388 Previous episodes, such as the one lasting from 1952 to 1970, or the one from 
1979 to around 1997, reflected distinct regional dynamics. However, they existed within, 
and were manipulated by, the larger great power conflict between the United States and 
the Soviet Union.389 After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Saudi Arabia and Iran formed 
competing blocs, the Saudis and their allies struggled to maintain the status quo while 
Iran and its allies formed a revolutionary bloc.390 The United States supported the Saudi 
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bloc, and the Russians and Chinese supported the Iranian bloc. When the Arab Spring 
sparked civil uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa, it presented challenges 
and opportunities to both blocs. Traditional patrons – the United States, Russia, and 
China – favored regional stability, but they had to choose how much to support their bloc 
in the new circumstances.391 Russia and China decided to support their Middle East 
allies, but President Obama opted to remain uninvolved, which left Saudi Arabia free to 
pursue its interests. 
 The Saudis and Iranians traditionally preferred to compete through proxies, and in the 
aftermath of the Arab Spring – the Arab Winter – they did so again.392 The Arab Spring 
and subsequent Arab Winter heightened Saudi Arabia’s concerns about its internal 
stability and Iranian actions. Consequently, Saudi leaders acted to maintain the regional 
status quo in what some described as a 21st century Brezhnev Doctrine – the Saudis could 
intervene in any state to protect their interests.393 Iran sough to take advantage of regional 
instability to expand the Shia Crescent by using Shia militias to create a land corridor 
running from Iran, through Iraq and Syria, and into Lebanon.394 The two blocs created or 
exacerbated instability as they fought using proxies in countries throughout the Middle 
East. For its part, Saudi Arabia’s proxy fights and contribution to instability ran at odds 
with American interests. 
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 Not only did Saudi Arabia fail to uphold the regional security order, its self-interested 
actions in places like Syria created circumstances to which President Obama had to 
respond. Because of his disinclination and preferred policy of Middle East retrenchment, 
President Obama often responded too slowly and reactively. Moreover, when Obama did 
decide to respond, in siding with Saudi Arabia and other status quo regimes affiliated 
with political oppression and human rights violations, his decision put the United States 
at odds with the rising wave of democratic, anti-authoritarian movements sweeping the 
region. This further benefited Iran, who remained hostile to American interests despite 
President Obama’s attempted rapprochement.395 
 Failed Rapprochement with Iran. President Obama spent the first two years of his 
first term trying to achieve rapprochement with Iran. His attempts spanned a range from 
the mundane, such as insisting on saying the full name of Iran in a video greeting to 
initially refusing to speak out in support of pro-democracy protests being brutally 
attacked by the ruling regime.396 President Obama’s attempt to reduce Iran’s nuclear 
threat was in line with his earlier diplomatic efforts to lead global nuclear reduction 
efforts;397 however, this put the administration in the morally dubious position of 
accepting anti-democratic efforts by an adversary. The Obama administration was trying 
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to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program and drive for regional 
hegemony. He believed that engagement and rapprochement offered the best option, 
though his policy used the threat of economic sanctions to further motivate Iran.398 
 Unlike some of his predecessors, President Obama did not view engagement and 
sanctions as mutually exclusive. He was personally in favor of working with Iran, but he 
also saw the value in putting pressure on the regime through sanctions.399 From the start, 
the purpose of the administration’s policy was to help generate international support for 
tougher sanctions if engagement failed. When early engagement attempts ultimately 
failed, President Obama was able to gain more European and international support than 
previous administrations.400 This was crucial because of the regional threat and risk of 
nuclear proliferation posed by Iran. President Obama’s engagement with Iran culminated 
in October 2009 when representatives from Britain, China, France, Germany, Iran, 
Russia, and the United States met in Geneva to discuss Iran’s nuclear program. During 
this meeting, representatives from the United States and Iran met separately in the 
highest-level bilateral meeting between the two countries since the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution.401 
 The Geneva conference achieved a deal for Iran to give up its enriched uranium, but 
the deal fell apart two weeks later when Iran refused to comply. By early 2010, the 
Obama administration shifted its efforts from engagement to implementation of economic 
sanctions intended to coerce Iran into abandoning its nuclear ambitions. These sanctions 
appeared affect Iran by raising factional strife and political dissent and intensifying Iran’s 
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domestic economic problems. However, three critical weaknesses hindered the extent to 
which sanctions could alter Iran’s behavior. First, evidence revealed that key states like 
Austria, China, and Switzerland were not fully complying with the sanctioning agreement 
and Iran was actively trying to circumvent the sanctions.402 Second, despite clear effects 
on the Iranian economy, there was little evidence suggesting they were affecting the 
regime’s cost-benefit calculations about the value of its nuclear program. Moreover, the 
sanctions required strategic patience and political costs,403 something President Obama 
lack because of the danger nuclear weapons held for regional dynamics.404 Finally, 
Iranian leaders believed they held the stronger position,405 even as President Obama 
sought to implement a policy of containment.406 
 President Obama opted for a policy of containment after rapprochement failed and 
sanctions appeared to be diminishing in effectiveness. Proponents of the policy argued 
that containment would allow the United States to mitigate the consequences of Iran’s 
“nuclear defiance.” To do so, the Obama administration would have to be willing to 
establish “redlines” defining acceptable Iranian behavior and be willing to use military 
force if necessary. Moreover, it would have to reassure regional allies that the United 
States remained committed to preserving the regional balance of power.407 Regardless, 
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Iran’s continuing shadow wars with the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq led Iran to 
believe that even if it could not militarily defeat the United States it could wear America 
down through exhaustion.408 President Obama’s retrenchment from the Middle East and 
reluctance to intervene during the Arab Spring served to fuel this perception. Iran’s 
strategy relied on Middle Eastern volatility which the Arab Spring provided in 
abundance. However, by 2011, President Obama had abandoned any hopes of 
rapprochement as Iran remained recalcitrant and took advantage of the turmoil from the 
Arab Spring to advance its interests. 
 Inability to Abandon Middle East Interests. President Obama entered office 
intending to cut military spending, reduce military forces, and downplay the importance 
of military power in foreign relations. However, less than half way through his first term, 
he increasingly found himself bogged down in geopolitical rivalries that forced 
reengagement in the Middle East.409 The domestic-level “mismatch between the 
complexity of the global system and the simplicity of [American] foreign policy rhetoric” 
was another critical challenge President Obama faced in implementing his security 
policies.410 Political tensions between the Republican party’s antipathy towards 
multilateralism and the Democrat’s aversion to military power projection made it difficult 
for the Obama administration to implement his policies without having to confront 
challenges from multiple directions.411 The Obama administration’s response to the Arab 
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Spring demonstrated a clear preference for restraint and limiting the use of American 
power. However, the administration’s response to the uprisings in Libya and Syria 
demonstrated the costs of President Obama’s policy of Middle East retrenchment and the 
inability of the United States to abandon its security interests in the region. 
 The Obama administration based its response to events in Libya during the Arab 
Spring as the unfolded rather than based on a clear-cut plan. President Obama 
consistently demonstrated reluctance to intervene, an attitude some critics described as 
dithering.412 He only decided to intervene with airpower when it became clear that anti-
Gadhafi rebels faced imminent defeat and slaughter in Benghazi. Obama stressed that 
“America’s role would be limited; that we would not put ground troops into Libya; that 
we would focus our unique capabilities on the front end of the operation and that we 
would transfer responsibility to our allies and partners.”413 These declarations suggested 
that President Obama would use American military power in support of the United 
Nations Security Council resolution 1973 to intervene under the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) principle to protect Benghazi – something that would preserve the United States’ 
interest in averting mass slaughter.414 However, shortly after beginning military 
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operations Obama accepted the urgings of those who sought to expand the mission 
beyond the mandate for R2P to a mission for regime change.415 
 After the first wave of bombing, President Obama explained that the United States 
would transfer responsibility and assume “a supporting role” to ensure that “the risk and 
cost of this operation – to our military and to American taxpayers – will be reduced 
significantly.” He stressed that “to be blunt, we went down that road in Iraq…That is not 
something we can afford to repeat in Libya.” Instead, he would “[create] the conditions 
and coalitions for others to step up…to work with allies and partners so that they bear 
their share of the burden and pay their share of the costs.”416 Allied burden sharing aside, 
post-Gadhafi Libya became marked by lawlessness,417 extralegal imprisonments,418 
weapons proliferation,419 infiltration of Islamist terror groups,420 and spillover in the 
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neighboring states.421 President Obama still refused to step in even as Libya descended 
into chaos and lay on the brink of becoming a failed state. According to one State 
Department official, 
“Obama remained intent upon leaving the Middle East, and he was not 
going to let himself be distanced from that mission by sudden eruptions of 
pro-democracy protests, teetering dictators, and looming civil wars. He did 
not know whether the Arab Spring would lead to ubiquitous democracy or 
a prolonged period of instability, but regardless, he was determined that 
America would not try to influence the outcome – not if it meant reversing 
course to get involved in the region.…”422 
 
This intent was in line with a retrenchment policy, but the aftereffects of the Libya 
intervention unsettled the trans-Sahel region and expanded the influence of Islamist terror 
groups. These factors forced the Obama administration to escalate its level of military 
engagement throughout North Africa over the remainder of Obama’s term.423 
 Similar events occurred during the Syrian Civil War in 2011. In March of that year, 
antigovernment protests erupted over the Assad family’s four-decade rule. As protests 
spread, the level of violence committed by Syrian government forces and rebel groups 
escalated and numerous political and armed opposition groups emerged. President 
Obama openly called on Syrian president Bashar al Assad to step down and was ignored. 
The increasing level of violence, death toll, and use of chemical weapons by the Assad 
government put pressure on the Obama administration to support the resistance despite 
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his desire to remain uninvolved in the conflict. In 2013, Congress debated whether to 
provide lethal and nonlethal assistance to suitable Syrian opposition groups, ultimately 
authorizing nonlethal aid. Moreover, Congress refrained from authorizing President 
Obama to use force in response to an August 2013 chemical weapons attack.424 
 In 2014, the Obama administration requested that Congress grant authority and 
funding for providing lethal support to selected Syrian opposition groups. The 
administration’s original request aimed to support defending Syrian people against Assad 
regime attacks: however, the subsequent rise and expansion of ISIS across Syria and 
portions of Iraq forced the administration to refocus on counterterrorism efforts in the 
region. Congress authorized the Department of Defense to lead a train and equip program 
for Syrian groups fighting terror groups. In September 2014, the United States began air 
strikes in Syria aimed at preventing ISIS from using Syria as a base of operations for its 
efforts in Iraq. A month later, the Department of Defense established Combined Joint 
Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve to “formalize ongoing military actions against the 
rising threat posed by ISIS in Iraq and Syria.” American military personnel on the ground 
in Syria increased from 50 in late 2015 to over 2,000 by 2017.425 
 The Obama administration also deployed several thousand more American 
servicemembers in June 2014 to fight ISIS in Iraq. The deployment was made at the 
invitation of the Iraqi government in response to successful offensives conducted by ISIS 
that defeated Iraqi Security Forces and seized large portions of territory in western Iraq. 
The United States now had several thousand servicemembers committed in Iraq less than 
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three years after they were withdrawn under President Obama’s policy of retrenchment. 
He justified his actions by saying 
…the world is confronted by many challenges. And while America has 
never been able to right every wrong, America has made the world a more 
secure and prosperous place. And our leadership is necessary to 
underwrite the global security and prosperity that our children and our 
grandchildren will depend upon. We do so by adhering to a set of core 
principles. We do whatever is necessary to protect our people. We support 
our allies when they’re in danger. We lead coalitions of countries to 
uphold international norms. And we strive to stay true to the fundamental 
values – the desire to live with basic freedom and dignity – that is 
common to human beings wherever they are. That’s why people all over 
the world look to the United States of America to lead. And that’s why we 
do it.426 
 This justification for intervention directly contradicted the one he provided to justify 
non-intervention in Libya despite the similarities between the two situations. President 
Obama’s decision also ran counter to his express intent to extricate the United States 
from the Middle East. Instead, the recommitment of thousands of troops to Iraq and Syria 
once again embroiled the United States in a conflict that pitted America and its regional 
allies – Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates – against Russia, Iran, and 
the Iranian-backed terror group Hezbollah. Moreover, as the spillover from the Syrian 
Civil War affected neighboring states, the Saudis and Iranians pursued their own security 
interests and fought proxy conflicts that further destabilized the region against American 
interests.427 In the end, the United States could not abandon its security interest in the 
Middle East. 
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Outcome of Strategic Reorientation 
 Level of Reduced Commitment. President Obama successfully withdrew all 
American forces out of Iraq and significantly reduced the number of soldiers in 
Afghanistan; however, major cost savings resulted from decreasing the defense budget. 
There were multiple rounds of military cuts beginning in 2009, and defense spending 
declined significantly as domestic spending increased.428 As a proportion of the United 
States’ gross domestic product, the military budget was 5% in 2010 and approximately 
3% by 2016. The national defense budget declined from $722 billion in 2010 to $580 
billion by 2015. Rather than directly engaging in key regions, the 2012 Defense Strategic 
Guidance sought to develop low-cost, small-footprint approaches to achieving security 
objectives. These included heavy reliance upon exercises, rotational units to maintain a 
military presence, and advising partner militaries.429 More importantly, the Obama 
administration decided that the military would no longer be required to be prepared to 
fight two wars simultaneously; instead, the military would only be sized to fight one 
large-scale operation in one region, while denying an adversary’s objectives in a second 
region (i.e., fighting one and a half instead of two wars).430 The Obama administration 
also de-prioritized large-scale counterinsurgency and ground campaigns in favor of 
“innovative, low-cost and small-footprint approaches to achieve…security objectives.”431 
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Finally, the administration decreased spending on military research and development, 
procurement, and modernization.432 
 The Obama administration’s cost reductions saved money but entailed another, 
intangible, cost. Reducing the size of the military increased the level of risk in America’s 
strategic engagements and commitments. Primary strategic documents, like the 2012 
Defense Strategic Guidance, did not address the trade-offs between costs and risks. 
Instead, the guidance tacitly assumed that the resulting risk increase would be 
manageable.433 Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta did concede “Because [the United 
States military] will be somewhat smaller…risks will be measured in time and 
capacity.”434 One way the administration sought to minimize these risks was through 
“reversibility,” maintaining the ability to reconstitute personnel, the defense industrial 
base, and science and technology capabilities the administration cut. This, however, 
ignored how requiring longer time to rebuild capacity might affect a future operation’s 
cost, whether financial or human, and the likelihood of success. It also did not address 
how the military would be able to overcome the loss of leadership and trained personnel 
cut during retrenchment. Finally, guidance did not address how long key portions of the 
defense industrial base could remain operating under the policy of reversibility.435 
 These issues assumed added significance once sequestration became a fiscal reality. 
Sequestration was an austerity fiscal policy that required automatic spending cuts to 
federal government spending under the 2011 Budget Control Act. The cuts required by 
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sequestration exacerbated those already enacted by the Obama administration, to the 
point where American military capabilities were unaligned with even the administration’s 
more modest commitments. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance assumed that the 
Department of Defense would experience an approximately $500 billion budget reduction 
over ten years; however, when sequestration occurred the department suddenly faced $1 
trillion in cuts. This jeopardized what one analyst noted were the “irreducible 
requirements in American defense policy – winding down current wars responsibly, 
deterring Iran, hedging against a rising China, protecting global sea lanes vital for 
commerce, attacking terrorists and checking state sponsors of terror, and ensuring a 
strong all-volunteer military as well as a world-class defense scientific and industrial 
base.”436 It was not just analysts and government observers who were concerned, but 
senior military leaders as well. In a congressional hearing, three of the four assembled 
Joint Chiefs of Staff testified that the military under sequestration would be incapable of 
handling even a single major armed conflict.437 Critics might argue this should be 
expected from chiefs seeking to increase their service’s budgets, but the unity of the 
chiefs and consequences they described reflected far more than previous inter-service 
budgetary rivalry or jockeying for defense dollars. 
 Outside of readiness issues, the Obama administration’s military reductions and the 
effects of sequestration constrained the envisioned pivot to Asia. Obama’s policy looked 
to counterbalance China’s military power and assertiveness in the Pacific. One key 
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element of achieving this goal was increasing United States naval forces in the region; 
however, force structure cuts and the consequences of sequestration effectively prevented 
this. Because of force reductions, the United States military in East Asia remained about 
as strong as it was ten years before. Over that same period China’s military expenditures 
grew dramatically, a fact likely noticed by China and American allies.438 This resulted in 
continuing American relative decline in the Pacific. 
 While the Obama administration managed to retrench from Iraq and Afghanistan, it 
came at a significant cost. The United States forfeited the ability to influence the behavior 
or shape preferable policies when President Obama withdrew completely from Iraq and 
announced a timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan. Already hard-pressed to control 
political events in these two countries when the United States maintained a sizable 
contingent of forces in each, that lack of presence made it virtually impossible to do so. 
This led to several problems. First, the United States was unable to assist the Iraqi 
government fight resurgent Sunni jihadists in ISIS between 2012 and 2014. Second, a 
lack of American influence resulted in Iran gaining sway over much of the Iraq 
government, to the point where Iraqi prime minister Maliki allowed Iranian overflights to 
deliver weapons to Assad during the Syrian Civil War. Finally, Maliki increasingly 
became authoritarian and cracked down on political opposition and Iraq’s Sunni minority. 
The latter became increasingly alienated and increased the level of sectarian violence and 
support for ISIS.439 Increased tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia also ran the risk of 
reigniting Iraq’s sectarian civil war as Saudi Arabia and Iran used proxies in Iraq to fight 
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each other. Kurdish-Arab relations in Iraq remained strained as the result of territory 
disputes, and ongoing sectarian and ethnic rivalries made governing Iraq more 
challenging and contested.440 Finally, the sharp reduction in American ground personnel 
in Afghanistan coincided with a resurgence of the Taliban and increased involvement by 
Pakistan in Afghan affairs. 
 Effects on Allies and Adversaries. President Obama’s retrenchment from the Middle 
East was intended to extricate the United States from its regional overcommitment and to 
complement the “pivot” to Asia. The pivot, however, rested upon flawed assumptions. 
First, was the assumption that the rising economic and political importance of Asia not 
only required additional American engagement, but the assignment of additional military 
forces to the region. The Obama administration placed Asia at the center of its security 
strategy; however, this appeared to Chinese leaders as if the United States was adjusting 
its defense policy to contain China. 
 The underlying premise of the pivot to Asia was that the region’s growing economic 
importance made it more globally important relative to other regions like the Middle 
East. This suggested an economic response – for instance, joining the Asia Infrastructure 
Investment Bank at China’s invitation. However, not only did the administration decline 
China’s invitation, it included a sizable military component to its rebalancing efforts. For 
instance, the release of the United States’ Air-Sea Battle doctrine in 2010 outlined an 
operational doctrine for military confrontation with China. Official proclamations by 
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prominent administration officials like Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who discussed 
the importance of countering China’s growing military capabilities further signaled to 
China that the United States intended to contain China’s power in the region. As a result, 
China began acting more assertively throughout East Asia in general, and the South 
China Sea and Senkakus more specifically. 
 The Obama administration attempted to counter China’s assertive territorial claims 
over the Scarborough Shoal, Paracel Islands, and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea 
by conducting freedom of navigation operations and increasing military support to 
American allies. It also made diplomatic overtures to India, Indonesia, Myanmar, and 
Vietnam, and aimed to develop closer economic ties to the Asia-Pacific region by 
increasing trade through the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Finally, the Obama administration 
began developing new military doctrines to conducting potential combat in the Pacific 
Theater. These goals all focused on three components of the military aspect of the pivot 
to Asia: strengthening alliances and building new partnerships, adjusting force postures, 
and strategic planning. First, the Obama administration reemphasized existing formal 
alliances and began building new ones to expand its ally network in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Second, the administration sought to maintain a visible military presence in the 
region, promising not to cut military budgets for forces in Asia, despite being forced to 
do so because of sequestration. Third, the Department of Defense updated its strategic 
battle plans and devised the Air-Sea Battle concept to counter an adversary’s anti-access 
and area denial capabilities. 
 The expanding network of American allies reached China’s border, the increased 
presence of United States military forces throughout the Pacific brought them into more 
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frequent contact with Chinese forces, often in contested areas, and the fact that China was 
the likely rival against which Air-Sea battle would be used, all heighten China’s concerns 
about being contained. The main reason the Obama administration increased the saliency 
of the military component of the Asian pivot was ostensibly in reaction to growing 
Chinese assertiveness; however, China had made no new claims and its “assertiveness” 
was intended to strengthen its position in established claims or defend outstanding 
claims. In most instances, the Chinese were reacting, or overreacting, to a rival’s 
actions.441 The United States arguably already had enough air and naval assets in the 
region to counter Chinese overreactions. However, the Obama administration misread 
China’s leadership. As a result, subsequent policies to enhance American’s Pacific 
presence compounded China’s insecurities, motivated Chinese assertiveness, and 
undermined regional stability.442 This occurred at a time when Middle Eastern turmoil 
was forcing the United States to refocus its attention back on that region. 
 The Syrian Civil War resulted in the rise of the Islamic State whose actions and 
regional success at seizing territory forced the Obama administration to refocus on the 
Middle East at the expense of its Asian efforts.443 This highlighted the second, and 
perhaps most important, flawed assumption. The Obama administration wrongly assumed 
that the United States could afford to withdraw from the Middle East despite ongoing 
social, economic, and political challenges in a region critical to American and global 
economic security. While generally ignoring the Arab Spring uprisings, President 
Obama’s reluctance to act during the Syrian Civil War resulted in a conflict that 
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displaced eleven million people and caused a refugee crisis that further destabilized 
countries in the Middle East and Europe. American disengagement also allowed the 
Islamic State to exploit the conflict and move into, and subsequently occupy portions of 
Iraq 
 Intervening in Syria presented the Obama administration with few good options. 
However, a counterfactual argument could be made that President Obama should have 
worked harder to renegotiate a status of forces agreement. Had he kept some level of 
forces in Iraq, the United States would likely have been better postured to combat ISIS 
and counter Iran. Meanwhile, the spread of Iranian influence to fill the vacuum created by 
withdrawing American power weakened American relationships with Gulf State partners 
and allies. Therefore, the Obama administration’s approach not only increased tensions in 
Asia, it allowed the Middle East to descend further into chaos due the United States’ 
relative neglect. 
 Outcome. Retrenchment occurs when leaders attempt to mediate between existing 
security goals and the need to adapt to an evolving security environment. Retrenching 
states are more likely to succeed when they can share a security burden with a likeminded 
ally, settle grievances or diffuse secondary threats with a rival through rapprochement, or, 
failing either of these, abandon an interest regardless of the consequences. When none of 
these options are available, retrenchment will fail because a great power will be unable to 
extricate itself from existing commitments and free resources to address more critical 
challenges. In this case, President Barack Obama sought to lay the foundation for a 
proactive, long-range foreign policy by implementing a policy of retrenchment from the 
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Middle East and pivoting to Asia. He was unsuccessful and ultimately failed to improve 
the United States’ strategic solvency. 
 As my theory of retrenchment outcomes predicts, Obama’s failure stemmed from 
unsuccessful burden sharing by allies, failed rapprochement with rivals, and an inability 
to abandon American interests in the Middle East. I argue that retrenchment is more 
likely to succeed when a state can identify a suitable successor to uphold an existing 
security order. In this case, President Obama committed substantial material resources to 
strengthen Saudi Arabia’s ability to maintain regional security favorable to American 
interests. However, instead of doing so, Saudi Arabia engaged in a new Cold War with 
Iran which was attempting to expand its influence after the American withdrawal. This 
competition led Saudi Arabia to engage in proxy conflicts throughout the Middle East. 
Whether these conflicts contributed to or resulted from Saudi and Iranian intervention, 
they served to destabilize the region. Therefore, while Saudi Arabia pursed its interests, 
the results of its efforts undermined the United States preference for regional stability. 
Moreover, events in the region forced President Obama to recommit diplomatic energy 
and military forces to the Middle East at the expense of his Asian pivot. 
 My theory of retrenchment outcomes also holds that retrenchment is more likely to 
fail when a state is unsuccessful at rapprochement with a rival. President Obama 
attempted to engage with Iran, especially over its nuclear program. However, Iran 
remained implacable and refused to abandon its nuclear program or its attempt to achieve 
regional hegemony. By early 2010, the Obama administration shifted its efforts to the 
implementation of economic sanctions intended to coerce Iran into altering its behavior 
and engage in negotiations. The effects of the sanctions clearly affected Iran’s domestic 
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economy, but they had an ambiguous effect of Iran’s leaders who continued to pursue 
their strategic goals in defiance of the United States. By 2011, President Obama 
abandoned attempts at rapprochement as Iran remained recalcitrant and stoked turmoil 
during the Arab Spring to advance its interests. The turmoil of these conflicts, 
particularly the Syrian Civil War and subsequent rise of ISIS as a regional threat, forced 
President Obama to reengage in the Middle East. 
 Without an ally willing and able to assume responsibility for maintaining security, 
and with rapprochement failure, the last option for retrenchment to succeed is for a great 
power to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal. In the end, President 
Obama was unwilling or unable to abandon the United States’ interest in the Middle East. 
The Arab Spring proved to be the undoing of the Obama administration’s retrenchment 
attempt. Though initially refraining from intervention, President Obama half-heartedly 
reversed course when he supported attacking Libya, first to prevent mass killings then to 
effect regime change. During the initial stages of the Syrian Civil War, the Obama 
administration debated how best to respond though there was a clear preference for a 
hands-off approach. However, as ISIS emerged during the conflict then spread into Iraq 
the administration finally settled on deploying military forces to directly confront the 
threat. Once again, the United States was militarily engaged in the Middle East and 
retrenchment had failed. 
 Regarding my last two hypotheses – retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less 
influence domestic political divisions have on accepting the logical implications of 
regional withdrawal, and retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail – I find little 
evidence to support the either claim. The American public favored withdrawal from Iraq, 
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political elites did as well, but they were concerned about the way withdraw occurred. 
President Obama declared a deadline for withdrawal from Iraq, and the subsequent 
collapse of talks to extend the Status of Forces Agreement provided the political cover 
necessary to complete full withdrawal. Republicans and Democrats both supported 
intervening during the Arab Spring – though for different reasons – so President Obama 
likely could have gained support for intervention had he wanted to do so. Retrenchment 
in this case failed because the United States was unable to find an ally for burden sharing, 
failed to settle disputes with its rivals, and, when Middle East turmoil erupted during the 
Arab Spring, could not abandon its interest in a region vital for global economic security. 
 Table 6 summarizes my findings regarding the five main hypotheses.  
Table 6. Hypotheses and summary of failed retrenchment 
Hypothesis 1 
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed when a state can identify a 
suitable successor to uphold an existing security order.  
Hypothesis 2 
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more a state succeeds at 
rapprochement with adversaries. President Obama failed at 
rapprochement with Iran after trying engagement then sanctions. 
Hypothesis 3 
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more able a great power 
is to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal. The 
United States could not abandon its interest in an economically 
important region. 
Hypothesis 4 
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less influence domestic 
political divisions have on accepting the logical implications of 
regional withdrawal. American public and political elites favored 
withdrawal then reengagement. Obama squandered this support 
because of his personal desire to avoid Middle East entanglements 
Hypothesis 5 
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. President Obama 
might have invested more political effort in strengthening Saudi 
Arabia’s efforts to counter Iranian influence throughout the region. 
Instead, he focused on pivoting to Asia. President Obama might also 
have opted to abandon American interests in the region regardless of 
the consequences, since the United States would not suffer from them 
nearly as much as others. Either action would have likely resulted in 
successful retrenchment. 
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 Alternatives. How about my alternative hypotheses? This case provides limited 
support for any of the three identified alternatives. What support does appear falls well 
short of the robust evidence supporting my main claims. First, retrenchment may be more 
likely to succeed the more closely leaders align the type of cost reductions with the nature 
of relative decline. There is limited support for this, though the case does offer avenues 
for additional research along these lines. President Obama simultaneously enacted 
strategic and operational retrenchment when he withdrew military forces from the Middle 
East and subsequently reduced the size of the military, particularly the Army, and 
significantly reduced the defense budget. While the Obama administration focused on the 
domestic concerns related to the 2008 economic crises, it failed to adjust its policies to 
ensure it could address the source of America’s international relative decline, namely 
China. The reduced force structure and low readiness resulting from sequestration meant 
President Obama lacked the means to simultaneously execute his pivot to Asia and 
respond to the turmoil of the Arab spring. As a result, intervening in Iraq and Syria in 
2014 came at the expense of the Asian pivot. This, however, was not the cause of 
retrenchment failure, but a consequence. 
 Second, another possible explanation is that operational retrenchment is less likely to 
succeed than strategic retrenchment. Here too, the evidence of the case does not fully 
bear this out, though it does suggest the need for further investigation. By enacting 
operational retrenchment, President Obama limited the means with which to purse the 
military component of his Asia policy and reengage in the Middle East. The United 
States already had enough air and naval assets in the Pacific theater to contain China. 
However, America lacked the capacity to respond to rising Chinese assertiveness. 
155 
 
China’s assertiveness was arguably a reaction to take advantage of the United States’ 
circumstances following the 2008 financial crisis and its inability to disengage from the 
Middle East. The military and diplomatic components of President Obama’s strategy also 
raised fears in China that America was trying to implement a policy of containment. Both 
factors likely contributed to growing Chinese assertiveness to which the United States 
had limited military capability to respond. American intervention after the Arab Spring 
forced President Obama to choose between Asia and the Middle East. Having to make 
this choice suggests that operational retrenchment was a poor decision, particularly since 
the cost savings did little to address the domestic economic concerns. Therefore, the 
hypothesis that operational retrenchment is more likely to fail than strategic retrenchment 
has some support and warrants further investigation, even if it was not an operative factor 
for failure in this case. 
 Finally, slower rates of retrenchment may be more likely to succeed than rapid 
withdrawal or reductions. Here again, the evidence does not fully support this hypothesis. 
There is little evidence to support the claim that the rate of retrenchment matters. 
However, a counterfactual argument can be made that had President Obama kept some 
level of forces in Iraq the United States may have been better postured to combat ISIS. 
President Obama arguably could have offered to leave more troops in Iraq to demonstrate 
American commitment, or he could have negotiated terms to a new Status of Forces 
agreement that might have appeased domestic Iraqi political dynamics. However, his 
desire to withdraw from Iraq and pivot to Asia likely weakened his resolve. When Iraqi 
leaders would not concede to legal protections for remaining American servicemembers, 
President Obama used it as a pretext for full withdrawal. President Obama left the United 
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States at a strategic disadvantage by removing all American forces and forfeiting the 
United States’ ability to influence an Iraqi government increasingly coming under the 
influence of Iran. As in the successful case of retrenchment from Southeast Asia, 
counterfactuals in this case suggest the need for further research regarding not only 
whether the rate of reductions matter, but how they might matter. 
 Table 7 summarizes my findings regarding the three alternative hypotheses. 
Table 7. Alternative hypotheses of failed retrenchment 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 1 
Retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more closely leaders align 
the type of cost reductions with the risks associated with the nature of 
relative decline. President Obama faced international relative decline 
because of China’s rise, and domestic relative decline resulting from 
the 2008 financial crises. Of the two, while the latter drove pressing 
domestic concerns, the former presented the biggest potential threat. 
(Limited Support) 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 2 
Operational retrenchment is less likely to succeed than strategic 
retrenchment. By enacting operational retrenchment, President 
Obama limited the means with which to purse the military component 
of his Asia policy and reengage in the Middle East. As a result, 
intervention forced a choice between Asia and the Middle East, 
indicating operational retrenchment was a poor decision, particularly 
since the cost savings did little to address the domestic economic 
concerns driving the decision to reduce the price of defense. 
(Limited support) 
Alternative 
Hypothesis 3 
Slower rates of retrenchment are more likely to succeed than rapid 
withdrawal or reductions. There is little evidence to support the claim 
that the rate of retrenchment matters. However, a counterfactual 
argument can be made arguing that had President Obama kept some 
level of forces in Iraq the United States may have been better 
postured to combat ISIS. 
(Limited support) 
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CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSION 
 
“We must achieve both security and solvency.”444 
 
Security and Solvency 
 At times is appears that security and solvency are antimonies. The costs of pursing 
national security, whether through military expenditures or in defense of a national 
interest, often leads to insolvency. Similarly, achieving solvency, economic or strategic, 
often requires leaders to accept higher levels of security risk than they might otherwise 
prefer. For example, the Eisenhower administration’s policy of retrenchment beginning in 
1953 reflected the paradox of security and solvency. President Eisenhower sought to 
reduce military expenditures to divert the savings towards domestic economic concerns. 
His administration’s top foreign policy goal was to reduce the cost of the Cold War to 
preserve America’s economic solvency. 
 President Eisenhower wanted to reduce the cost of the Cold War through a two-
faceted policy of retrenchment. The first facet was a policy aimed at lowering the risk of 
security by shifting burdens onto allies (i.e., strategic retrenchment).445 Eisenhower 
wanted to conclude American involvement in the Korean war by reaching a negotiated 
settlement with China and North Korea.446 This would facilitate the administration going 
beyond a mere “spasmodic reaction to the stimulus of emergencies” and reorienting its 
diplomatic efforts to address challenges in Europe and Latin America.447 Unfortunately, 
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the United States lacked an ally to assume South Korea’s security burden, and 
Eisenhower faced resistance from European allies to assume more responsibility for their 
security interests.448 Moreover, he was politically unable to abandon American interests 
on the Korean peninsula and Western Europe. Regardless, this facet of President 
Eisenhower’s retrenchment policy succeeded because of his rapprochement with wartime 
rivals. 
 The second facet of Eisenhower’s retrenchment policy was lowering the price of 
security by cutting defense spending (i.e., operational retrenchment). Ending the Korean 
War afforded the opportunity to realize a peace dividend to help restore America’s 
economic solvency. President Eisenhower cut his predecessor’s last defense budget 
proposal from $41.2 billion to $35.8 billion, a more than 13% reduction. In his first 
budget proposal for fiscal year 1955, Eisenhower proposed only $30.9 billion, a 
cumulative 25% reduction of the United States defense budget.449 Eisenhower thought his 
predecessor’s goal of making the United States less reliant on nuclear weapons was too 
expensive. In the age of nuclear weapons, deterrence would only be effective if the 
United States focused on those things most likely to deter the Soviet Union. Accordingly, 
President Eisenhower he cut American ground forces by a third between 1953 and 1955. 
He off-set these cuts by considering the use of nuclear weapons more often and for a 
wider range of security problems than any other president.450 
 Both facets of President Eisenhower’s retrenchment policy were successful at 
reducing the costs associated with providing security. On the one hand, strategic 
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retrenchment from Korea lowered the risks associated with preventing the spread of 
international communism. On the other hand, it facilitated lowing the price of American 
security by allowing Eisenhower to claim a peace dividend and cut military budgets and 
force structure. However, this was not security and solvency; instead, what Eisenhower 
managed to achieve was security with solvency. Perhaps this is the best any leader can 
accomplish. After all, the risks to security are potentially limitless, while the domestic 
resources available for defense are undeniably limited. Normatively, security with 
solvency – the ability to defend national interests with enough power in reserve to 
address emerging threats – is the goal to which great power leaders should aspire. The 
question is how, particularly in circumstances characterized by relative decline. How can 
a great power realign its strategic priorities when overcommitment abroad results in 
diplomatic inflexibility and constrained power projection in the face of increasing foreign 
policy challenges and decreasing domestic resources? 
 In this project I argued that a policy of retrenchment conducted within a larger 
process of strategic reorientation allows leaders to redistribute resources from peripheral 
to core security interests. Strategic reorientation occurs over time as a four-stage life-
cycle with mutually-reinforcing, sequentially-linked stages. Leaders perceive a need for 
retrenchment during periods of misalignment marked by rising international threats, 
especially shifts in relative power, and declining domestic resources resulting from 
economic downturns, dysfunctional politics, or declining public support for existing 
foreign policies. These antecedent conditions eventually lead to a decision point 
regarding retrenchment where leaders consider the strategic circumstances and decide 
how to reduce security costs. Realignment begins once leaders start to implement and 
160 
 
synchronize retrenchment policies. An outcome eventually emerges based on whether 
retrenchment facilitates strategic reorientation. Retrenchment succeeds when it results in 
strategic reorientation and fails otherwise (figure 6). 
 Retrenchment is the core stage of strategic reorientation during which leaders mediate 
between existing security goals and the need to adapt to a changing security environment. 
States retrench during periods of overcommitment and acute relative decline because the 
nature of great power politics incentivizes them to remain strategically solvent.451 
Overcommitted great powers attempt to avoid insolvency by retrenching to regroup and 
slow, if not reverse, their decline by implementing more sustainable foreign policies. This 
is important to the long-term strategic solvency of a great power. The international 
system ultimately punishes states that fail to balance their foreign policy objectives with 
available resources. States that fail to retrench will eventually succumb to aggression as 
rivals exploit inflexible foreign policies and military overextension. Therefore, remaining 
strategically insolvent will result in relative decline becoming absolute. 
 The goal of retrenchment is to realign resources by reducing security-related costs in 
one region to provide additional resources for addressing a neglected security challenge 
in another region. There are two types of retrenchment – strategic and operational – 
differentiated by the types of policies implemented and whether retrenchment lowers the 
price or associated risk of security.452 Strategic retrenchment reduces the risks associated 
with a state’s foreign policy by minimizing extraneous or overly costly commitments and 
makes resources available for improving deterrence and defenses in more important 
                                                 
451 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 88; Robert Jervis, 
“Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167. 
452 Leaders often select policy options from both types of retrenchment, but the overall type is evident in 
the predominant reductions of either price or risk. 
161 
 
areas. Operational retrenchment lowers the price of security and increases the amount of 
available resources. However, regardless of the type, not all retrenchment attempts 
succeed. Therefore, I aimed to identify what explains the variation in retrenchment 
outcomes. 
 Retrenchment arguably has the best potential for improving a great power’s strategic 
solvency relative to the uncertain options of muddling along or launching costly 
preventative wars. I argued that retrenchment fails when a great power is unable to 
extricate itself from existing commitments and is therefore unable to free resources to 
address more critical challenges. In broad terms, a great power might extricate itself in 
one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to a like-minded ally, through 
rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment regardless of the 
consequences. Retrenchment fails when none of these three options are available. 
 Contrary to prevailing wisdom, I argued that retrenchment will generally succeed 
unless there is no ally willing and able to accept responsibility, and a great power fails at 
rapprochement, and the great power is politically unable to abandon an interest. Using 
primary and secondary sources, I conducted in-depth historical analysis using structured, 
focused comparison of two cases of post-World War II retrenchment attempts by the 
United States. The first, a success, explored American retrenchment from Southeast Asia 
between 1969 and 1975. The second, a failure, looked at an attempted retrenchment from 
the Middle East between 2009 and 2015. Below, I discuss my findings and their 
significance to scholarship and policymaking 
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Findings 
 Case 1 (Success): Retrenchment from Southeast Asia, 1969-1975. The Nixon 
administration assumed responsibility for American foreign policy during a period of 
international and domestic change that necessitated developing a new strategic approach. 
American diplomacy and military force had become overcommitted during the American 
conflict in Vietnam where political objectives remained elusive. The level of political and 
diplomatic effort expended in Vietnam resulted in the strategic neglect of other critical 
areas of Cold War competition. In the Middle East, the Soviet Union took advantage of 
American preoccupation with Vietnam to increase the Soviet presence and influence in 
the region. President Nixon believed that ongoing international changes reduced the 
United States’ relative power and had to be addressed.453 
 President Nixon and his security advisor, Henry Kissinger, recognized that ongoing 
American involvement in Vietnam and the nature of the evolving international system 
needed to be addressed to solve their foreign policy dilemma. Changes in the 
international system included the emergence of nascent political and economic 
multipolarity as the strength of the Western European and Japanese economies increased 
their international clout. The Soviet Union’s attainment of strategic parity and emergence 
as a global power was another key development during the United States’ distraction in 
Vietnam. The Nixon administration had to reconcile the conflicting demands emerging 
from political and economic multipolarity and revitalized military bipolarity, though the 
administration focused more on the latter given the inherent risks involved in ongoing 
Cold War competition along the periphery. 
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 President Nixon opted for a policy of retrenchment from Vietnam and Southeast Asia 
to facilitate strategically reorienting towards more important regions of geopolitical 
competition. He managed to retrench successfully by using a policy of gradual and 
orderly withdrawal supported by burden sharing with an ally, South Vietnam, and 
rapprochement with rivals, China and the Soviet Union. Differentiating between the ends 
of foreign policy helped President Nixon develop a consensus regarding American 
engagement with the world. By 1975, despite the changed dynamics of the executive and 
legislative branches that emerged after the withdrawal from Vietnam and the Watergate 
scandal, Congress continued to support engagement abroad even if though forced 
President Ford to abandon American interests in South Vietnam. Overall, President 
Nixon successfully retrenched and reoriented American foreign policy. American 
withdrawal from Southeast Asia neither discouraged key allies nor encouraged adversary 
aggression. Moreover, retrenchment facilitated reorientation towards the Middle East to 
counter increasing Soviet involvement in a region critical to the economic security of the 
United States and its allies. Figure 7 illustrates the pertinent facets of this case. 
 Nixon’s success stemmed from a combination of ally burden sharing, rapprochement 
with geopolitical rivals, and abandoning American interests in Southeast Asia. I argued 
that retrenchment will be more likely to succeed when a state can identify a suitable 
successor to uphold an existing security order. In this case, President Nixon focused on 
Vietnamization to improve South Vietnam’s ability to assume responsibility for its own 
defense and relieve the United States of its security burden. Vietnamization also 
facilitated the United States’ troop drawdown between 1969 and 1973. Nixon committed 
substantial financial and material resources to strengthen South Vietnam’s ability to 
164 
 
defend itself. By the time United States military forces withdrew in 1973, South Vietnam 
had a numerically and qualitatively superior military that gave the South a fighting 
chance. The failure by South Vietnamese leaders to implement meaningful governmental 
reforms and politicization of their senior military leaders resulted in the collapse of South 
Vietnam; however, this was the South’s failure and did not impede American 
retrenchment. 
 I also argued that retrenchment is more likely to succeed the more a state succeeds at 
rapprochement with adversaries. President Nixon believed that competing interests with 
rivals were not immutable and could be realistically managed through negotiation. 
Therefore, he attempted, and ultimately succeeded at, implementing a policy of détente 
with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China. Nixon’s policy of détente with the 
Soviet Union was an instrumentalist strategy for achieving the administration’s goals in 
Vietnam. Similarly, President Nixon intended to complement détente and facilitate 
retrenchment from Southeast Asia through rapprochement with China. By improving 
relations with China, Nixon hoped to produce stable regional conditions to facilitate 
American withdrawal. The American opening to China was intended to elicit diplomatic 
pressure on North Vietnam to negotiate an end to the war. Consequently, rapprochement 
led to triangular diplomacy between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union 
which facilitated American retrenchment. 
 Without an ally to assume more responsibility for burden sharing, and when 
rapprochement fails, I predicted that retrenchment will be more likely to succeed the 
more able a great power is to abandon its security interest in the region of withdrawal. 
During the United States’ retrenchment from South Vietnam, President Nixon committed 
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extensive political, economic, and military resources to improve South Vietnam’s 
security capacity. Given the consequences of failure, South Vietnamese leaders were 
ostensibly willing to provide their own security, and American military aid gave the 
South the material ability to do so. However, South Vietnamese political dysfunction 
hindered military effectiveness and ultimately led to collapse. Faced with the prospect of 
re-intervening to honor its commitments, United States leaders opted instead to abandon 
all interest in South Vietnam, a decision supported by the public and political elites. 
 In this case of successful retrenchment, I also found evidence to support the 
predictions that retrenchment is more likely to succeed the less influence domestic 
political divisions have on accepting the logical implications of regional withdrawal, and 
that retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail . The American public and political 
elites favored withdrawal, and Congress went so far as to limit the president’s war 
powers, cut funding for South Vietnam, and preclude using American military forces in 
in that country. President Ford tried to secure additional military aid for South Vietnam, 
but faced with a political consensus about disengagement he acquiesced and declared that 
the Vietnam War was over shortly before the South finally collapsed. 
 Case 2 (Failure): Retrenchment from the Middle East, 2009-2015. President Barack 
Obama attempted, and ultimately failed, to retrench from the Middle East between 2009 
and 2015. President Obama rose to office on a wave of public discontent with the 
country’s foreign policy and questions about the role of American power and ideas.454 
The security context he faced was arguably more complicated than that of his processors, 
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partly because the consensus regarding the American-led liberal order was shaken 
following the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2008 financial crisis.455 The Obama 
administration faced a tough reality characterized by rising regional powers, America’s 
relative military and economic decline, and power diffusion through a changing 
international order. President Obama believed that his foreign policy task was to redefine 
the United States’ role in the world. He sought to restore weakened relations with allies, 
extricate the United States from Iraq and Afghanistan, and to avoid further entanglements 
in the Middle East. In other words, President Obama aimed to retrench. 
 President Obama intended to improve the United States’ strategic solvency by 
eliminating peripheral commitments in the Middle East and reorienting policy to address 
more critical interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Before entering office, he concluded 
that the ideological struggles in the Middle East were too complex for external powers to 
resolve, particularly through either regime change or large-scale ground operations.456 
However, President Obama failed to hand off responsibility to regional allies like Saudi 
Arabia and failed at rapprochement with Russia and Iran. Subsequent security challenges 
in the Middle East demonstrated that the United States could not afford to limit its role in 
the region. Figure 8 illustrates the pertinent facets of this case. 
 President Obama’s failure stemmed from unsuccessful burden sharing by allies, failed 
rapprochement with rivals, and an inability to abandon American interests in the Middle 
East. I argued that retrenchment is more likely to succeed when a state can identify a 
suitable successor to uphold an existing security order. In this case, President Obama 
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committed substantial material resources to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s ability to maintain 
regional security favorable to American interests. However, instead of doing so, Saudi 
Arabia engaged in a Cold War with Iran which was attempting to expand its influence 
after the American withdrawal. This competition led Saudi Arabia to engage in proxy 
conflicts throughout the Middle East. Whether these conflicts contributed to or resulted 
from Saudi and Iranian intervention, they served to destabilize the region. While Saudi 
Arabia pursed its interests, the results of its efforts undermined the United States 
preference for regional stability. Moreover, events in the region forced President Obama 
to recommit diplomatic energy and military forces to the Middle East at the expense of 
his Asian pivot. 
 I also argued that retrenchment is more likely to fail when a state is unsuccessful at 
rapprochement with a rival. President Obama attempted to engage with Iran, especially 
regarding its nuclear program. However, Iran remained implacable and refused to 
abandon its nuclear program or its attempts to achieve regional hegemony. By early 
2010, the administration shifted its efforts to implementing economic sanctions intended 
to coerce Iran into altering its behavior and engaging in negotiations. The sanctions 
clearly affected Iran’s domestic economy, but they had an ambiguous effect on Iranian 
leaders who continued to pursue their strategic goals in defiance of the United States. By 
2011, President Obama abandoned attempts at rapprochement as Iran remained 
recalcitrant and stoked turmoil during the Arab Spring to advance its interests. The 
turmoil of these conflicts, particularly the Syrian Civil War and subsequent rise of ISIS as 
a regional threat, forced President Obama to reengage in the Middle East. 
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 The last option for retrenchment to succeed is for a great power to abandon its 
security interest in the region of withdrawal. In the end, President Obama was unable to 
abandon the United States’ Middle East interests. The Arab Spring proved to be the 
undoing of the Obama administration’s retrenchment attempt. Though initially refraining 
from intervening in the popular uprisings, President Obama half-heartedly reversed 
course when he supported attacking Libya, first to prevent mass killings then to effect 
regime change. During the initial stages of the Syrian Civil War, the Obama 
administration debated how best to respond, though there was a clear preference for a 
hands-off approach. However, as ISIS arose during the conflict and spread into Iraq, the 
administration finally settled on deploying military forces to directly confront the threat. 
Once again, the United States was militarily engaged in the Middle East and 
retrenchment had failed. 
 I found limited evidence to support the claim that retrenchment is more likely to 
succeed the less influence domestic political divisions have on accepting the logical 
implications of regional withdrawal. The American public favored withdrawal from Iraq, 
political elites did as well, but they were concerned about the way withdraw occurred. 
President Obama declared a deadline for withdrawal from Iraq, and the subsequent 
collapse of talks to extend the Status of Force Agreement to let American forces remain 
after the deadline provided the political cover necessary to complete full withdrawal. 
During the debates over intervention during the Arab Spring, Republicans and Democrats 
both supported it – though for different reasons – so President Obama likely could have 
gained support to intervene had he wanted to do so. 
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 This case provided evidence for my claim that retrenchment is more likely to succeed 
than fail. Retrenchment in this case failed because the United States was unable to find an 
ally for burden sharing, failed to settle disputes with its rivals, and, when Middle East 
turmoil erupted during the Arab Spring, could not abandon its regional interests. If any of 
these three things occurred, President Obama’s retrenchment attempt likely would have 
succeeded. Had Saudi Arabia better protected American interests instead of pursuing its 
own interests, President Obama may have been better able to remain disengaged. 
Similarly, had President Obama’s rapprochement with Iran or Russia succeeded in 
alleviating security concerns much of the great power rivalry that re-emerged in the wake 
of the Arab Spring might have been less contentious. Alternatively, security challenges 
may have been resolved before escalating to a point where President Obama could no 
longer remain disengaged. Lastly, if President Obama could have withstood calls for 
reintervention in the Middle East made by Congress and European allies, he would have 
been able to follow through with his preference to withdraw from the Middle East and 
focus on Asia. However, he was unable to do so, and intervened in the Middle East even 
though the prospects for success were dim. 
Alternatives 
 Both cases provided limited or no support for any of my three identified alternative 
hypotheses regarding retrenchment outcomes. Even when the cases provided limited 
support, it fell well short of the robust evidence supporting my main claims. 
 The first alternative was that retrenchment may be more likely to succeed the more 
closely leaders align the type of cost reductions with the risks associated with the nature 
of relative decline. President Nixon did opt for strategic retrenchment when faced with 
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international relative decline; however, this did not necessarily contribute to the United 
States’ success. His ability to enhance South Vietnam’s capability for providing for its 
own defense and triangular diplomacy made possible because of rapprochement 
facilitated America’s deliberate withdraw. Had either of these factors not manifested, 
retrenchment likely would have failed due to the consequences of a precipitous withdraw 
and rapid collapse of the South at a time when the American public still supported 
honoring their country’s commitment to a free and democratic South Vietnam. While 
President Nixon did correctly link the type of cost reductions with the nature of American 
relative decline, this alone was not enough to bring about success. 
 There is limited support for this alternative in the case of retrenchment from the 
Middle East, though the case offers avenues for additional research along these lines. 
President Obama simultaneously enacted strategic and operational retrenchment when he 
withdrew military forces from the Middle East and subsequently reduced the size of the 
military, particularly the Army, and significantly reduced the defense budget. The Obama 
administration focused on domestic concerns related to the 2008 economic crises, but it 
failed to adjust its policies to ensure it could address the source of America’s 
international relative decline. Reduced force structure and low levels of readiness 
resulting from sequestration meant President Obama lacked the means to simultaneously 
execute his pivot to Asia and respond to Middle East turmoil. As a result, when President 
Obama decided to intervene in Iraq and Syria in 2014, the intervention came at the 
expense of the Asian pivot. This, however, was not the cause of retrenchment failure, but 
a consequence. 
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 A second alternative was that operational retrenchment is less likely to succeed than 
strategic retrenchment. Here too, evidence does not fully bear this out, though it does 
suggest the need for further investigation. President Nixon implemented a mixture of 
operational and strategic retrenchment policies, yet the main thrust of cost savings 
involved reducing the level of foreign commitments – the level of foreign policy risk. He 
also off-set force reductions and reduced warfighting capacity by engaging in active 
diplomacy with America’s rivals. This reassured allies, particularly in the Middle East, 
who up to that point were slowly being pulled into the Soviet orbit. Middle Eastern 
countries quickly abandoned the Soviets when the United States asserted itself 
diplomatically. Had President Nixon opted to solely cut costs through reducing the price 
of security or refrained from substituting diplomacy for force, it seems likely 
retrenchment would have failed. Counterfactually, by withdrawing from South Vietnam, 
abandoning its interests in Southeast Asia, and significantly cutting its forces, American 
rivals might have opted to act more aggressively to take advantage of the apparent United 
States’ retreat, aggression to which America might not have been able to respond with its 
recently reduced force structures. 
 The evidence in President Obama’s retrenchment attempt also did not fully bear out 
this alternative, though it suggests the need for further investigation. By enacting 
operational retrenchment, President Obama limited the means with which to purse the 
military component of his Asia policy and reengage in the Middle East. The United 
States already had enough air and naval assets in the Pacific theater to contain China, 
which remained focused on defending its current position and outstanding claims. 
However, America lacked the capacity to respond to rising Chinese assertiveness. 
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China’s assertiveness was arguably a reaction to take advantage of the United States’ 
circumstances following the 2008 financial crisis and its inability to disengage from the 
Middle East. Moreover, the military and diplomatic components of President Obama’s 
pivot strategy raised fears in China that America was trying to implement a policy of 
containment. Both factors likely contributed to growing Chinese assertiveness to which 
the United States had limited military capability to respond. American intervention after 
the Arab Spring forced President Obama to choose between Asia and the Middle East. 
Having to make this choice suggests that operational retrenchment was a poor decision, 
particularly since the cost savings did little to address domestic economic concerns. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that operational retrenchment is more likely to fail than 
strategic retrenchment has some support in both cases and warrants further investigation 
even though it was not an operative factor in either case. 
 Finally, the third alternative was that slower rates of retrenchment may be more likely 
to succeed than rapid withdrawal or reductions. Here again, the evidence did not fully 
support this hypothesis. Nixon began withdrawing large numbers of troops within eight 
months of assuming the presidency. After making the initial withdrawal announcement, 
he proceeded to make other large reductions over the course of the next three years. 
While the number of servicemembers in South Vietnam rapidly declined, President 
Nixon attempted to calibrate withdraw to on-the-ground conditions and the South’s 
ability to assume more responsibility for their security. In this respect, the size of 
reductions seems less important that the managed pace at which they occurred. While 
providing some support for the idea that the rate of withdrawal may matter, little 
evidence points to it being a vital factor to success. In 1974, after it became clear to the 
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North Vietnamese that the United States would no longer support the South, the North 
planned and initiated an offensive to takeover South Vietnam. Perhaps had Nixon opted 
for rapid and immediate withdraw this might have precipitated a similar response from 
the North; however, the factor determining success would have been the United States’ 
ability to abandon its interests, not how quickly it withdrew its forces. There might have 
been an effect on allies or other rivals, but this case provides little evidence. Therefore, 
there is limited support for the rate of retrenchment influencing outcomes.  
 The evidence from President Obama’s retrenchment also did not fully support this 
hypothesis. However, a counterfactual argument can be made arguing that had President 
Obama kept some level of forces in Iraq the United States may have been better postured 
to combat ISIS. President Obama arguably could have offered to leave more troops in 
Iraq to demonstrate American commitment, or he could have negotiated terms for a new 
Status of Forces agreement that might have appeased domestic Iraqi political dynamics. 
However, his desire to withdraw from Iraq and pivot to Asia weakened his resolve. When 
Iraqi leaders would not concede to legal protections for any remaining American 
servicemembers, President Obama used it as a pretext for full withdrawal. By removing 
all American forces and forfeiting the United States’ ability to influence an Iraqi 
government increasingly coming under the influence of Iran, President Obama left the 
United States at a strategic disadvantage. Counterfactuals in both cases suggest the need 
for further research regarding not only whether the rate of reductions matter, but how 
they might matter. 
 
 
174 
 
Implications for Academic Scholarship 
 My findings have implications for retrenchment scholarship and other tangential 
literatures. They refute assertions made by critics and extend some arguments advanced 
by retrenchment advocates. Critics contend that retrenchment is a rare, high-risk 
endeavor that signals waning power and damages a state’s reputation.457 They also assert 
that retrenchment from even peripheral commitments signals weakness and demonstrates 
a lack of resolve.458 Since retrenchment sacrifices relative power, critics contend that it 
lowers a state’s likelihood of winning if war occurs. Therefore, critics believe that leaders 
adopting this strategy hasten their state’s decline, and retrenchment is rational only when 
using force is not a viable option.459 From this perspective, retrenchment will rarely, if 
ever, succeed since the outcomes are all negative – diminished power, influence, and 
security. 
 Available evidence does not support these claims. First, it appears that retrenchment 
is commonplace. While presenting only two cases of American retrenchment attempts, 
others exist – in the 1920s during the Harding and Coolidge administrations, in 1946 
under President Truman, in 1953 during the Eisenhower administration, and in 1992 
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when President George H. W. Bush retrenched at the end of the Cold War. Plenty of non-
American examples exist as well. The universe of cases for this project included ten non-
American retrenchment attempt since 1870. Extending the search prior to 1870 would 
undoubtably reveal many more examples. Retrenchment is not rare – it is after all the 
most common response to relative decline.460 It does, however, appear to be largely 
confined to great powers who have wide-ranging security commitments. 
 Second, at least in the American cases, it does not appear that retrenchment signaled 
waning power or weakness. In fact, overcommitment in pursuit of a foreign policy goal in 
one region contributed to relative decline and provided opportunities for a rival power to 
advance their interests and sphere of influence in another region. America’s diplomatic 
and military focus on Vietnam created a vacuum in the Middle East which the Soviet 
Union attempted to exploit. President Nixon had to reorient American foreign policy to 
counter the Soviet threat, and that meant retrenching from Southeast Asia. Similarly, 
American overcommitment in the Middle East resulted in its inability to effectively 
counter China’s rising economic and military clout in East Asia. No leader could 
reasonably argue that the United States was weak given its overall economic and military 
dominance. However, by rapidly withdrawing forces and diplomatically deemphasizing 
the Middle East, President Obama did create conditions in which Iran expanded its 
influence. This was not the result of retrenchment, however, but the failure of President 
Obama to achieve rapprochement with Iran and Saudi Arabia’s unwillingness to protect 
American security interests. Therefore, my findings show that it is not retrenchment that 
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signals waning power, but overcommitment, and leaders can effectively correct this 
through retrenchment and strategic reorientation. 
 Third, the belief that leaders attempting retrenchment will hasten their state’s decline 
seems misguided. If overcommitment is the primary international cause of relative 
decline, then continuing overcommitment will only hasten decline. Retrenchment clearly 
has costs, but these costs pale when compared to the costs of prolonging the diplomatic 
and military inflexibility that comes from overcommitment. Retrenchment can facilitate 
reallocating resources to core interests which may signal resolve in more vital regions. 
President Nixon recognized that the American focus on Vietnam was distracting it from 
other pressing challenges like the Soviet Union’s achievement of strategic parity and 
growing influence in the Middle East. Continuing to slog in the quagmire of Vietnam 
would only have drained resources better used for military modernization to outpace the 
Soviets. Moreover, prolonging the United States’ diplomatic fixation on Vietnam would 
only serve to provide time for the Soviets to solidify their diplomatic gains in the Middle 
East. Retrenchment freed the resources necessary for the Nixon Administration to counter 
both challenges. Similar dynamics existed during President Obama’s retrenchment 
attempt; however, his failure to retrench resulted in the continuing inability to effectively 
counter a rising China. Both cases clearly show that retrenching does not hasten a state’s 
decline but failing to retrench does. 
 Finally, my findings support and extend advocates’ claims in recent retrenchment 
scholarship. MacDonald and Parent show that retrenchment is a common occurrence that 
is remarkably successful. My findings confirm this and go further by showing 
retrenchment is more likely to succeed than fail. MacDonald and Parent argue that the 
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rate and magnitude of a state’s decline explains the extent and form of its retrenchment 
choices. States with only limited decline will opt for operational retrenchment strategies 
focused on the price of security, while in severe cases states will select strategic 
retrenchment to minimize risks and burdens.461 One issue with their parsimonious, 
structural model is that it basically presents a unidimensional prediction about whether 
there will be more or less retrenchment. My findings do not dispute this, but they do 
show leaders seem to prefer combining retrenchment types rather than pursuing a single 
policy. That said, my findings extend MacDonald and Parent’s theory by revealing the 
conditions in which retrenchment will succeed or fail, thereby building upon their 
baseline realist theory. 
Policy Implications 
 What lessons does my theory of retrenchment outcomes yield for contemporary 
policymakers? Many observers argue that the United States’ position atop the 
international hierarchy has become tenuous following the long wars Afghanistan and 
Iraq, along with the lingering effects of the 2008 financial crisis. Even though the United 
States spends more on defense than any other nation – it accounts for over 37% of world 
military expenditures and spends more than the combined spending of the next seven 
largest military budgets – its annual budget deficit exceeds $1 trillion. These levels are 
unsustainable and will need to be reduced. The re-emergence of overt great power 
competition in international relations also suggests that the capacity of the United States 
to sustain its current strategic commitments will be contested and constrained. As a 
result, the United States will eventually face the decision to retrench to reduce the price 
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and risk of security to free resources for focusing on protecting core interests. My model 
of retrenchment outcomes offers useful insights to policymakers by providing guidance 
on when retrenchment will most likely succeed. 
 The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the effects of the 2008 financial crisis, ceaseless 
Middle East turmoil, Russian revanchism, and China’s rapid growth have led to the 
realization of America’s relative decline. The United States undoubtably sits atop the 
international hierarchy, but some question whether the current budgetary and geopolitical 
circumstances will change this.462 Given its outsized expenditures on defense, future 
deficit reduction measures will likely come at the expense of military spending. Reducing 
defense budgets will constrain the United States’ capacity to station forces abroad, 
sustain weapons research, development, and procurement, and respond to a wide range of 
contingencies at the level required by its current foreign commitments. Even absent large 
defense spending cuts, the intensifying level of great power competition suggests that the 
United States will eventually be forced to abandon peripheral commitments to free 
resources to confront a resurgent Russia or assertive China. Put simply, the United States 
will likely have to retrench in the future, just as it has to in the past. 
 America’s geographically expansive and longstanding commitments to allies and 
regional stability mean that any retrenchment attempt should not be implemented lightly 
or without consideration of the likelihood of success. America’s military underwrites the 
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security order and stability in many areas around the world, so American withdraw may 
jeopardize regional stability – security and economic. Without a dependable ally or 
rapprochement with a regional rival, the only option left for American leaders is to 
abandon national interests in an area. If they cannot, then retrenchment will fail. 
Attempting to retrench under these conditions will only result in instability and force 
American leaders to intervene later and at higher cost than they would have incurred if 
they opted to remain engaged. 
 Therefore, before attempting retrenchment, American leaders will need to evaluate 
regional commitments according to the three criteria my theory identifies as crucial for 
successful retrenchment. First,  leaders need to assess the availability of willing and able 
allies to assume a security burden. Any ally should be militarily capable and, to a large 
degree, should share America’s threat perceptions in the region. The former criteria may 
be supplemented by negotiating arms sales and military assistance agreements much as 
Nixon and Obama did with South Vietnam and Saudi Arabia, respectively. The latter 
criteria are important, because they suggest the extent to which an ally might pursue its 
own versus American interests. South Vietnam shared the United States’ threat 
perception of North Vietnam and fought until the end. Saudi Arabia, though sharing the 
perception of an Iranian threat, opted instead to pursue its own regional interests at the 
expense of America’s even after receiving sizeable arms and assistance packages. 
 Second, leaders will need to determine the ability to reach a settlement through 
rapprochement with regional rivals or other great powers with regional interests. This is 
particularly important if there is no viable regional ally or an ally who does not share 
America’s threat perception. Achieving rapprochement requires a high degree of 
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diplomatic focus and a willingness to forego previous claims to achieve a peaceful 
settlement on outstanding security issues. Nixon and Kissinger successfully opened 
relations with China and eased tensions with the Soviet Union, both of which facilitated 
American retrenchment from Southeast Asia. President Obama unsuccessfully negotiated 
with Iran. Though eventually reaching a nuclear weapons agreement, Obama was unable 
to convince Iran to refrain from spreading its influence throughout the Middle East 
following American withdrawal. 
 Finally, leaders will have to judge whether the United States is willing and can afford 
to abandon a commitment if all else fails. This will require level-headed consideration of 
the strategic importance of regional commitments. Anywhere America retains a 
commitment has a degree of strategic importance; however, levels of importance are 
unequal, so leaders will need to focus on those most vital to national security. Doing so 
may mean abandoning a previous foreign commitment. President Nixon and President 
Ford retained an interest in maintaining a free and democratic South Vietnam, but in the 
face of congressional opposition and more critical security challenges Ford opted to 
abandon South Vietnam. President Obama preferred to leave the interminable security 
challenges in the Middle East to focus on reengaging in East Asia. As pressure from 
Congress and allies increased in the wake of the Arab Spring and Syrian Civil War, 
Obama was forced, however reluctantly, to reengage in the region at the expense of 
American reorientation to Asia. While America might have withstood the economic and 
security shocks resulting from its continued disengagement, it allies could not which 
forced reintervention. Ultimately, President Obama misjudged the degree to which he 
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could reduce American commitments in the Middle East. So, how will these factors play 
out in future retrenchment attempts? 
The Future of Syrian Withdrawal 
 Given the criteria mentioned above and elaborated upon in this project, it is worth 
considering the prospects of success for President Donald Trump’s recent decision to 
withdraw American military forces from Syria. The reaction from the media and foreign 
policy elites following President Trump’s announcement largely treated the decision as 
reckless and borderline illegitimate, while simultaneously implying that indefinite 
military deployments were the only legitimate option.463 To be clear, I am not examining 
the wisdom of President Trump’s decision, I am only assessing whether the relevant 
conditions exist for a successful outcome. Below I briefly provide a background on the 
Syrian conflict, discuss President Trump’s decision to withdraw all American military 
forces from Syria, and apply the three criteria for retrenchment success – ally availability, 
ability to affect rapprochement with a rival, and ability to abandon an interest – to 
determine whether this attempted retrenchment is more likely to succeed or fail. 
 Syria was ruled by the Assad family for more than forty years, but antigovernment 
protests broke out in Syria in March 2011 during the Arab Spring. As protests spread and 
violence escalated, Syrian government forces began aggressively battling emerging 
political and armed opposition groups. By August 2011, the violent Syrian crackdown 
prompted President Obama to call for Syrian president Bashar al Assad to resign. Assad 
refused, and the rising Syrian civilian death doll and Syrian government’s use of 
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chemical weapons resulted in Congress debating whether to assist Syrian opposition 
groups with lethal and non-lethal aid – they approved the latter. 
 President Obama requested authority and funding from Congress in 2014 to provide 
lethal support. The administration’s initial focus for support was for vetted opposition 
groups who would protect the Syrian people from Assad regime forces. However, the 
subsequent advance of ISIS from Syria across northern and western Iraq shifted the focus 
of support to counterterrorism efforts. Congress finally authorized an American-led train 
and equip mission to combat terror groups in Syria to defend the United States and its 
allies, and to establish the necessary conditions for a negotiated settlement to the Syrian 
conflict. The United States began air strikes in Syria in September 2014. In October 
2014, it established Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, which 
eventually included more than 70 partner countries. The Obama and Trump 
administrations also slowly increased the number of American military personnel in Syria 
from a few dozen to almost 2,000 by late 2017.464 
 The United States and coalition-backed forces in Syria managed to retake almost all 
the territory held by ISIS between 2015 and 2018. However, during this same period, 
Russia, Iran, and the Iranian-backed group Hezbollah all intervened on behalf of Assad’s 
regime during military campaigns against opposition groups. The conflict between the 
opposing coalitions complicated the chaotic situation within Syria and contributed to a 
humanitarian crisis where more than 5.6 million Syrians fled to other countries and 
another 6.3 million became internally displaced. Though American-backed forces 
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contributed to the collapse of ISIS’s territorial control in Syrian, the Assad regime took 
advantage of this to make significant military and territorial gains at the expense of 
opposition groups.465 By February 2018, the conflict decisively shifted in Assad’s favor, 
thereby enabling Russia and Iran to entrench themselves in Syria and expand their 
influence throughout the region.466 
 President Trump called for an accelerated withdrawal of American forces from Syria 
in early 2018. His administration remained divided, however, with some officials arguing 
for a continued American presence to prevent the re-emergence of ISIS.467 The Syrian 
government under Assad had managed to weaken, defeat, or geographically isolate most 
of the American-backed opposition groups, so it faced little pressure to make 
concessions.468 Administration officials declared that the United States was committed to 
defeating ISIS.469 Retired ambassador James Jeffrey, the Secretary of State’s Special 
Representative for Syria Engagement, stated on 6 September 2018 that the Trump 
administration intended to keep military forces in Syria beyond the end of the year to 
ensure the defeat of ISIS.470 However, on 19 December 2018, President Trump asserted 
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ISIS was defeated in Syria, stating “[w]e have defeated ISIS in Syria, my only reason for 
being there during the Trump Presidency.”471 He then abruptly announced the full and 
immediate withdrawal of American forces, a policy the drew immediate criticism from 
Congress, allies, the military, and within his administration.472 
 Regardless of the widespread criticism surrounding President Trump’s troop 
withdrawal from Syria – de facto retrenchment – what is the likelihood it will succeed? I 
argue that retrenchment will fail when a great power is unable to extricate itself from an 
existing commitment and is unable to free resources to address more critical challenges. 
A great power might extricate itself in one of three ways: by handing off responsibility to 
a like-minded ally, through rapprochement with a rival, or by abandoning a commitment 
regardless of the consequences. Retrenchment fails when none of these three options are 
a possibility. Contrary to prevailing wisdom, retrenchment will generally succeed unless 
1) there is no ally willing and able to accept responsibility, and 2) a great power fails at 
rapprochement, and 3) the great power is politically unable to abandon an interest. 
 How do these factors play out in the current case of attempted American withdrawal 
from Syria? First, is there an ally willing and able to accept responsibility for defeating 
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ISIS, creating the conditions for a negotiated settlement between Assad and oppositions 
groups, and countering Russian and Iranian influence in Syria? The answer appears to be 
no. Three potential candidates exist – Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Kurds – but none 
appear willing or capable of filling the vacuum created by the United States’ departure. 
While Turkey supports American withdrawal, it remains less concerned with defeating 
Assad or ISIS than it is with America’s Kurdish ally, the People’s Protection Units 
(YPG). Turkey views the YPG as an ally of the Kurdish Workers Party, a Kurdish 
militant group Turkey views as an enemy and terror group, a view shared by the United 
States. Even before the American withdrawal, Turkey threatened to raid YPG areas. This 
threat not only risked confrontation with the United States, it demonstrated that Turkey is 
more interested in pursuing its own regional interests rather than America’s.473 
 Saudi Arabia was previously discussed, but it mimics Turkey’s behavior in that the 
Saudis remain more concerned with conducting their proxy war against Iran than with 
promoting American interests in Syria. The Kurdish YPG, though arguably the best 
fighters against ISIS will be unable to focus on that threat if Turkey attacks them. 
Moreover, abandonment of their Kurdish allies provided another example American 
abandonment of allies and lack of commitment so the YPG will likely be reluctant to 
pursue anything but their own interests. Lastly, allies outside of the region, like France 
and Britain who both have forces in Syria, sent those troops on the assumption that the 
United States was committed to the fight. President Trump’s abrupt contradiction of his 
administration’s policy and failure to consult with these key allies will likely result in 
their unwillingness to help.474 
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 Absent an ally willing to assume the United States’ security burden in Syria, can the 
Trump administration pursue rapprochement with Russia and Iran? Again, the answer 
appears to be no. Russia began providing support to Assad in 2011 at the beginning of the 
Syrian conflict. Over the course of 2015, Russia built up the number of its military 
personnel in Syria, introduced combat aircraft and other military equipment, then 
launched an active military intervention in September 2015. 
 Russia’s military intervention on behalf of the Assad regime simultaneously 
improved the capacity of the Syrian government forces and complicated operational and 
technical aspects of the United States’ military mission in Syria.475 This represents a 
strategic win for Russia, who backed President Assad and who will likely be unwilling to 
engage in rapprochement with the United States. Russia has a strong interest in 
maintaining its economic and political influence in Syria, which has long been a lucrative 
market for the Russian defense and intelligence sectors.476 The United States has almost 
no incentives it can offer the Russians to induce them to abandon their Syrian interests, 
nor does the United States have much leverage in negotiations over a situation which is 
effectively a de facto victory by the Syrian government. Therefore, rapprochement with 
Russia regarding the Syrian conflict appears highly unlikely. 
 Iran also intervened in Syria at the invitation of President Assad. It began to empower 
pro-Assad militant groups, including Lebanese Hezbollah, and the intervention placed 
Iranian forces within Syria, a circumstance that Israel viewed as directly threatening its 
security. United States officials also viewed the Iranian intervention as a strategic threat 
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to American interests in Syria and the Middle East. Then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson 
stated in 2018 that a goal of American policy in Syria was to reduce Iran’s influence,477 
and other Trump administration officials described Iran’s presence in Syria as a 
potentially greater threat than the continuation of the Assad regime.478 Iran is using soft 
power and exerting its influence throughout Syria to create a land bridge from Iran to 
Lebanon. Iran’s leaders are using strategies like ones they used with Hezbollah in 
Lebanon to embed Iranian influence militarily, politically, economically, and culturally. 
Iran is purchasing real estate, constructing Shiite mosques, and schools, and replacing 
Sunni communities with pro-Assad ones, and even offering jobs to unemployed 
Sunnis.479 
 Given Syria’s strategic importance to Iran’s regional goals, it seems unlikely Iranian 
leaders would be willing to engage in rapprochement with the United States. Moreover, 
President Trump’s unilateral decision to abandon the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action, commonly referred to as the Iran Nuclear Deal, and reimplement sanctions 
against Iran further incentivizes Iranian intransigence. President Trump might attempt to 
divide Russia and Iran by offering to ease sanctions against the latter; however, both have 
an interest in maintaining their influence in Syria and in sticking together in defiance of 
American, European, and Middle Eastern pressure.480 Therefore, as with Russia, 
rapprochement with Iran regarding the Syrian conflict appears highly unlikely. 
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 Finally, absent an ally to assume America’s security burden in Syria, and Russian and 
Iranian unwillingness to engage in rapprochement with the United States, can the Trump 
administration abandon American interests in Syria? Here again, the answer appears to be 
no, though President Trump’s idiosyncratic behavior may make it possible. When 
President Trump announced the full withdrawal of American military forces from Syria, 
he essentially reduced to zero the United States’ ability to influence events. As Russia 
and Iran coordinate to expand their regional interests, this may bring them into contact 
with more vital declared American interests, for instance the uninterrupted flow of oil 
shipments through the Persian Gulf or Israeli security. These challenges would likely 
prompt a response that would reintroduce American forces in the region to protect 
interests and support diplomacy. President Trump’s decision also sparked immediate 
backlash from Congress, even from within his own party,481 so it seems likely that this 
domestic political opposition will influence plans for Syrian withdraw. This already 
appears to be happening as President Trump’s original call for the withdrawal of 
American forces within thirty days was adjusted to allow approximately 1,000 troops to 
remain with no timeline for removal.482 So, it appears unlikely that the United States can 
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abandon its interest in Syria and the Middle East. Therefore, President Trump’s 
retrenchment from Syria is likely to fail. 
Relative Decline, Retrenchment, and Reorientation 
 The narratives of decline and retrenchment are distinct yet interconnected. Leaders 
have three choices when faced with a period of relative decline in which geopolitical 
competition reveals a mismatch be their country’s foreign commitments and resources. 
First, they can muddle along and hope for the best. This, however, is not a strategy, but 
only a policy of inaction. Second, leaders can “rage against the dying of the light” and 
launch an attack against the perceived source of decline. This choice implicitly assumes 
that necessary resources for this course of action will be available and that the outcome 
will be favorable. In fact, neither may be true. Third, leaders can come to grips with 
emerging realities and adjust their policies within a process intended to reverse, or at least 
mitigate, the consequences of decline. This option, retrenchment and strategic 
reorientation, appears to offer the best chance for success, defined as regaining strategic 
solvency by reducing existing commitments to free resources for addressing more critical 
challenges. In evaluating these options, it is important to avoid conflating what is with 
that of what is preferred. 
 Retrenchment is the intentional reduction of costs associated with a state’s foreign 
policy, where costs are the product of security expenses, risks, and burdens.483 It is the 
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core stage of strategic reorientation during which leaders mediate between existing 
security goals and the need to adapt to a changing security environment. Retrenchment 
alleviates the “dilemma of rising demands and insufficient resources” by reducing risks, 
shifting burdens, or economizing expenses to improve a state’s political and strategic 
solvency.484 Regardless of a retrenchment’s form, it allows a state to redistribute 
resources from peripheral to core security interests. This is important to the long-term 
strategic solvency of a great power, without which relative decline may become absolute. 
States that fail to retrench will eventually succumb to aggression as rivals exploit 
inflexible foreign policies and military overextension. 
 Despite retrenchment’s benefits, scholars and policymakers continue to believe in the 
importance of prestige, the need for credibility, and the dangers of appeasement. From 
this perspective, even the mere perception of decline or hint of retrenchment could lead to 
trouble.485 This flawed logic has buttressed policies of geopolitical overstretch and 
resulted in failed geostrategic adjustment.486 Recent arguments for continued American 
engagement abroad rest upon this logic which holds that any decline in American 
engagement will destabilize the international order.487 Within the policymaking arena, the 
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mantra about the indispensability of United States leadership for global peace and 
prosperity short-circuits rational policy considerations. Rather than critically evaluate the 
wisdom of retrenchment, leaders hold that America must maintain all its commitments 
and credibility regardless of the cost.488 
 The United States now faces a dilemma as its leaders struggle to prolong the benefits 
of hegemony. Political and military developments in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East 
threaten important national interests, but the effects of America’s military 
overcommitment and eroding domestic resource base have resulted in strategic 
insolvency. Despite having the largest economy in the world, almost two decades of 
sustained combat operations have left the United States poorly postured and struggling to 
outpace modernizing rivals like China and Russia.489 Elite polarization also diminishes 
the political capacity for purposeful action. The American public supports current defense 
spending levels and an active role in foreign affairs.490 Therefore, the crux of the current 
debate is whether and how leaders can reorient American foreign policy and realign the 
resources necessary for continuing global leadership. 
 Moving forward, American foreign policy must confront two distinct challenges over 
the coming decades. The first challenge is how to develop a new approach to evolving 
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patterns of geopolitical competition that fits within the United States’ intellectual and 
historical context of unfettered growth over the past two centuries. Another challenge 
involves evaluating the wisdom of attempting to sustain American primacy within the 
changing international order. These challenges, distinct but intertwined, exist at different 
levels of analysis and timeframes. The first focuses on the strategic ends and the means 
used to achieve them by successive presidential administrations, while the second 
concerns the trajectory of American power. Each challenge grapples with a different core 
question: the first concerns how American leaders use the country’s power, and the 
second deals with the quantity of available national power.491 
 Despite these differences, the two challenges of American foreign policy are 
interconnected in three ways. First, the United States’ ability to influence the 
international order and shape the strategic environment will decline in proportion to the 
extent that America experiences relative decline. This has implications for what exactly 
the United States will be able to achieve through any strategy that links ends and means. 
Second, the policy decisions of American leaders have consequences for the country’s 
relative power, because these decisions will result in fiscal and strategic solvency or 
insolvency. Wise decisions to adjust the nation’s strategic ends to match its means will 
slow the inevitable long-term trajectory of decline, while poor decisions will have the 
opposite effect. Finally, leaders’ decisions must account for both an assessment of the 
country’s current relative power and an estimate of future levels. Misjudging either will 
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likely result in a mismatch between foreign policy and the strategic environment, which 
can hasten decline.492 
 If American leaders adopt a foreign policy focused on managing the loss of primacy 
and relative decline, then retrenchment offers the means for reducing commitments and 
ambitions. This will allow the United States to realign and reorient its power, so it can 
use its available resources to preserve core security interests. The alternatives involve 
maintaining a profligate foreign policy of securing every interest everywhere or 
escalating conflictual relations with rivals at the risk of not having the necessary 
resources when a moment of crisis arises. Either of these latter options will only hasten 
relative decline, since additional resources will be drained away in strategic rivalry with 
China, military provocation of Iran, involvement in interminable Middle Eastern 
quagmires, and military interventions across northern Africa.493 
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